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Chinese businesses are turning away from the legal protection offered by state-
sponsored institutions and legitimate private agencies and choosing instead the 
extra-legal protection services supplied by organized crime groups and corrupt 
government officials. This thesis develops an empirical analysis of the rise of extra-
legal protection in post-Mao China. It emphasizes two major types of extra-legal 
protectors in contemporary China: corrupt police officers (‘Red Mafia’) and locally-
based criminal groups (‘Black Mafia’). It explores why mafia groups re-emerged after 
China adopted its reform and opening-up policies in the late 1970s. In particular, it 
focuses on essential conditions directly related to the rebirth and subsequent growth 
of the Chinese mafia.  
The aim of this thesis is to test the economic theory of the mafia, to demonstrate the 
strengths and limitations of this theory when it is applied to China, and to establish 
an updated theory through a combination of economic theory and social capital 
theory. Using published materials as well as fieldwork data comprising of 33 
individual interviews and nine focus group discussions with a total of 28 participants 
from two Chinese cities (Qufu and Chongqing), this thesis incorporates the concept 
of guanxi—a Chinese variant of social capital—into the discussion of state weakness 
and the rise of mafias. It demonstrates the corruption-facilitating roles of guanxi, i.e. 
how guanxi distorts China’s legal system by facilitating the buying and selling of 
public offices and promoting the formation of corrupt networks between locally-
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based criminals and government officials. The result, the Red Mafia, is a clear 
indicator of state weakness. The clash between guanxi and the formal legal system 
prevents law enforcement agencies from being able to provide sufficient protection 
for citizens, contributing to the rise of the Black Mafia. The analysis of the negative 
aspects of guanxi provides a new perspective for understanding corruption and 
organized crime in contemporary China. 
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On 18 May 2012, Lai Changxing, a 53-year-old billionaire entrepreneur, was 
sentenced by a court in Xiamen, a port city in south-eastern China, to a life sentence. 
According to Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, his crime was smuggling a 
total of 27.4 billion RMB ($4.3 billion) of goods from December 1995 to 1999 (Xinhua 
2012d). Lai’s company, the Yuanhua group, collaborated with other firms and 
organized crime groups based in Xiamen and Hong Kong to smuggle a wide variety of 
goods including vegetable oil, automobiles and cigarettes, electronics, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and textiles (Jacobs 2012). The smuggling resulted in the evasion of 
an estimated 13.99 billion RMB ($2.21 billion) in taxes, about 15% of the nationwide 
revenues from tariffs in 19981. 
Mr Lai was also found guilty of bribing 64 government officials with cars, cash and 
real estate valued at more than 39 million RMB from 1991 to 1999. Lai’s corrupt 
network of officials, as Shawn Shieh (2005: 75) argues, ‘was drawn from a variety of 
functional areas: party and government leaders; customs; public security; state 
security; tax and banking; enterprise managers; and even the military’. The Xiamen 
smuggling case brought down many high-ranking officials at the national and 
regional levels, for example, Ji Shengde (the head of military intelligence for the 
People's Liberation Army), Li Jizhou (the deputy minister of Public Security), Lan Pu 
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(the deputy mayor of Xiamen), Liu Feng (the deputy party chief of Xiamen), Zhuang 
Rushun (the deputy head of the Fujian provincial Public Security Bureau), and Yang 
Qianxian (the head of Xiamen Customs) (Xinhua 2012b). 
Lai’s smuggling empire was smashed by the authorities in 1999. This resulted in the 
investigation of more than 600 people (government officials, customs officers, 
military personnel and gangsters), and more than 300 of them were punished for 
their involvement in the operation (Watts 2012). But master smuggler Lai evaded 
capture by fleeing to Hong Kong on a tourist visa and then made his way to Canada, 
where he resided in Vancouver. Lai fought a 12-year legal battle against his 
extradition, claiming that he would face torture or death if deported. Lai failed to 
obtain refugee status, and was repatriated to China on 23 July 2011 (Xinhua 2011e).  
The Xiamen smuggling case illustrates the dangerous collusion between organized 
crime, business and politics that occurred in the late 1990s. In July 2001, the details 
of the Xiamen smuggling case were revealed by Focus (焦点访谈 ‘jiaodian fangtan’), 
a renowned Chinese Central Television (CCTV) show in China. Chinese people were 
very surprised to see such an extensive corrupt network revealed between Lai 
Changxing’s Yuanhua Group and all levels of government officials. The Xiamen 
smuggling case ranks as one of the biggest scandals for the Chinese government, 
which prefers to regard sophisticated, well-structured organized crime groups as a 
problem existing only in Western capitalist countries.  
The crackdown on the Xiamen smuggling empire took place in 1999, when I was in 
junior school. The public disclosure of collective corruption within and between 
public and private sectors aroused my interest in the nexus between organized crime 
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and corruption in post-Mao China. Ten years later, when I did my MA in criminology 
and criminal justice, two particularly important books—Gambetta’s The Sicilian 
Mafia (1993) and Varese’s The Russian Mafia (2001)—encouraged me to take 
another important step: embarking on a PhD and pursuing a thesis focusing on the 
Chinese mafia.  
Diego Gambetta establishes a solid theoretical framework, the Sicilian model of 
mafia emergence or the ‘property rights theory of mafia emergence’, by focusing on 
two fundamental aspects: the demand for private protection and the supply of the 
same (the ‘supply-demand for mafia services’ scheme). The key argument suggested 
by Gambetta is that mafias will emerge into quasi-governmental institutions when 
the state fails to provide fair, equitable, and sufficient protection for the 
enforcement of property rights (Gambetta 1993). Federico Varese takes an 
important step in developing this theory when he interprets the emergence of mafia 
groups in post-Soviet Russia (Varese 2001). The successful transplanting of 
Gambetta’s theory from Italy to a post-socialist country may suggest that ‘the 
property rights theory of mafia emergence’ can be used as a single framework 
explaining the origins of the well-established mafias in all transitional countries (or 
areas), including post-Mao China.  
A three-year period of PhD research at King’s College London provided an excellent 
opportunity to examine whether Gambetta and Varese’s economic theory of the 
mafia is suitable to explain the rise of extra-legal protection groups in mainland 
China. The economic theory of the mafia is useful to the understanding of the 
emergence of the mafia, but this does not necessarily imply that this theory is valid 
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in all circumstances. In other words, the application of this theory to mainland China 
requires researchers to take local conditions into consideration.  
The ‘property rights theory of mafia emergence’, centring on the theoretical 
framework of supply and demand for mafia services, oversimplifies the process of 
mafia emergence. As this thesis will argue, corruption, organized crime, and 
economic behaviour in general are embedded in social relations. The emergence of 
the mafia is not only driven by the invisible hand of market mechanisms but also by 
the visible hand of social relations. Drawing on published materials and fieldwork 
data, this thesis establishes a newly revised and updated theory—the ‘socio-
economic theory of mafias’—by combining Gambetta’s and Varese’s economic 
theories and theories of social capital. In other words, it incorporates local 
conditions—the negative effects of guanxi (a Chinese variant of social capital)—into 
the discussion of state weakness and the rise of extra-legal protection.  
1. Extra-legal protection with Chinese characteristics 
This thesis develops an empirical analysis of the rise of extra-legal protection in post-
Mao China. It explores why mafia groups re-emerged after China adopted its reform 
and opening-up policies in the late 1970s. In particular, it focuses on essential 
conditions directly related to the rebirth and subsequent explosion of the Chinese 
mafia. The aim of this thesis is to test the economic theory of the mafia, to 
demonstrate the strengths and limitations of this theory when it is applied to China, 
and to establish an updated theory through a combination of economic theory and 
social capital theory.  
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This thesis suggests two distinct and related theories: the ‘market competition 
theory of mafia emergence’ and the ‘socio-economic theory of mafia emergence’. 
Drawing on a critical review of existing literature, this thesis develops a new 
framework: the ‘supply-market competition-demand for mafia services’, 
emphasizing the importance of market competition in the process of mafia 
emergence. This hypothesis is founded on the assumption suggested by economists 
and political scientists that the state and the market are alternatives to each other. 
When the state fails to supply sufficient protection to its citizens, the market 
becomes the only remedy for state failure. The ‘market competition theory of mafia 
emergence’ sees individual behaviour in purely rational terms, and thus the rise of a 
certain type of protection and enforcement mechanism (either legal or illegal) is 
perceived as a result of market competition.   
Fieldwork data from China, however, unexpectedly provided evidence against this 
hypothesis. Guanxi, a Chinese version of social capital, is the most important 
informal institution which substitutes for and complements the formal legal system. 
The economic behaviour of Chinese people is embedded within the structure of 
social relations (i.e. guanxi networks). To be specific, the term ‘guanxi’ was 
frequently and spontaneously identified by most interviewees as an important 
mechanism employed by individuals to protect their rights, facilitate (corrupt) 
transactions, identify protection suppliers and seekers, and guarantee the quality of 
both legal and illegal services. In this case, the choice of a proper protection and 
enforcement mechanism largely depends on social networks rather than fair market 
competition. The divergence of interview data from the original proposition forced 
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the author to reshape the research design by stressing the role of guanxi in the rise 
of extra-legal protection. The analysis of fieldwork data and a review of guanxi 
literature give rise to the second theory: the ‘socio-economic theory of mafia 
emergence’. This theory focuses on the dark side of guanxi, the way in which it 
subverts legal institutions and facilitates the rise of extra-legal protectors. 
The author’s empirical research in China suggests that Chinese businesses are 
increasingly turning away from the legal protection offered by state-sponsored 
institutions and legitimate private agencies and choosing instead the extra-legal 
protection services supplied by organized crime groups and corrupt government 
officials. Mafia scholars limit their attention to the relationship between state failure 
and the rise of mafias in transitional countries and demonstrate that mafia groups 
function as quasi-governmental institutions providing private protection for people 
in need (Gambetta 1993). This thesis differs from the traditional study of extra-legal 
protection by not only analysing the rise of criminal groups specializing in the 
provision of private protection, but also emphasizing the role of  law enforcement 
agencies and state security in the production and distribution of unlawful 
enforcement and protection services.2  
This thesis emphasizes two major types of extra-legal protectors in contemporary 
China: corrupt police officers (‘Red Mafia’) and locally-based criminal groups (‘Black 
Mafia’). The concept ‘Red Mafia’ refers to corrupt government officials who abuse 
power and supply illegal protection; the main categories of its services include 
                                                          
2
 Federico Varese in The Russian Mafia (2001) offers a thorough discussion about the different types 
of ‘protectors’ that populated the market of protection in post-Soviet Russia (see pp. 55-75; pp. 188-
189). His arguments contribute greatly to the author’s understanding of the rise of extra-legal 
protection in mainland China.  
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safeguarding organized crime groups and protecting illegal entrepreneurs in the 
criminal underworld, supplying insider information and protection for businesses or 
individuals, sheltering subordinates’ corrupt transactions, and preferential 
distribution of public appointments. ‘Red’ is not only the symbolic colour of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), but also the colour of all government officials 
because the CCP monopolizes the three branches of government (legislative, 
executive and judicial). ‘Red Mafia’, therefore, is the proper term to describe 
government officials who obtain illegal benefits through the buying, selling, and 
distribution of private/illegal protection. In order to differentiate the mafia from the 
Red Mafia, this thesis renames the mafia—a particular type of criminal group which 
derives its income mainly from the business of private protection—as ‘Black Mafia’. 
The use of the colour ‘black’ is because Chinese authorities and scholars tend to call 
organized crime groups ‘Black Societies’. It is logical to use the term ‘Black Mafia’ to 
refer to a special type of black societies. 
2. Corruption, guanxi and mafias 
Using published materials and fieldwork data from two Chinese cities (Qufu and 
Chongqing), this thesis incorporates the concept of guanxi into the discussion of 
state weakness and the rise of mafias. It demonstrates the corruption-facilitating 
roles of guanxi, i.e. how guanxi distorts China’s legal system by facilitating the buying 
and selling of public offices and promoting the formation of corrupt guanxi networks 
between locally-based criminals and government officials. The negative influence of 
guanxi on the formal legal system results in the rise of the Red Mafia, a clear 
indicator of state weakness. This thesis also illustrates the mafia-facilitating roles of 
guanxi; the clash between guanxi and the formal legal system prevents law 
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enforcement agencies from being able to provide sufficient protection for citizens, 
contributing to the rise of the Black Mafia (e.g. underground police organizations). 
The negative aspects of guanxi, emphasized by this thesis, provide a new perspective 
for understanding corruption and organized crime in contemporary China. 
Guanxi is a double-edged sword. The term guanxi is applied indiscriminately by 
Chinese people to all forms of horizontal and vertical dyadic ties. Guanxi is described 
by Oi (1991: 131) as ‘a special system of exchange between persons of equal or 
unequal status; it can be clientelistic or nonclientelistic’. Clientelistic exchanges (such 
as between government officials and businessmen) tend to have negative effects, 
whereas nonclientelistic exchanges (such as between friends) tend to be positive.  
An important category of clientelistic guanxi is patron-client relations. These 
relationships are formed when powerful officials control all state resources (Gold et 
al. 2002). Battersby et al. (2011) find that guanxi practices in Chinese business merge 
with ‘patterns of patron-client relationship’ where the principle of reciprocity and 
the essence of mianzi (face) in guanxi exchange violate bureaucratic norms and 
undermine the rule of law. In other words, certain kinds of guanxi are closely 
associated with corrupt behaviours (e.g. favouritism and nepotism) (Luo 2008). 
This thesis will argue that guanxi plays an important role in facilitating corrupt 
transactions (such as bribing government officials) and the buying and selling of 
extra-legal protection services. It would be wrong, however, to automatically equate 
guanxi with corruption. Guanxi can be benign and valuable. For example, drawing on 
the data collected through a multi-stage survey of residents, Zhang (2009: 472) 
18 
 
demonstrates that ‘residents who have strong neighbourhood guanxi are less likely 
to be fearful of crime in contemporary urban China’. 
If cultural differences in network practices are set aside, guanxi in China might be 
equated with personal networking or connections in the West. The role of personal 
connections, however, differs according to whether a country has a strong or a weak 
institutional environment. The negative influence of personal connections in a 
transparent country (e.g. the UK and Germany) is limited by progressive social laws 
and openness of government, while personal connections in an opaque country (e.g. 
China) are seen as corrupting the public administration. Openness and transparency 
strengthens people’s trust in government and protects the decision-making 
mechanism from the demands of personal connections. The opaque nature of the 
Chinese government, however, makes it difficult to see how public policy is 
developed and how the civil service operates, creating favourable conditions for 
people to employ personal connections (i.e. guanxi) rather than formal rules to get 
things done. This negative aspect of guanxi in the context of China's weak 
institutional environment emphasises the importance of incorporating an analysis of 
these negative aspects into the examination of corruption and the rise of extra-legal 
protection. 
The author’s data collection in two Chinese cities (Chongqing and Qufu) was 
conducted from December 2011 to early March 2012. It involved a total of 33 in-
depth semi-structured interviews with journalists, academics, police officers, 
prosecutors, judges, local government officials, entrepreneurs, private (illegal) 
bankers, and lawyers; nine focus group discussions with a total of 28 participants; an 
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extensive review of published materials; and a number of email communications 
with law professors. The Chongqing crime crackdown, the most influential anti-crime 
campaign in the last decade, provides valuable materials to illustrate the corruption-
facilitating roles of guanxi. Wen Qiang’s corrupt network within the Chongqing Public 
Security Bureau offers a vivid example of how the Red Mafia safeguards corrupt 
police officers and enables criminal groups to dominate the Chongqing criminal 
underworld. Fieldwork data from Qufu demonstrates how private individuals and 
entrepreneurs employ law enforcement, guanxi and mafia services to get things 
done. It stresses the importance of guanxi in facilitating transactions of extra-legal 
protection services. In particular, when individuals and entrepreneurs choose to 
purchase illegal services, they need take account of the reputation of illegal 
enforcers in the guanxi network. Additionally, in order to obtain high-quality mafia 
services, purchasers must spend time, energy and money in developing and 
maintaining a close guanxi with unlawful enforcers. 
This research contributes to three literatures. First, previous research examines the 
relationships between state failure and mafia emergence. Publications relating to 
the Sicilian Mafia (Bandiera 2003; Gambetta 1993), the Russian Mafia (Varese 2001), 
Hong Kong triads (Chu 2000), the Japanese Yakuza (Hill 2003; Milhaupt and West 
2000a), extra-legal protection in Bulgaria (Tzvetkova 2008), mafia movements 
(Campana 2011a; Varese 2006, 2011a), prison gangs (Skarbek 2010, 2011, 2012), and 
youth gangs (Russell S Sobel and Osoba 2009) set up a theory named by Federico 
Varese as ‘the property right theory of mafia emergence’ (Varese 2011a). Mafias act 
as quasi-governmental institutions when the state fails to provide fair, equitable, and 
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sufficient protection for the right-holders in the procedures concerning the 
enforcement of property rights (Wang 2011). The existing research on mafia 
emergence has generally been limited to examining the substitutive relationship 
between the state and the mafia. This thesis contributes to existing research by 
exploring the relationship between the three independent systems of order in the 
Chinese context: the legal system, guanxi and the mafia. In other words, it 
incorporates the concept of guanxi in the discussions of state weakness and the rise 
of mafias. 
Second, alongside the growing interest in China’s economic and social 
transformation, the conception of guanxi has become a popular academic topic over 
recent decades (Gold et al. 2002b). Past research mainly focuses on two aspects of 
guanxi: the cultural and the institutional dimensions (Chang 2011). Cultural scholars 
view guanxi as a specific type of relationship or a unique strategic behaviour deeply 
rooted in Chinese culture (Dunning and Kim 2007; Park and Luo 2001; Yan 1996a). 
Institutional theorists define guanxi as a Chinese idiom of social capital and network 
(Adler and Kwon 2002; Park and Luo 2001; Xin and Pearce 1996). This thesis is based 
on institutional theories of guanxi. The relationship between guanxi and the legal 
system has been commonly described as substitutive or complementary (Peng 2003; 
Potter 2002; Xin and Pearce 1996), but the negative side of personal guanxi needs 
further examination. This thesis provides an opportunity to examine how guanxi 
distorts and subverts the Chinese legal system; it also explores the new feature of 
guanxi that functions as extra-legal governance protecting corrupt transactions 
between government officials and locally-based criminals in contemporary China.  
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Third, past research examines multi-dimensional nature of Chinese organized crime 
in China and beyond. Three aspects have been emphasized. From the global 
perspective, human smuggling (Bolz 1995; Zhang and Chin 2002), illegal cigarette 
trade (von Lampe et al. 2012) and drug trafficking (K. Chin and Zhang 2007) have 
been thoroughly explored, and counterfeiting (UNODC 2013), sex trafficking (Chin 
and Finckenauer 2012) and loan sharking (Soudijn and Zhang 2012) have gained 
increased attention. From the regional perspective, cross-border crime between 
mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan (Lo 2009; Vagg 1992) and the 
mainlandisation of Hong Kong- and Taiwan-based criminal groups (Lo 2010; T Wing 
Lo and Kwok 2012; Wang 2012a) have been deeply examined in recent years. From 
the national perspective, past research focuses on various aspects of Chinese 
organized crime, such as drug trafficking and distribution (Huang et al. 2012), 
prostitution (Liu 2012a), robbery (Xu 2009b), stolen children (Shen et al. 2012), 
cigarette counterfeiting (Shen et al. 2010), and the relationship between politics and 
organized crime (Broadhurst 2013; Chin and Godson 2006). Criminal protection or 
quasi law enforcement, however, has received surprisingly little attention in 
discussions of organized crime in China. The author’s research complements the 
existing research by examining the involvement of criminal groups in the private 
protection business.  
3. Map of the Thesis 
The following chapters address the key issues of corruption, guanxi and extra-legal 
protection in contemporary China. Chapter II consists of two sections. Section one 
provides a thorough discussion of definition issues regarding the terms ‘organized 
crime’ and ‘mafia’. It firstly focuses on how the Chinese government defines 
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organized crime by using the terms ‘dark forces’, ‘mafia-style organizations’, and 
‘black societies’. It then illustrates the way in which international scholars define and 
distinguish organized crime and the mafia. The review of existing literature on the 
definitions suggests an obvious contradiction between international scholars’ and 
Chinese authorities’ understanding of the mafia. In order to avoid confusion, the 
author considered proposing a new term: ‘extra-legal protection group’. This 
equated with the term ‘mafia group’ as used by Gambetta and Varese: a particular 
type of criminal group that derives its main source of income from the criminal 
protection business. It soon became apparent, however, that the term ‘extra-legal 
protection group’ is much broader, encompassing not only the mafia but also 
entrepreneurial bureaucrats and corrupt security and police officers. The author 
therefore suggests distinguishing between two types of extra-legal protectors: (1) 
the ‘Black Mafia’, referring to a special type of criminal group which derives its main 
source of income from private protection; (2) the ‘Red Mafia’, referring to corrupt 
government officials who sell extra-legal protection by abusing their power and 
office.  
Section two provides the history of organized crime in China from the Qing Dynasty 
until now. It examines why this problem is important and situates it historically. The 
development of organized crime during China’s economic reforms is closely 
associated with corruption within the political establishment. The nexus between 
organized crime groups and government officials, especially law enforcers, enables 
criminals to control illicit businesses such as gambling, prostitution, and drug dealing. 
An overview of the literature on Chinese organized crime demonstrates that both 
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international scholars and Chinese criminologists neglect an important aspect of 
organized crime in contemporary China, which is extra-legal protection. 
Chapter III examines Gambetta and Varese’s economic theory of mafia emergence 
and suggests the ‘market competition theory of mafia emergence’ by building on the 
framework ‘supply—market competition—demand for mafia services’. The 
economic theory of the mafia centres on a ‘supply—demand for mafia services’ 
scheme, which suggests that the emergence of mafias is directly linked to a weak 
state where the legal framework is confusing, the definition of property rights 
ambiguous, the judicial system weak, enforcement limited, and corruption rampant. 
The private ordering literature suggests various combinations of enforcement 
mechanisms: state-illegal (state police and units of security forces acting as private 
entrepreneurs), private-legal (private security companies) and private-illegal (mafias). 
It demonstrates that these mechanisms can operate more efficiently than the 
overloaded and procedure-laden public courts (state-sponsored institutions).  
The review of the literature on both mafia emergence and private ordering 
illustrates that the study of extra-legal protection in China should incorporate two 
distinct but related phenomena: mafia groups and state-illegal enforcers. Building on 
the two theoretical frameworks, a modified framework suggests that the inability of 
the state to supply protection for its citizens and settle disputes in commercial 
transactions may not inevitably result in the rise of extra-legal protectors. The new 
framework argues that extra-legal protectors—mafia groups and/or state-illegal 
enforcers—will arise where state-sponsored protection enforcement is weak or 
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absent, costly and/or biased, and where private legal enforcement can make up the 
‘protection deficit’ caused by a failed state are less preferable than the mafia. 
Chapter IV discusses the use of the case study as an appropriate research 
methodology, explains the choice of research sites, shows how the author dealt with 
the methodological problems that were encountered in the fieldwork, and illustrates 
the process of data analysis. During the author’s fieldwork in China, guanxi was 
spontaneously mentioned by interviewees as an important informal institution that 
is frequently used to facilitate transactions and protect private rights. Moreover, 
guanxi was described as an effective mechanism for protecting corrupt transactions. 
In contrast with the new theory discussed in chapter III which argues that the buying 
and selling of protection and enforcement services occurs in a competitive market 
and protection-seekers make rational choices, interview data suggests that 
economic behaviour (e.g. the choice of preferred protection mechanism) is closely 
embedded in networks of interpersonal relationships. This encourages the author to 
rewrite the proposition by applying guanxi theories to the discussion of state 
weakness and the rise of extra-legal protection, and suggest instead a ‘socio-
economic theory of mafia emergence’.  
Chinese society is characterized by the long-term coexistence of guanxi and the legal 
system. The Chinese guanxi network arose centuries ago to protect property rights, 
secure trade relations and regulate transactions. The economic reform in post-Mao 
China has been mirrored by the emerging law system, giving rise to the court-centric 
approach. The juxtaposition of these two systems, however, does not necessarily 
result in a positive outcome. Chapter V discusses the coexistence of these two 
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systems, and emphasizes the negative influence of guanxi on China’s formal legal 
system. Most China scholars stress the positive side of guanxi by discussing the 
relationship between the guanxi network and the legal system (Luo 2000; Peng 2003; 
Xin and Pearce 1996). Guanxi has been defined as the most important informal 
institution in China, achieving what formal institutions are designed, but fail, to 
achieve (Xin and Pearce 1996). In the face of weak market structures, ill-defined 
property rights, institutional uncertainty, and incomplete institutional foundations, 
guanxi substitutes for formal institutional support (Nee 2000). This was especially 
true in the 1980s and 1990s, but still holds true today. Since China gradually 
strengthened its legal framework and its socialist market dramatically expanded in 
the late 1990s, guanxi has gradually been transformed from a substitutive to a 
complementary informal institution (Potter 2002; Zhang and Keh 2009).  
The arguments on the substitutive and complementary relationships between two 
systems of order illustrate the changing significance of guanxi in China’s transitional 
economy. However, the existing literature neglects the negative influence of guanxi 
practice on China’s legal system. Guanxi, as an informal institution, starts off by 
substituting and complementing formal rules, but it eventually subverts formal 
institutions. A theory of institutional interaction suggests that informal institutions, 
in some circumstances, undermine and contravene the newly-formed or existing 
formal institutions (Grzymala-Busse 2010). The negative impact of the guanxi 
network on formal institutions is derived from the increasing intertwinement 
between guanxi and corruption (Luo 2008).  
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Focusing on the Chongqing crime crackdown, Chapter VI illustrates how guanxi 
distorts China’s legal system by facilitating the rise of illegal job markets (the buying 
and selling of public appointments) and building the corrupt network between 
locally-based criminals and government officials. The analysis of the Wen Qiang case, 
one of the most famous and widely-publicized cases in Chongqing’s latest crime 
crackdown campaign, suggests that the rise of the Red Mafia is a key feature of state 
weakness. Moreover, this chapter develops a typology of organized crime, explores 
how gangsters developed guanxi networks with public officials, suggests why 
organized crime groups chose the Red Mafia as their preferred protection and 
enforcement mechanism, and examines patterns of services the Red Mafia provided.  
Chapter VII focuses on how criminal groups and the urban underclass take 
advantage of China’s modernization by engaging in the provision of private 
protection. As chapter VI demonstrated, the Red Mafia is the major supplier of extra-
legal protection, but this does not mean no other types of extra-legal protectors (e.g. 
Black Mafia) exist in the market. The increasing demand for criminal protection 
cannot be fully fulfilled by the Red Mafia. To be specific, corrupt transactions either 
within the political sectors or between government officials and criminal groups 
coordinate via guanxi networks and take place in secret. Locally-based criminals, 
legal/illegal entrepreneurs and corrupt government officials are major beneficiaries 
of Red Mafia protection, while private individuals and legitimate entrepreneurs who 
do not possess guanxi resources with government officials tend to employ other 
means (e.g. street gangs). Moreover, the Red Mafia does not always offer the best 
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path to dispute resolution. For example, the Black Mafia possesses comparative 
advantage in dealing with disputes (e.g. debt dispute) between private parties. 
This chapter describes the scale and seriousness of extra-legal protection activities, 
and explores the relationship between law, guanxi and the use of extra-legal 
protection by analysing two phenomena, underground police organizations (‘地下出
警队’) and the provision of hospital security by unlawful protectors (‘医院内保’). It 
suggests that it is guanxi that facilitates the buying and selling of extra-legal 
protection or quasi law enforcement services by reducing illegal transaction costs, 
guaranteeing quality of services, and punishing violators. 
The concluding chapter reviews Gambetta and Varese’s theoretical framework on 
mafia emergence in the light of the original empirical data. It points out the 
limitations of the Sicilian model in interpreting the rise of Chinese-style criminal 
protection groups and develops a Chinese model of mafia emergence (‘socio-
economic theory of the mafia’) by incorporating local conditions (guanxi practice). 
Guanxi in contemporary China is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, guanxi 
provides a complement to the formal institutional framework. On the other hand, 
guanxi practice conflicts violently with the rule of law and fair competition, damaging 
China’s legal system. When the establishment of a socialist market economy with 
Chinese characteristics is not accompanied by an efficient legal framework 
protecting law enforcers and government officials from the demands of guanxi 
networks, the negative effects of guanxi become more obvious. As a result, 
corruption, bribery and organized crime are closely associated with the practice of 
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guanxi, a situation which threatens the authority of the Chinese government and the 








With the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Mao Zedong 
succeeded in destroying the influence of ancient Chinese secret societies (A. Chen 
2005).3 A good example of Mao’s success is the demise of the Shanghai Green Gang, 
which had until then monopolised the gambling and prostitution industries in 
Shanghai. The gang also played an essential role in the global distribution of opium 
from the Golden Triangle, one of Asia’s two main opium-producing areas, 
overlapping Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Thailand (Broadhurst 2011).  Numerous 
campaigns (such as ‘banning opium’, ‘prohibiting gambling’, ‘closing down 
prostitution houses’, ‘cracking down on religious cults and superstitious sects’) 
adopted by the Chinese Communist Party resulted in a surprising achievement: 80 
million members of secret societies, over two million bandits and a huge number of 
members from 300 religious cults were ‘re-educated’ and re-introduced into society 
(Chen 2005; Lieberthal 1973). One of the results of this was the eradication of the 
criminal underworld in mainland China. Nonetheless, secret societies, especially the 
triads, still remained in the colonial remnants of Hong Kong and Macau, in Chiang 
Kai-shek’s Taiwan, and in Chinatowns in America, Europe and southeast China 
(Glenny 2008). 
                                                          
3
 All the evidence, especially government documents, demonstrates that organized crime disappeared 
during Mao’s period, but there is a lack of research examining what happened to the residuum of 
secret societies and whether they really disappeared completely. It is, however, certain that after a 
series of campaigns against secret societies in the early 1950s, organized crime was not a concern for 
the Chinese Communist Party until Mao’s death in 1976.  
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In 1978 the Chinese government, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, made a 
dramatic break with ‘the Maoist variant of the classical Stalinist model which 
previously existed in China’ (Ellman 1986: 423), and began implementing economic 
reform and market liberalization in place of a centrally-planned economy (Zheng 
2005). As Deng and Cordilia (1999: 213) show, ‘these changes are so fundamental, 
complex, and far reaching that the basic character of China has been and continues 
to be profoundly and irrevocably altered’.  
Over 30 years on ‘the road to free economy’, China has become the world’s second 
largest economy. Private property rights have been gradually and selectively 
established in China through a list of economic reforms: the partial privatisation of 
farms, large-scale decollectivization of state-owned enterprises, and the mass 
privatisation of collectively owned township and village enterprises (Wang 2011).  
China’s economy witnessed continuous rapid growth during and after the global 
financial crisis of 2008, and that growth has dramatically driven the recovery of the 
international economy. However, this growth does not mean that China’s economic 
transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented economy is 
perfect. Organized crime has risen from near-extinction and continues to broaden its 
presence domestically and internationally since China adopted its reform and 
opening-up policies.  
With the growing global importance of China, Chinese organized crime has become 
an increasing non-military threat to national, regional and international security. 
International scholars focus on the three dimensions of Chinese organized crime: the 
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resurgence of the criminal underworld in mainland China; cross-border crime in 
Greater China; and Chinese organized crime overseas.  
Firstly, the re-emergence of organized crime has been closely associated with the 
increasing marginalisation of rural migrant workers and laid-off workers (Lo and 
Jiang 2006). Under such unfavourable circumstances, resource-deprived people 
often resort to the criminal underworld, seeking opportunities in black markets for 
illicit goods (Xia 2009). As leading Chinese criminologist He Bingsong illustrates, 
organized crime in post-Mao China has ‘developed from nothing to something, from 
small to big, from isolated to well-organized, from domestic to international during 
the past 30 years’ (He 2009a: 161; Xia 2006).  
Secondly, cross-border crime has become a new threat for Greater China (Lo 2009). 
Before Hong Kong reverted from British to Chinese rule on 1 July 1997, a popular 
view held by both academics and practitioners was that, after the transition, major 
triad societies would leave Hong Kong for Western countries where they would 
rapidly expand their influence, making them the most powerful criminal 
organizations in the new century (Lo and Kwok 2012). Unexpectedly, however, the 
triads expanded instead into mainland China (Broadhurst 2011; Chu 2005; Wang 
2012a). Criminal groups from Hong Kong and Taiwan adopted three strategies to 
exploit mainland China: (1) forming cooperative relationships with local gangs on the 
mainland; (2) establishing subsidiaries in major Chinese cities; (3) investing in 
legitimate businesses, most of which serve as fronts for their illegal activities (Qiu 
2011; Wang 2013a).  
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Thirdly, despite the fact that Hong Kong triads lost their international significance 
because their entrenched culture and patterns of organization were incompatible 
with modern transnational criminal activities, a generation of non-triad organised 
criminals ‘has emerged as an active, if not dominant, force in illegal transnational 
enterprises’ (Zhang and Chin 2003: 469). The gradual formation of large international 
Chinese communities abroad has been accompanied by an attendant growth in 
Chinese organized crime—a link that was more broadly acknowledged by a 2002 
report on Chinese organized crime by the US Library of Congress, which 
demonstrated that the transnational activities of Chinese crime groups constitute a 
serious threat to societies with significant Chinese migrant communities (Curtis et al. 
2002).  
Take Chinese organized crime in the UK for example: mainland Chinese gangs are 
now an emerging power in the Chinese communities within Britain (Muir 2004). The 
development of mainland Chinese gangs, and of the Fujianese gangs in particular, 
into separate criminal syndicates poses a serious threat to those triad societies (14K, 
Wo Shing Wo, Wo On Lok and Sun Yee On) already established in the UK. Over the 
past decade, London’s Chinatown has witnessed the decline of triad influence. This 
has largely been the result of a successful policing strategy, underpinned by the 
confidence of the Hong Kong community in reporting all kinds of criminal offences to 
the police. The growth of the mainland Chinese gangs has been facilitated by the lack 




The national, regional and international threats posed by ethnic Chinese crime 
groups to both China and those countries hosting Chinese nationals demonstrate 
that the study of Chinese organized crime is both necessary and timely. Rather than 
focusing on the three dimensions of Chinese organized crime (Wang 2013a), this 
chapter focuses its attention on two main aspects: definitions and the history of 
Chinese organized crime. To be specific, it explains how the Chinese government and 
western criminologists define organized crime and outlines the historical evolution 
of Chinese organized crime. Particular attention is paid to Chinese secret societies 
during the Qing Dynasty, the Shanghai Green Gang in the Republic of China (1912-
1949) and the resurgence of organized crime in contemporary China. The history of 
Chinese organized crime reflects the enormous political and economic changes 
experienced by China over the same period. 
1. Definitions 
‘Organized crime’ as a concept has been frequently used, but ‘defining the concept 
of organized crime has long been a source of controversy and contention’ (Adamoli 
et al. 1998: 4; Levi 1998). The common misconception is either equating organized 
crime with the mafia, or regarding them as completely different things. Scholars 
from China have a very different understanding to scholars from foreign countries of 
what organized crime is and how organized crime is in fact ‘organized’. Despite the 
lack of a universally accepted definition of organized crime, the comparative analysis 
of organized crime has produced definitions from two perspectives—China and 
western countries. These provide an opportunity to gain insights into the structure 
and activities of organized crime groups.   
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1.1. The legal definition of ‘black society’ in China 
This section firstly focuses on a critical review of definitions of organized crime and 
the mafia in contemporary mainland China. In China’s Criminal Law and its legislative 
or judicial interpretations, there is no explanation which directly interprets the 
meanings of ‘organized crime’ or ‘mafia’. According to official documents and 
Chinese government legislation, the term ‘heishehui’, which is usually translated as 
‘black society’ or ‘dark society’, is an ambiguous and versatile word used to mean 
organized crime group, secret society4, or the criminal underworld in general (Chen 
2005; Chin and Godson 2006; Wang 2011; Xia 2006; Zhang 2001b).  
Regarding the characteristics of ‘heishehui xingzhi zuzhi’ (literally: black society-style 
organization, or organization with a gangland nature, or organization with an 
underworld nature)5, Article 294 of The Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (passed in 1979 and revised in 1997) states that: 
                                                          
4 The term ‘secret society’ (literally ‘mimi huidang’) is also an ambiguous concept in China. It refers to 
‘underground political organizations that aim to overthrow the government’, and also to ‘religious 
societies that are dedicated to advocating and spreading the creeds’ (Chen 2005: 77). In traditional 
China, ‘all criminal organizations in Chinese society have been brought under the umbrella of the 
“secret society”. To separate them conceptually from the secret societies of a more political or 
religious nature, they are often referred to as “black gangs” (hei bang) or “black societies” (hei shehui) 
in the Chinese discourse’ (Chen 2005: 78). 
5
 Scholars and Chinese authorities translate the term ‘heishehui xingzhi zuzhi’ into ‘a criminal 
syndicate’ or ‘organization in the nature of criminal syndicate’. This is an indirect translation that 
attempts to grasp the real meanings of this term in China’s Criminal Law. But I prefer to translate 
‘heishehui xingzhi zuzhi’ directly as ‘black society-style organization’ or ‘organization with a gangland 
nature’ or ‘organization with an underworld nature’ in order to suggest it has been ambiguously 
defined in a broad way, because the term ‘heishehui xingzhi zuzhi’ has been used by Chinese 
authorities and researchers to interpret many concepts, like ‘organized crime group’, ‘secret society’, 
and ‘the criminal underworld’. 
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Whoever organizes, leads, or actively participates in an organization with 
characteristics of a criminal syndicate, which carries out lawless and criminal 
activities in an organized manner through violence, threat, or other means, with 
the aim of playing the tyrant in a locality, committing all sorts of crimes, bullying 
and harming the masses, and doing what has seriously undermined the 
economic and social order.6 
A judicial interpretation7 issued by China’s Supreme Court in 2000 suggested that 
organizational structure, organizational behaviour, economic strength, protection 
from government officials, and organizational harm were regarded as five key 
features when judges attempted to identify a criminal group as a Black Society-style 
organization.8 In 2002, a legislative interpretation9 attempted to revise the Supreme 
                                                          
6
 The translation of Article 294 was provided by Professor Ming Xia in his paper published in 2008: 
‘Organizational formations of organized crime in China: perspectives from the state, markets, and 
networks’, Journal of Contemporary China, 17 (54): 1-23, page 2.  
7
 Judicial interpretation (also called judicial explanation) issued by the Supreme People’s Court is an 
important part of mainland China’s law system. It is normally used to regulate and standardise trial 
procedures. For more information, please see: C. Shibing, 'The Status of Decisions and Judicial 
Interpretations of Supreme People's Court', China Legal Science, 3 (2006), 1-14. 
8
 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Heishehui Xingzhi Zuzhi Fanzui De Anjian Juti Yingyong Falu 
Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi [Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation on Several Questions Concerning 
the Concrete Application of Laws in Adjudicating Criminal Syndicate Cases]. This judicial interpretation 
issued by China’s Supreme Court has elaborated on the defining characteristics of a black society-type 
organization, which are listed as follows: ‘(a) they have a more or less fixed structure, with a large 
number of members and clearly identifiable leaders. Their core members are stable and comply with 
rigid disciplinary rules; (b) they make financial profits through engagement in illegal activities or other 
means that allow them to obtain a position of economic power; (c) they tempt or force government 
officials to take part in their activities through bribery, threats or other means, or make officials 
provide protection for them; (d) they commit illegal or criminal acts, in some areas or sectors, through 
violence, threats, disturbance or other means, such as extortion, racketeering (monopolizing markets 
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Court’s 2000 judicial interpretation. It emphasised that organizational structure, 
organizational behaviour, economic strength and organizational harm were typical 
features of a black society-type organization, but regarded ‘protective umbrella’ as 
an optional feature of black society-style organization10.  
The 2011 revision of Article 294 defines the key characteristics of ‘organization with 
a gangland nature’ as follows: 
‘(1) A relatively stable criminal organization is formed with a relatively large 
number of members, and there are specific organizers or leaders and basically 
fixed core members. (2) Economic interests are gained by organized illegal or 
criminal activities or other means, and it has certain financial strength to 
support its activities. (3) By violence, threat or other means, it commits 
                                                                                                                                                                      
through violence), creating disturbances or intentionally injuring people, thus seriously disrupting 
economic order and people’s daily activities’ (Zhang 2001: 55). 
9
 The full title of it is ‘Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress 
Regarding the First Paragraph of Article 294 of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China’. 
10
 Guanyu ‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa’ Di 294 Tiao Diyikuan De Jieshi [Interpretation by the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Regarding the First Paragraph of Article 294 of 
the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China]. The interpretation regarding the characteristics of 
‘Black Society-style organization’ are listed as follows: ‘(a) the criminal organization is relatively stable, 
with a relatively large number of members, definite organizers or leaders, and basically fixed 
backbone members; (b) it gains economic interests through organized illegal acts, criminal acts or 
other means, with a certain amount of economic strength to support its activities; (c) it has 
committed organized illegal and criminal acts on many occasions through violence, threat or other 
means, perpetrating outrages, riding roughshod over or cruelly injuring or killing people; (d) through 
committing illegal and criminal acts, or taking advantage of protection and connivance by State 
functionaries, it plays the bully over an area, exercising illegal control and wielding enormous illegal 
influence over a certain area or trade, thus seriously disrupting the economic order and people's daily 
activities’. The translated version is from the Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing 




organized illegal or criminal activities many times to do evil, bully and cruelly 
injure or kill people. (4) It dominates a certain area by committing illegal or 
criminal activities or taking advantage of the harboring or connivance by the 
state functionaries, forming an illegal control or significant influence in a certain 
area or sector, which seriously disrupts the economic and social order.’ 
(Broadhurst 2013: 104) 
According to the characteristics of ‘heishehui xingzhi zuzhi’ (‘organization with a 
gangland nature’) defined in China’s Criminal Law and its interpretations, the 
Chinese government has launched a series of crime crackdown campaigns aiming at 
‘striking against organized crime and eradicating the dark forces’ (dahei chu’e). These 
campaigns suggest that Chinese authorities regard a hierarchical structure as the 
fundamental defining feature of organised criminal groups in practice. However, 
scholarly researchers, especially those from Western countries, regard this as an 
obsolete way of thinking because the Chinese government ‘looks only for tightly knit 
organizations with a pyramid-like structure’ (Xia 2008: 2).  
In addition, Chinese authorities and scholarly researchers have faced abundant 
conceptual confusions as they do not have clear distinctions among many terms. 
Terms like ‘criminal group’, ‘mafia-style syndicates’, ‘dark force’, ‘organization with 
mafia characteristics’, ‘organization with an underworld nature’, ‘black society-style 
organization’, and ‘underworld society’, are vaguely defined and are often used 
interchangeably (Xia 2008). Typical examples are discussed as follows: 
“According to Chinese authorities, the most powerful and best-organized 
criminal organizations in China have not yet reached the status of underworld 
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organizations like the Italian Mafia, the Japanese Yakuza, or the Hung Kong Triad. 
As a result, Chinese authorities described the most advanced criminal 
organizations in China as ‘organizations with underworld nature’ (or 
characteristics), to differentiate them from other loosely knit and less influential 
criminal organizations such as criminal gangs and crime groups…In addition to 
the Chinese government's label, terms such as ‘underworld-like gangs’, 
‘underworld-like organizations’, ‘underworld gangs’, and ‘mafia-like gangs’ are 
also used to depict these groups” (Chin and Godson 2006: 41). 
“The official stance continues that only ‘criminal groups with mafia 
characteristics’ have emerged in China, but not that a criminal underworld exists. 
This is far from popular perception” (Xia 2008: 1-2). 
“Organized crime in contemporary China seems like a soaring giant Dragon: the 
Dragon’s Head is the most advanced and influential criminal groups – fully 
fledged Mafia; the Dragon’s Body is Mafia-style organizations and other well-
structured organized crime groups; the Dragon’s Tail is criminal gangs with small 
size, limited scope, and simple structure” (Wang 2011: 292). 
This gives rise to two problems. Firstly, the term ‘black society’ (also named 
‘criminal underworld’) has been interpreted by Chinese authorities as the same 
phenomenon as mafias, like the Sicilian mafia, triad societies in Hong Kong, and 
the Japanese Yakuza. Chinese authorities tend to regard black society (or the 
mafia) as the most influential and best-organised criminal group in the world, but 
deny that the black society (or the fully-fledged mafia) exists in contemporary 
mainland China. However, it is neither right to equate the mafia with a ‘black 
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society’ (Varese 2010a), nor to regard the mafia as the best-organised or most 
powerful (or influential) criminal group.11 
Secondly, it seems that Chinese authorities and academics tend to use the defining 
characteristic of organised criminal groups, namely the hierarchical structure, to 
make distinctions among different types of criminal groups. But this fails to make a 
clear distinction between organized crime and what is commonly called mafia. It is 
necessary to emphasise that not all kinds of organized crime groups can be 
considered as mafia groups (Varese 2010a).  
Misconceptions in mainland China have definitely brought negative consequences 
to law enforcement as well as research because ‘how the problem of organized 
crime is defined goes a long way toward determining how laws are framed, how 
investigations are conducted, how research studies are done, and, increasingly, 
how mutual legal assistance across national borders is or is not rendered’ 
(Finckenauer 2005: 68). This requires the author to undertake a historical review 
of organized crime definitions in western countries.  
1.2. Under western eyes: ‘organized crime’ and ‘mafia’ 
1.2.1. Organized Crime 
Developing a commonly-accepted definition of organized crime has been regarded 
as one of the most stubborn difficulties with which researchers and law-enforcement 
agencies struggle. Varieties of definitions in criminal or civil statutes, according to 
                                                          
11
 The criminal underworld refers to organised groups in general, while a mafia group is a special kind 
of organized crime group. It is neither right to define them as completely different issues, nor to 
regard them as the same phenomenon. 
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Finckenauer (2005), were often either very vague or extremely broad. Fortunately, 
Klaus von Lampe, a criminologist in Germany, contributed greatly to solving the 
definitional problem by collating over 150 definitions of organized crime and related 
perspectives (see: www.organized-crime.de/OCDEF1.htm). However, great 
confusion still surrounds its precise meaning.  
Why is agreement on a proper definition important? Defining the phenomenon is a 
significant issue for law enforcement as well as research. As Finckenauer notes:  
‘How the problem of organized crime is defined goes a long way toward 
determining how laws are framed, how investigations are conducted, how 
research studies are done, and, increasingly, how mutual legal assistance across 
national borders is or is not rendered. What they perceive organized crime to be, 
and how seriously they regard it, also determines the degree of the public’s 
support for policies and resources to combat it’ (2005: 68). 
Is it possible for the international community to reach a consensus on the definition 
of organized crime? The answer is disappointing. First, depending on the basic 
requirements of a concept offered by Smith (1971: 10), a definition should ‘not only 
include all the phenomena that are relevant, but also exclude all the phenomena 
that are irrelevant’. The definitions, according to von Lampe (2003: 45), were (and 
are) unable to provide ‘a thorough understanding of the wide range of potentially 
relevant phenomena and interplay among them’. In other words, the concepts 




Second, what history tells us is that ‘the concept has had a chequered development 
process—it has been used to refer to diverse phenomena often with overtly political 
and partisan intentions’ (Varese 2010a: 1). Third, the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime aimed to conclude an agreement on defining 
organized crime but only produced a very loose definition.12 This indicates that a 
definition that could suit all parties is one of the most difficult tasks for both 
research and policy (Finckenauer 2005).  
A number of studies conducted by researchers and academics from all over the 
world attempt to create a knowledge base with respect to organized crime in order 
to guarantee that what everyone is talking about the same thing. However, the 
definition of organized crime is problematic because it is extremely difficult to gain 
agreement from all parties. This chapter provides a general introduction to 
organized crime through systematic analysis of some influential definitions: the alien 
conspiracy model, the enterprise model and the network model. Varese also uses 
the three models in his 2010 paper ‘General Introduction: What is Organized Crime?’. 
Alien conspiracy model  
The ‘alien conspiracy’ perspective developed by policymakers was the most widely-
disseminated theory of organized crime in the United States until the 1980s 
(Kleemans 2014). The creation of alien conspiracy theory, as Hobbs and 
Antonopoulos (2013) argue, was a government response to the widely-accepted 
belief that the American criminal underworld was dominated by Italian-American 
                                                          
12
 The Task Force on Organized Crime concluded in 1967 that organized crime was a ‘society’ 
consisting exclusively of Italian-Americans. For more information, please see: Jay S Albanese, 
'Governemnt Perceptions of Organized Crime: The Presidential Commissioners, 1967 and 1987', Fed. 
Probation, 52 (1988), 58-63. 
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Mafia groups. The alien conspiracy theory suggests that organized crime was 
imported by Italian immigrants during the immigration waves from 1880 to 1920 
(Potter1994).  
The 1967 U.S. Task Force on Organized Crime (President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice) asserted that the rise of organized crime 
was due to the Cosa Nostra conspiracy and equated ‘organized crime’ with ‘Mafia’. 
Donald Cressey, sociologist and consultant to the Commission, focused his main 
attention on the study of the Italian-American mafia and offered his own definition 
which identified organized crime and the Mafia/La Cosa Nostra as synonymous 
phenomena (Cressey 1967).  
In his book Theft of Nation: The Structure and Operations of Organized Crime in 
America, Cressey (1969) explores three aspects of Cosa Nostra: history, structure and 
function. Cressey describes Cosa Nostra as a strict bureaucratic hierarchy consisting 
of 24 ‘families’ located in different cities across the nation. The activities of this 
complex confederation were governed by a ‘commission’ (Albini 1988). Cressey’s 
theory provided a foundation for the modern study of organized crime and resulted 
in the creation of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968 and the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970 (Hobbs and Antonopoulos 2013). 
The Cressey model has been disputed by many other scholars, however. For example, 
Albini (1988) points out that Cressey’s research suffers from two major shortcomings: 
first, he limits his historical analysis of organized crime to ‘the period in American 
history when the Italian and Sicilian immigrants came to America’ (p. 347); second, 
he fails to critically examine the reliability of the data offered by law enforcement 
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agencies and an informant. Evidence collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) since the early 1970s and the prosecution of Cosa Nostra members shows that 
the Italian-American mafia possessed only limited capability to control illegal 
businesses, demonstrating that the organization is not ‘a tightly-knit, all-powerful, 
national syndicate’ (Woodiwiss 2003: 23). Moreover, the alien conspiracy theory, as 
Hobbs and Antonopoulos (2013: 37) argue, ‘did little justice to the confused, fluid, 
and essentially entrepreneurial character of most criminal activity and ignores the 
specific activities and enterprises that lie at the core of what it usually meant by 
organised crime’.  
The enterprise model 
Cressey’s model has also been the target of criticism in recent academic reviews 
(Varese 2010a). Dwight C. Smith is one of the most influential academics to criticize 
Cressey's bureaucratic interpretation of organized crime families. Smith, in his book 
The Mafia Mystique (1975), aims to eradicate the Cressey model of the ‘myth of 
mafia’ by directing attention to a spectrum of market activities. The occurrence of 
phenomena that academics categorize as organized crime can be interpreted, as 
Smith argues, from a broader economic viewpoint. He considers the illegal 
enterprise model as a substitute for the ethnic stereotypes of crime and argues that 
‘illicit enterprise is the extension of legitimate market activities into areas normally 
proscribed, for the pursuit of profit and in response to latent illicit demand’ (Smith, 
1978: 164). Albini (1971) endorses Smith’s analysis by demonstrating that the growth 
of illicit entrepreneurs (referred to  ‘syndicated crime’ in his book) is triggered by the 
demand for illegal goods and services from a great number of needy people.  
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Peter Reuter, an influential economist and scholar of organized crime, argues that 
illegal markets are populated by a great number of relatively small enterprises, 
rather than large enterprises that achieve monopolistic control (Reuter 1985). 
According to Reuter, illegal enterprises cannot exercise complete control over large-
scale illegal markets for two reasons: enterprises tend to increase the amount of 
information available to their current and potential customers, which inevitably 
results in a high rate of arrest that disrupts market control; on the other hand, 
building reputation and preventing new entrants into illegal markets requires the 
use of more violence, which also attracts the attention of law enforcement (Reuter 
1983, 1985, 1987).  
In parallel with Reuter’s viewpoints, Mark Haller in his paper ‘Illegal Enterprises’ 
(1990) argues that illegal enterprise can be defined as the retailing of illicit goods and 
services, and thus a wide range of criminal activities might be studied as businesses. 
As Haller (1990: 208) further explains, illegal entrepreneurs tend to operate on a 
small scale with ‘lower capitalization, fewer personnel and less formal management’ 
when compared with legal businesses.  
Varese (2010: 7) conducts the broadest systematic content analysis of 115 
definitions of organized crime used in the past century, and concludes that 
‘references to “enterprise” start to appear in the definitions in the 1970s and 
continue to grow decade after decade’.  Since the mid-1970s, the illegal enterprise of 
organized crime has become the dominant perspective (especially in the analysis of 
the Italian mafia) in European academic debate (Paoli 2002). The illegal enterprise 
model in the 1970s and 1980s, however, fails to make a clear distinction ‘between 
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producers of illicit goods and services, and providers of services of dispute 
settlement and protection in criminal markets’ (Varese, 2010: 12). 
The network model 
The last decade saw an increasing number of scholars who incorporated social 
network analysis and its methods into criminology, especially within the study of 
organized crime and terrorism (Carlo Morselli and Petit 2007). McIllwain (1999) 
discusses the importance of interpersonal relationships in (transnational) organized 
crime, as he explains: 
‘Human relationships form the least common denominator of organized crime. 
The actors composing these relationships engage in the process of social 
networking for the provision of illicit goods and services. They also protect, 
regulate and extort those engaged in the provision or consumption of these 
goods and services’ (p. 319).  
The use of the structure of criminal networks by organized crime groups is the result 
of internal and external pressures as ‘the exchange of illicit commodities requires 
covert action’ (Bright and Delaney 2013: 239). All criminal groups, even these 
hierarchical organizations (Varese 2012a), can be considered networks because a 
social network is defined as ‘any connection of actors (N > 2) that pursue repeated, 
enduring exchange relations with one another, and at the same time lack a 
legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and solve disputes that may arise 
during the exchange’ (Podolny and Page 1998: 58-59). 
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Social network analysis (SNA) is a valuable analytical method to describe 
organizational structure and the connections among actors in a specific social 
context. As Lupsha (1983: 133) demonstrates, social network analysis is an important 
step in the programmatic analysis of organized crime:  
‘Network analysis consists of developing and laying out all the linkages and 
associations, roles, positions, and interactions of every known member of all 
organized crime groups in the jurisdiction and the patterns of association of that 
group with other organized crime groups and operations in the jurisdiction and 
elsewhere’.  
As with Lupsha, Sparrow (1991) regards the discipline of network analysis as a 
significant tool for law enforcement agencies to extract information about the 
mechanics and vulnerabilities of criminal organizations from existing criminal 
intelligence databases. Bright and Delaney (2013) review the existing literature and 
identify four categories of approach: description, statistics, simulation and 
visualisation (also see: Doreian and Stokman 1997; Jennifer Xu et al. 2004). As Bright 
and Delaney explain: 
‘Descriptive techniques examine structural changes in social networks by 
measuring and comparing the structural properties of networks across 
time...The second group of methods are statistical approaches that aim not only 
to detect and describe changes in the network but to find reasons for such 
changes…Thirdly, simulation methods rely on multi-agent technology to analyse 
network dynamics. In this method, individuals in social networks are modelled 
as agents who behave and formulate decisions based on specific criteria…In the 
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fourth technique, visualisation methods, the social network is displayed as a 
network map at a number of different points in time and the series of maps is 
then compared via visual inspection to identify structural changes’ (Bright and 
Delaney 2013: 240) 
The criminal network perspective starts to appear in the 1980s and remains a 
popular approach today. Like the enterprise model, the network model of defining 
organized crime has been proved to be too broad. A brief overview of the history of 
organized crime studies provides a multi-dimensional understanding of organized 
crime, but does not offer a widely-accepted definition. In the ensuing section, a 
thorough review of relevant literature offers a crucial distinction between organized 
crime and the mafia as well as Gambetta’s and Varese’s definitions upon which this 
thesis mainly relies.   
1.2.2. Brotherhood of evil: the mafia 
Organized crime and the mafia are neither synonymous terms nor completely 
opposite concepts. The mafia can be categorized as one particular part of what is 
known as organized crime. The ‘illegal enterprise’ paradigm has deeply influenced 
studies of the Italian mafia. Studies of the mafia during the past decades have 
emphasized ‘the economic dimension of the mafia and the role played by mafiosi on 
both the domestic and international illegal markets’ (Paoli 2002: 57). 
In the past 40 years, these studies can be divided into two main lines of thought, 
namely the traditional and modernized scientific analysis. The stereotype of 
traditional ‘mafiology’ is carried out by Henner Hess (1973), who maintains that the 
mafia is a kind of power structure, and equates the mafia with organized crime. In 
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contrast with Hess’ viewpoint, Finckenauer (2005: 74) firmly states that ‘the mafia is 
very definitely a form of organized crime, but, and this is important, it is not the only 
form’. 
Arlacchi (1993) offers an essential link between the old and new methods of analysis. 
According to Arlacchi, modern mafia studies are abandoning the traditional 
sociological or criminological approaches and turning to entrepreneurial 
transformation. The role the mafia plays in legal and illegal arenas has become the 
route for future scientific analysis. Blok (1974) concludes that the mafia has 
exercised a quasi-governmental role in modern society through the systematic use of 
organized force. The mafia arises as an illegal self-enforcement organization in the 
power vacuum created when governments are so weak and inefficient that they 
cannot wholly control the use of force.  
Gambetta (1993) suggests that ‘the mafia is a specific economic enterprise, an 
industry which produces, promotes, and sells private protection’ (p. 1). The identical 
commodity with which both the state and the mafia have been most closely 
associated, he argues, is protection rather than violence. Moreover, the Sicilian 
mafia is not a brand name; it specifically refers to the many small-scale groups that 
deal in protection both in legal and illegal markets. The apparent distinction between 
organized crime and the mafia is that ‘the mafia supplies, first and foremost, the 
organizing force; mafiosi and illegal dealers are not one and the same, the latter are 
usually independent economic agents licensed and protected by the former’ 
(Gambetta, 1996: 227).  
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In parallel with Gambetta, Varese (2010a) makes a clear distinction between an 
organized crime group which ‘attempts to regulate and control the production and 
distribution of a given commodity or service unlawfully’ (p. 14) and a mafia group 
which ‘is a type of organized crime group that attempts to control the supply of 
protection’ (p. 17). Varese’s definition, however, contradicts most Chinese 
criminologists’ understanding of the mafia. The mafia, also called ‘black society’ or 
‘dark society’, is defined by Chinese scholars as the most powerful and best-
organized criminal organization in China.  
In order to avoid confusion, the author initially attempted to establish a new term, 
‘extra-legal protection group’, which refers to ‘mafia’ as used by Gambetta and 
Varese: a particular type of criminal group that derives its main source of income 
from the criminal protection business. This, however, brings a new problem. As this 
thesis (Chapter VI) will argue, corrupt government officials, especially police officers, 
are emerging as major extra-legal protectors in the criminal underworld. In this case, 
‘extra-legal protection groups’ cannot refer exclusively to the mafia as suggested by 
Gambetta and Varese. 
The second strategy—the adoption of Varese’s definition as well as his distinction 
between organized crime and the mafia—requires the author to find ways to 
differentiate the two types of illegal protectors. This thesis proposes two new terms, 
the Red Mafia and the Black Mafia, by adding ‘red’ (the colour of the Chinese 
Communist Party) and ‘black’ (the symbolic colour of the criminal underworld) to the 
term ‘mafia’. In this case, the Red Mafia refers to extra-legal protectors who are 
from the public sector and sell protection by abusing power, while the Black Mafia 
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refers to criminal groups who derive income mainly from the provision of private 
protection and quasi law enforcement.  
In the following, this chapter offers a historical review of Chinese organized crime. 
The history of Chinese organized crime can be divided into four major periods:  Qing 
dynasty origins, Republic of China (1912-1945) boom, Mao-era (1945-1978) 
disappearance, and post-Mao resurgence. This historical perspective analyses the 
political and social conditions that led to the rise, fall and rise again of Chinese 
organized crime. 
2. The origins of organized crime in China 
The last 200 years of Chinese history have been characterised by upheaval. China has 
witnessed radical regime changes touching all aspects of the nation’s political, 
economic and social structure: from the Opium War to the end of the feudal dynasty, 
the warlords, the Nationalist (Kuomintang) government, the Maoist period, and 
finally the new period of reform and opening up (Martin 1996). Organized crime 
groups have successfully adapted to these complex and uncertain circumstances, 
becoming an integral element of China’s transformation from traditional society to 
modern society. Chinese organized crime groups have their roots in now-vanished 
Chinese secret societies. 
2.1. Chinese secret societies 
Chinese secret societies can be divided into two main types: the secret religious 
denomination (Mimi Jiaomen ‘秘密教门’) and the secular secret association (Mimi 
Huidang ‘秘密会党 ’) (Cai 1987; He 2009a; Qin 2009). The secret religious 
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denomination seems like a subgroup within a religion, but it was an organization that 
specialized in the systematic use of violence against the state in order to gain 
political, religious, or ideological goals. The White Lotus Cult (‘白莲教’), established 
in 1133, and the Patriarch Luo Cult (‘罗教’), established in 1500, were two influential 
secret religious denominations in ancient China. The second category, the secular 
secret association, refers to a mutual-aid and brotherhood organization composed of 
poor peasants as well as marginalized populations. It is sometimes called the secret/ 
feudal Banghui (‘帮会’) (Qin 2009).  
The origin of Chinese organized crime can be traced back to the activities of the 
secret Banghui in the Qing Dynasty (He 2009a). The feudal Banghui was similar to the 
feudal family, but it was not a system based on kinship. Bang (‘帮’) was organized 
according to master-disciple relations, while Hui (‘会’) was an illegal group of sworn 
brothers (Zhou and Shao 1993). The amalgamated term ‘Banghui’ was generally used 
by the late 19th century. According to the leading Chinese criminologist He Bingsong 
(2009), there were three major Banghui in the Qing Dynasty—Tiandihui (in English, 
Heaven and Earth Society, or the triads; in Chinese, ‘天地会’); Qingbang (in English, 
the Green Gang; in Chinese, ‘青帮’); and Gelaohui (in English, the Red Gang, or the 
Society of Brothers; in Chinese, ‘哥老会’, or ‘红帮’). These Banghui organizations had 
an immense effect on society at that time, and their legacy (e.g. organizational 
structure, ideology, and subculture) continues to have a profound influence on 
organized crime groups in contemporary China.  
The research conducted by Chinese social historians, especially Cai Shaoqing (1987) 
and Qin Baoqi (2009) from Nanjing University, suggests that the boom of the secret 
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societies in the late 18th and 19th centuries can be identified as an inevitable 
outgrowth of the destruction of the small peasant economy and initial development 
of a capitalist commodity economy. During the late Qing Dynasty, China experienced 
a number of wars, including the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804), the Opium Wars 
(1840-1842 and 1856-1860), the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), and the Boxer 
Uprising (1899-1900). Peasant farming systems in the Qing Dynasty were vulnerable 
to wars and environmental changes, forcing a great number of peasants to leave 
their homes and separate from their families. Poor peasants as well as other 
marginal and destitute populations became the most important demographic 
component of the secret societies (Bianco and Chesneaux 1972).  
The late Qing Dynasty witnessed the emergence of capitalist industry and commerce. 
The growth of a commercial economy in coastal areas, especially the Yangtze River 
Delta Region and the southeast coastal area, attracted hundreds of thousands of 
immigrants from relatively undeveloped areas. These cities, however, failed to 
accommodate the surplus population from rural areas because the capitalist industry 
was only in its infancy (Zhang 2001a). Based on voluntary initiatives and individual 
choice, a large number of marginal and displaced persons formed mutual-aid/self-
protection organizations. That is to say, the failure of the Qing government to 
provide social welfare to those who lost their homes due to the collapse of the 
agrarian economy facilitated the rise of Banghui. These crime groups functioned as 
quasi-governmental institutions offering protection to these displaced people (Cai 
1987; Qin 2009). In the following, three main secret societies— the Heaven and 
Earth society, the Green Gang, and the Red Gang—are discussed.  
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2.1.1. The Heaven and Earth Society  
The Heaven and Earth Society or Tiandihui (‘天地会’) has been defined as a secret 
brotherhood association initially in pursuit of political aims—‘overthrow the Qing 
(dynasty) and restore the Ming (dynasty)’ (FanQing FuMing ‘反清复明’)—and later 
developed into a purely criminal organization with predominantly economic 
objectives (He 1996). In the past three decades, Chinese historians have provided 
many explanations concerning the origin of Tiandihui. The explanation offered by He 
Zhiqing (1996) has been widely accepted: Tiandihui was established in Zhangzhou 
(the southern part of Fujian province) in 1674 by a Buddhist monk named Zhang 
Daozong (his religious name is Wanwu Dazong ‘万五达宗’). Tiandihui has been 
frequently renamed to avoid government repression; Sanhehui (triads ‘三合会’) and 
Sandianhui (‘三点会’) were two generally-accepted names as well as the Small 
Sword Society (Xiaodaohui ‘小刀会’) that was used only in Fujian and Taiwan (He 
2009a).  
Tiandihui gradually lost its initial political beliefs and developed into one of the most 
powerful criminal organizations after adopting a great number of homeless persons 
who had different priorities. As Chu (2000: 12) argues, ‘Tiandihui as it subsequently 
developed has nothing to do with the political mission…but was a mutual protection 
society which emerged spontaneously to respond to the social conflicts among 
various sub-ethnic groups linked to their socio-economic circumstances’. In order to 
gain financial benefits, members of Tiandihui units were involved in different kinds 
of criminal activities including drug trafficking, human smuggling, dispute resolution, 
blackmail and extortion (He 2009a).   
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The Heaven and Earth Society adopted a complex organizational structure and strict 
initiation ceremonies. A fully-fledged system of identification was created: ‘members 
were given cloth or paper certificates, and were taught argots and secret body 
gestures; they all pledged to the Thirty-Six Oaths, Twenty-One Rules, Eleven 
Commandments, and Ten Punishments’ (Xia 2008: 9).  
2.1.2. The Green Gang 
The Green Gang or Qingbang (‘青帮’) evolved from the religious Patriarch Luo sect 
during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Green Gang and the Heaven and 
Earth Society came to be known as the two biggest secret associations in the Qing 
Dynasty (1644-1911). Wang (1999) argues that Qing Bang is a secret society sharing 
the characteristics of both the secular secret association and the secret religious 
denomination. In other words, the Green Gang is not only performing like the secret 
brotherhood organization, but also retaining its religious beliefs. He Bingsong in his 
recent book Research of Organized Crime in China (2009) demonstrates that the 
Green Gang should be categorized as a kind of secular secret association (along lines 
of the feudal Banghui) because its main feature resembles a brotherhood association.  
The Patriarch Luo sect was founded during the period of 1442-1527 by Luo 
Mengqing in the city of Jimo (‘即墨’), Shandong province (Qin 2009). The Patriarch 
Luo sect created its reputation among the Grand Canal boatmen (‘大运河船夫’). A 
lot of major temples (Jiamiao ‘家庙’) of the Luo sect were established in the Subei 
region of Jiangshu province. These temples were initially used as missionary training 
centres and were gradually turned into asylums and mutual-aid institutions 
providing accommodation for boatmen in need (Cai 2009).  
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In 1768, the Qianlong emperor (‘乾隆皇帝’) outlawed the Luo sect and demolished 
its temples because of his concern about instability caused by the increasing growth 
of the sect (He 2009a). This led the Luo sect to set up ‘burning incense boats’ (‘香火
船’: a kind of fleet floating on water) as a substitute for the major temples. As Martin 
(1996) has observed, the burning incense boat ‘replaced the temple-hostels as the 
organizational and religious nuclei of the boatmen’s association’ (p. 11). In this case, 
the proscription of the Luo sect was a key turning-point for its transformation from a 
secret religious denomination to an essentially secret association (Ma and Han 1992). 
Then it was again transformed with the establishment of Anqing Daoyou (‘安清道友’ 
which means ‘friends of the way of tranquillity and purity’) during the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries (Martin 1996). Anqing Daoyou was later renamed the Green 
Gang.  
The Green Gang was primarily engaged in various illegal activities, for example illegal 
trafficking of salt and the collection of the unpaid debts for its members (Tan and 
Peng 2002). The Green Gang, as Xia (2008) in his paper ‘Organizational formations of 
organized crime in China’ indicated, was created through master-disciple relations: 
‘twenty-four Chinese characters were assigned to the ladder of different generations, 
and another 24 characters were added as the Green Gang expanded’ (p. 8). In other 
words, the generation name (character or zi, ‘字’) was given to every new member 
and the positions of all members were basically dependent on their rank through 
generational position in its hierarchical ‘family’ tree. An applicant for membership 
had to get a recommendation from one Green Gang ‘boss’ (laotou, ‘老头’), and 
subsequently attend the membership ceremony. After these processes, he or she 
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became a member of the Green Gang and also a follower of his or her 
recommender—the initiating ‘boss’ (Bianco and Chesneaux 1972).  
2.1.3. The Red Gang 
Chinese historians offer four different versions of the origin of the Red Gang or 
Gelaohui (‘哥老会’): (1) Gelaohui has the same origin as Tiandihui (the Heaven and 
Earth Society). Both of them were established by Zheng Chenggong during the reign 
of Emperor Kangxi (‘康熙皇帝’) of the Qing Dynasty, and both were created to 
achieve the political mission of ‘overthrow the Qing and restore the Ming’ (fanqing 
fuming). (2) Gelaohui was founded during the reign of Emperor Qianlong (‘乾隆皇帝’) 
of the Qing Dynasty with the purpose of ‘overthrowing the Qing and restoring the 
Ming’; (3) Gelaohui is the secret brotherhood organization previously named 
Guoluhui (‘啯噜会’); and (4) Gelaohui was regarded as the combination of Tiandihui 
(the Heaven and Earth Society) and the White Lotus sect in the late Qing Dynasty (He 
2009a).  
Cai offered a new explanation of the origin after a thirty-year study of the history of 
the Qing Dynasty. This explanation has been generally accepted by academics. As Cai 
(Cai 2009) argues, the predecessor of the Red Gang was Guoluhui which was a secret 
brotherhood organization based in Sichuan province and established during the 
Qianlong reign (1736-1739). In the reigns of Emperor Jiaqing (‘嘉庆皇帝’) and 
Daoguang (‘道光皇帝 ’) (1795-1850), the Red Gang was formed through the 
integration of Guoluhui with the Sichuan branches of the Heaven and Earth Society 
and the White Lotus sect (also see: Qin and Meng 2000).  
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The freight/goods/passenger traffic in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze 
River (from the city of Chongqing to Shanghai via the city of Yichang in Hubei 
province) mainly depended on wooden ships, requiring a large number of sailors, 
helmsmen and trackers. These employees lived in a situation of great difficulty and 
perplexity, making them more likely to form self-help groups in order to guarantee 
their basic livelihood. Moreover, different parts of the river needed different 
amounts of labour, which resulted in a large number of surplus sailors retained in 
the Chongqing area without ensuring a minimum standard of living (Qin and Meng 
2000).  
Chongqing in the late Qing dynasty was a region with harsh natural conditions and 
adverse living circumstances that made things even worse: more and more 
unemployed sailors either joined Guoluhui or became beggars. Guoluhui had 
amalgamated with Qinglianjiao ‘青莲教’ (one subgroup of the Heaven and Earth 
Society) in 1821, becoming a hybrid organization including the main characteristics 
of Tiandihui. The new organization was called ‘the Red Gang’ in order to distinguish 
it from its original organization (Zhou and Shao 1993).  
Originating from both Guoluhui and the Heaven and Earth Society, the Red Gang was 
a powerful organization composed of sworn brothers based on fictive kinship. 
‘Mountain’ (Shan), ‘lodge’ (Tang), ‘shrine’ (Xiang) and ‘river’ (Shui) were names used 
by subgroups in the Society of Brothers. The chief of each ‘mountain’ was called 
‘dragonhead ’ (He 2009a). Although the Red Gang was an organization of sworn 
brothers, the relationship between the dragonhead and ordinary members was 
hierarchical (Xia 2008). The Red Gang was strictly organized; for example, it 
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established the code of discipline called ‘Ten Articles’ and ‘Ten Clauses’ to promote 
consensus by creating common knowledge and regulate behaviours that are 
damaging to the organization (also see: Leeson and Skarbek 2010). In addition, a 
large number of the Red Gang members joined the Xiang army (‘湘军’), so these 
gang leaders and their followers became the main force in the repression of the 
peasant uprising of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom. 13 
2.2. The formation of the Red/Green Gang in the late Qing dynasty 
In 1821, Emperor Daoguang of the Qing dynasty began to reform the water transport 
system. Grain transportation from southeast regions to the capital (the Forbidden 
City, ‘紫禁城’) was gradually shifted from river transport to maritime transport, 
which brought great challenges to the survival of the feudal Banghui (the secular 
secret associations) (He 2009a).  
The ending of river transport after 1853 caused millions of sailors, most of them 
members of the Green Gang and the Red Gang, to lose their jobs. Secret societies 
like the Green Gang and the Red Gang were on the verge of collapse. However, a 
new Green Gang was established through a merger between its members 
(unemployed boatmen) and salt smugglers who belonged to Qingpidang (‘青皮党’), 
the well-structured criminal organization that emerged during the reigns of 
Emperors Jiaqing and Daoguang of the Qing Dynasty (1799-1850) (Zheng 2000). The 
                                                          
13
 The Xiang Army, a standing regional army legalized by the Qing government and headed by Zeng 
Guofan (曾国藩), was a major force in the suppression of the Taiping movement, which was a 
massive war in Southern China from 1850-1864. For more information, please see: Shunshin Chin, The 
Taiping Rebellion (Sharpe, 2001). 
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smuggling of salt in Huainan and Huaibei regions became the main financial support 
of the new Green Gang (He 2009a).  
During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a huge number of Green Gang 
members migrated from the Huainan and Huaibei regions to the trading ports of 
Shanghai, Zhenjiang and Nanjing (He 2009a; Martin 1996). Meanwhile, the Xiang 
Army was disbanded after 1864 when the Taiping troops were defeated, which 
resulted in large-scale layoffs. Millions of unemployed people returned to or joined 
the Red Gang. They became new competitors of Green Gang members as both 
derived their main income from salt smuggling, leading to uninterrupted conflicts. 
An agreement between the two parties was eventually reached: the Red Gang took 
charge of opium trafficking along the Yangtze River, while the Green Gang 
monopolized the smuggling of salt.  
In the early 1920s, Red Gang and Green Gang members based in the three trading 
ports merged into a big family—the Green/Red Gang 14 — by relaxing their 
organizational structures to become more receptive to each other (Xia 2008). Gang 
members of these two secret societies continued to work independently in other 
areas.  
In the late Qing dynasty, a large number of people joined the feudal Banghui in order 
to earn a living. Extensive research shows that the feudal Banghui (e.g. the Red Gang, 
the Heaven and Earth Society, and the Green Gang) shared common features with 
                                                          
14
 The amalgamation of both the Green Gang and the Red Gang happened mainly in the lower areas 
of the Yangtze River, including Zhejiang Province, Jiangsu Province, and the City of Shanghai. The two 
organizations in other provinces still retained their original names because the level of amalgamation 
was limited.  
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long-standing mafias in other countries, such as the Sicilian Cosa Nostra, the 
Japanese Yakuza, and the Russian mafia. To be specific, these secret societies acted 
as the quasi-governmental institutions, providing extra-legal protection for these 
helpless people. The involvement of the Red Gang and the Society of Brothers in the 
repression of rebellions or the fights against local governments, as Cai (1987) and 
Qin (2009) state, grew out of the desire for better living conditions rather than a 
wish to displace the Qing dynasty.   
Illegal activities in which the Green/Red Gang mainly engaged can be categorized 
into four aspects: salt smuggling, opium trafficking, women trafficking and 
prostitution, and gambling. First, salt smuggling brought huge profits to the 
Green/Red Gang. Despite government control of the production, distribution and 
sale of salt, a huge price differential between various regions resulted in a massive 
increase in smuggling. On the one hand, Gelaohui in the upper areas of the Yangtze 
River engaged in smuggling Sichuan well-salt (‘井盐’)—the best salt in China. On the 
other hand, the Green/Red Gang controlled the smuggling of the salt produced by 
saltworks in the Lianghuai area (Huainan and Huaibei areas) and Zhejiang province 
(Wu 2008).  
Opium trafficking was another economic backbone of the feudal Banghui until the 
opium trade was legalized by the Qing government in 1858. In the 1880s and 1890s, 
the demand for opium increased dramatically in the southeast coastal region. 
Benefiting from their abilities to use organized violence, the feudal Banghui and 
warlords succeeded in regulating the opium trade (He 2009a). Entrepreneurs 
involved in the opium trade had to purchase protection from the Banghui or 
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warlords, otherwise they would be extorted by gangsters. In order to maximize 
profits, the Red/Green gang also established opium dens (Ibid).  
Moreover, women trafficking and prostitution were monopolized by the feudal 
Banghui. By the end of the 19th century, Shanghai had become a booming 
metropolis containing a large number of brothels. These brothels were managed by 
the feudal Banghui both directly and indirectly; Green and Red Gang members either 
managed brothels by themselves or trafficked females from inland China to Shanghai 
and sold their victims to brothels (Cai 2009). Finally, in the late Qing dynasty, the 
common gambling house was one of the most popular leisure centres, bringing huge 
profits to the feudal Banghui. In cities like Shanghai, Nanjing and Zhenjiang, most 
gambling houses were owned by Green and Red Gang bosses. Although some 
gambling houses were established by non-gang members, they had to obtain 
protection from the Green/Red Gang or warlords (Tan and Peng 2002).  
3. Chinese organized crime in the Republic of China (1912-1945) 
The Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Qing dynasty. But the end of the 270-year-old 
rule of the Qing government and the establishment of the Republic of China did not 
bring social stability to Chinese society. A number of wars happened after the end of 
the feudal system, for example, constant fighting among warlords (1916-1928), the 
Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945), and the civil war between the Kuomintang (KMT) 
and the Communist Party of China (CPC) (1945-1949) (Liu 1981). Long-lasting wars 
made the government unable to satisfy people's basic needs, which created 
favourable conditions for the emergence of private organizations providing primitive 
state functions. Banghui organizations in the inter-war period achieved rapid 
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development: the scale of their illegal businesses was gradually expanding, the 
cooperation between secret associations and warlords was unexpectedly close, and 
the criminal-political nexus between dragonheads and political leaders was widely 
established.  
The development of the Shanghai Green Gang, as Martin (1995: 64) argues, ‘was 
closely linked to the important demographic and social changes associated with the 
emergence of Shanghai as an important industrial and commercial center’. This part 
offers an in-depth analysis of the Shanghai Green Gang, the most powerful Chinese 
criminal organization in the early 20th century, emphasizing three aspects: the 
emergence of the ‘three Shanghai tycoons’, the ‘three Shanghai tycoons’ as 
businessmen and the collusion between Green Gang bosses and political leaders. 
3.1. The emergence of ‘three Shanghai tycoons’ 
The history of the Shanghai Green Gang has been extensively studied by historians, 
especially those from Shanghai (see: Guo 1996; Shao 1997; Su 2010; Zhou and Shao 
1993). According to Su (2010), Shanghai in the early 20th century was divided into 
three administrative regions: the French Concession, the International Settlement 
and China’s administrative region. Weak law enforcement and miscarriages of justice 
caused a power vacuum which stimulated the development of secret societies. On 
the other hand, opium trading, gambling, and prostitution had become main sources 
of revenue for both the Chinese government and the colonial authority (Zhou and 
Shao 1993). The most powerful bosses who were able to regulate these illegal 
businesses were three tycoons from the Green Gang: Huang Jinrong, Du Yuesheng, 
and Zhang Xiaolin (He 2009a).  
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The establishment of Huang Jinrong as a tycoon of the Shanghai criminal underworld 
was due to a combination of reasons (He 2009a; Su 2010). In the early 1900s, 
population explosion, coupled with an increasing threat of organized crime as well as 
the emergence of a huge floating population, brought great troubles to the French 
colonial administration. French policemen found it extremely difficult to maintain 
social order as they did not understand Chinese language and culture. Under such 
circumstances, the colonial government implemented an effective crime prevention 
strategy named ‘devil must be driven out with devils’—employ Green Gang 
members as police officers to crack down on criminal activities committed mainly by 
Green Gang members (Su 2010; Zhou and Shao 1993). Huang Jinrong, a senior Green 
Gang member, was selected as a police officer.  
Pulling himself up from the bottom of the society, Huang established wide social 
networks, especially within the Shanghai Green Gang, and had an in-depth 
understanding of all social strata. Fictive kinship ties and sharing information on 
criminal activities within the Shanghai Green Gang allowed Huang to identify 
criminals, and thus street crime and violent crime (e.g. theft, burglary and robbery) 
were reduced. In return, Huang was promoted all the way to Captain-
Superintendent of police in 1924 (Su and Chen 2004). Meanwhile, Huang established 
his reputation within the Shanghai Green Gang because gang members involved in 
criminal activities received less-severe or no punishment (Su 2010). Between 1892 
and 1945, Huang became one of the most powerful protectors safeguarding 
organized crime groups (e.g. the Shanghai Green Gang) in the French colonial 
concession.   
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In the early 1900s, Du Yuesheng joined the Shanghai Green Gang and became the 
‘pupil’ of a senior gang leader, Chen Shichang. In 1907, Du was introduced by Chen 
to Huang Jinrong and became a key member of the Huang Jinrong group (Zhang 
1981). Du made important contributions to the Huang Jinrong group, for example 
introducing Huang to Zhang Xiaolin, one of the three Shanghai tycoons; the 
establishment of The Small Eight Mob15 (Xiao Bagudang ‘小八股党’); and the 
creation of Sanxin Company (‘三鑫公司’) which engaged in the opium trade in the 
French colonial concession (Zhou and Shao 1993; Zhuang 1994). Although Du was 
relatively low on the generational level (he belonged to the Wu status group which 
was two generations lower than Tong), this did not prevent him from exercising 
‘authority over Green Gang members who belonged to Tong or Kong groups’ (Martin 
1996: 20). Zhang Xiaolin, a senior Green Gang member, possessed extensive 
networks with warlords and political leaders in east China. 
Gang members in Shanghai were frequently involved in opium robbery in order to 
make their living. Two of the most famous groups to establish their reputation in this 
field were Da Bagudang (the Big Eight Mob) and Xiao Bagudang (the Small Eight 
Mob) (Qin 2009). The Big Eight Mob, consisting of eight gang members, was 
established by Shen Xingshan, an influential gang leader in the International 
Settlement (Zhou and Shao 1993). Opium dealers in the International Settlement 
                                                          
15
 The Small Eight Mob was established by Huang Jinrong and Du Yuesheng to challenge the dominant 
role of the Big Eight Mob (Da Bagudang, ‘大八股党’) in the Shanghai criminal underworld. The 
establishment of the Small Eight Mob allowed Huang and Du to take over the Big Eight Mob’s 
protection business and to regulate the opium trade in Shanghai. For more information, please see: 
Brian G Martin, The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919-1937 (University of 
California Press, 1996). 
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were required to pay protection in order to avoid robbery conducted by street gangs 
(including the Big Eight Mob).  
The Big Eight Mob succeeded in moving from robbery to protection when most 
opium dealers paid ‘tax’ to avoid robbery. Through this strategy, the opium trade in 
the International Settlement was all but monopolized by Shen Xingshan (Qin 2009). 
However, huge profits prompted the rise of competitors. Under the instructions of 
Huang Jinrong, Du Yuesheng established the Small Eight Mob, which aimed to 
disturb the Big Eight Mob’s protection business.  
The implementation of ‘anti-smoking’ policies in the International Settlement forced 
over 1,400 opium traders to resettle their businesses in the French Concession (Guo 
1991). Taking advantage of the mutually beneficial network between the Huang 
Jinrong group and the colonial authorities, Huang and his two colleagues, Du 
Yuesheng and Zhang Xiaolin, established the Sanxin Company (the Three Prosperities 
Company), which enabled them not only to control the opium trade but also to 
establish themselves as tycoons of the Shanghai criminal underworld. 
3.2. Three Shanghai tycoons as businessmen 
Based on organized violence and extensive networks with warlords and colonial 
authorities, the Huang Jinrong group monopolized traditional illegal businesses such 
as illicit drug distribution, gambling and prostitution (Qin 2009; Su and Yao 2005). 
The three Shanghai tycoons, however, were never satisfied. They exploited 
Shanghai’s booming economy by expanding their sphere of influence to new areas, 
including banking, shipping, and food supply (Su and Chen 2004). All these efforts 
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made them not only dragonheads in the criminal underworld but also business 
leaders exerting great influence on economic development in Shanghai.    
‘Sanxin’ Company  
During the late 1910s and early 1920s, an anti-narcotics campaign within the 
International Settlement aimed to eradicate the opium trade. This threatened the 
protection business of the Big Eight Mob, and Shen Xingshan’s opium dens were 
closed. The Green Gang leaders, especially the three tycoons in the French 
Concession, took advantage of this opportunity to strengthen their control of the 
opium trade in Shanghai (Martin 1996). Shen was forced to sign an agreement with 
Huang Jinrong in which Shen promised to move all opium dens from the 
International Settlement to the French Concession.  
In 1918, Sanxin Company (the Three Prosperities Company) was set up. This 
company was popularly referred to as ‘Big Company’ because it was composed of a 
great number of shareholders, including the Shanghai Green Gang (with Huang 
Jinrong as the representative), Chiu Chow opium traders, the colonial authorities, 
and warlords in east China (Su and Yao 2005). Although the Big Company distributed 
its illegal benefits to a wide range of people, it was wholly controlled by the three 
tycoons: Du Yuesheng was appointed by Huang Jinrong as managing director of the 
‘Big Company’, Zhang Xiaolin and Jin Tingsun were deputy managers, and Jin Tingsun 
was also the virtual head of the business (Martin 1996).  
The Sanxin Company functioned like an insurance company providing protection for 
opium traders; in return, traders had to pay large amounts of money (10 percent of 
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the total value of the opium) to Sanxin Company (Zhang 1981). Only opium with the 
stamp of Sanxin Company could be sold in the French Concession. Although the 
stamp tax was an extra financial burden, opium traders were willing to pay because 
Sanxin Company offered them genuine protection. Moreover, the ‘Big Company’ was 
a ‘super opium market’ as it directly engaged in the opium trade and possessed the 
ability to manipulate the price of opium. Opium from Sanxin Company was 
distributed not only in the French Concession but also in the International 
Settlement as well as all the provinces and municipalities in China (Su 2010).  
The monopolization of the opium trade brought a total income of Ch$ 56 million per 
year to Sanxin Company, equating to 14 – 20 percent of total state revenue (Su and 
Yao, 2005). The secret for Sanxing Company’s success was its ability to create ‘the 
collusion with the Chinese authorities in Shanghai, the tacit cooperation with the 
French authorities, and the efficient network with the warlords in east China’ (Martin 
1996: 63).  
Banking 
The three Shanghai tycoons, especially Du Yuesheng, expanded their sphere of 
influence in Shanghai’s legal industries. Du succeeded in establishing himself as a 
business leader through investing in banking, the shipping industry, the city’s food 
supply and the establishment of the Shanghai Municipal Fish Market (Martin 1996). 
With the help of the famous banker Qian Xinzhi, Du established the Zhonghui Bank in 
1929 (Su and Chen 2004). In contrast with ordinary banks which offer public services, 
the Zhonghui Bank was established for providing personalized bank services to 
opium drug traders and Green Gang members (He 2009a).   
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Du Yuesheng exerted great influence on Shanghai’s banking system (Bao 2010). For 
example, he was able to put a financial institution on the edge of collapse by 
ordering a large number of Green Gang members to withdraw their deposits or 
demand cash at the same time. On the other hand, banks under Du’s protection 
were able to survive without strong government support even in a deep recession. 
For example, the Zhonghui Bank rescued the Shanghai Commercial Bank (Shanghai 
Shangye Chuxu Yinhang) and the Siming Bank from bankruptcy (Xu 1982). As Martin 
(1996) reveals: 
‘Du Yuesheng took over the Jiangsu-Zhejiang Commercial and Savings Bank in 
1936. He also established the Minfu Union Commercial Bank (Minfu Shangye 
Chuxu Yinhang) in August 1933, and two years later he was instrumental in the 
establishment of the China Investment Bank (Guoxin Yinhang), in association 
with his fellow Green Gang boss Zhang Xiaolin and leading Shanghai bankers 
such as Lin Kanghou. Du also had major interest in both Pudong Commercial 
Bank (Pudong Shangye Chuxu Yinhang), which had been set up in 1928 and of 
which he became chairman some years later, and the Bank of Asia (Yazhou 
Yinhang), which was established in 1934 by Li Yaozhang and others…Du set up 
two banks in Chongqing, the Yong Cheng and the Fu Hua, in association with the 
Sichuan warlord Fan Shaozeng, one of his business partners in the narcotics 
traffic, and Gu Jiatang, a leading member of the Small Eight Mob’ (p. 195). 
Du’s hegemonic position in the Shanghai banking world meant that nobody could 




In 1933, Du Yuesheng gained control over the Da Da Steam Navigation Company 
(DDSN, ‘大达轮船公司’) (Guo 1999b). The acquisition of the DDSN enabled Du to 
monopolize the shipping industry in the northern region of Jiangsu. The DDSN, 
established by the Zhang Family—Zhang Jian and Zhang Cha—in 1903, was a leading 
enterprise which dominated the shipping routes from Shanghai to Yangzhou (Su 
2010).  
The DDSN suffered a number of severe crises during the 1920s and the early 1930s, 
creating an excellent opportunity for Du to get involved. First, as is typical in China 
even today, the company suffered a crisis of reputation when company head Zhang 
Jian died in 1925. Second, Zhang Cha was forced to leave his job because he was 
designated as a ‘reactionary’ by the Chiang Kai-shek government. Third, the 
company's underlying profitability was largely destroyed by a disaster in 1931 which 
resulted in the death of over 1,000 passengers and the sinking of two steamers (Guo 
1999b). Fourth, the DDSN lost its financing support due to the collapse of its 
banker—the Deji Native Bank (Deji Qianzhuang). This was the final blow. With the 
help of Yang Guanbei, who was one of Du’s leading followers and economic advisors, 
Du Yuesheng obtained absolute control over the DDSN. As Martin (1996) observes:  
‘Taking advantage of the DDSN’s financial disarray, Yang Guanbei sought to gain 
leverage in the company by arranging for the Zifeng Native Bank (Zifeng 
Qianzhuang) to purchase a nominal shareholding of Ch$3,000 in the DDSN on 
behalf of himself and Du Yuesheng…During the negotiations over the 
composition of the new Board of Directors, Du strengthened his position by 
resort to strong-arm gangster tactics’ (p. 203). 
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By using Du’s influence in the Green Gang, the company’s business experienced a 
change from bad to good (Martin 1996). For example, Yang Guanbei was able to 
resolve disputes between the DDSN and bandits by using Du’s relationships with 
senior Green Gang members in Jiangsu province. All commercial enterprises in the 
Lake Hongze region, including the DDSN, were disrupted, however, by frequent 
extortions conducted by bandits, most of whom were Green Gang members. In 
order to deal with this problem, Gao Shikui, an influential Green Gang member, was 
invited by Du to persuade these bandits not to disturb DDSN’s businesses (He 2009a; 
Martin 1996). The bandits agreed to ‘protect’ the DDSN when they realized Du 
Yuesheng was the company’s new boss. In return, many bandit leaders joined the 
DDSN and took a share of the profits (He 2009a). As a result, the DDSN again became 
the dominant enterprise in southern Jiangshu.  
In the same period, Du Yuesheng and Yang Guanbei set up the Da Xing Trade 
Company (Da Xing Maoyi Gongsi) in Shanghai. This company was a trading 
conglomerate ‘that not only ran separate shipping services for passengers and 
freight but also provided agency services for local merchants, which even included 
arrangements with the Shanghai banks for a bills of exchange facility’ (Martin 1996: 
204). The acquisition of the DDNS and the creation of the Da Xing Trade Company 
contributed enormously to commercial and industrial development in Jiangsu and 
Shanghai, establishing Du Yuesheng as a business leader.   
Food supply and the Shanghai Municipal Fish Market 
Controlling fish supply chains was another important business for the three Shanghai 
tycoons, because ‘the Shanghai market in the 1930s represented about half of the 
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estimated total annual demand for fish in China, just under Ch$51 million out of 
Ch$100 million’ (Martin 1996: 208). Huang Jinrong controlled the distribution of fish 
in Shanghai until the mid-1930s through his ‘sworn brother’ relations with 23 fish 
traders located in the Marche de 1’Est (Su 2010). Du Yuesheng had also been 
involved in the fish business since he became one of Huang’s leading followers.  
Huang was gradually replaced by Du because Du managed to set up strong ties with 
the Kuomintang government. In 1933, the KTM authorities planned to establish a 
central fish market in order to ‘gain access to the largest and most profitable fish 
market in China, as well as to control the supply of basic food items in Shanghai’ 
(Martin 1996: 209). This government plan was consistent with the ambition of Du 
Yuesheng, who sought to enlarge his influence in the frozen fish business. As a result, 
the Shanghai Municipal Fish Market located in the Point Island site opened for 
business in 1936, and Du Yuesheng was appointed the Chairman of the Board of 
Directors (Yao and Qiu 2001).  
The relocation of the fish market directly undermined the dominant position of 
Huang Jinrong (Martin 1996). In response, Huang encouraged thirteen seafood 
traders to go on strike to express their dissatisfaction with the compulsory relocation. 
After identifying the causes of this protest, Du Yuesheng persuaded Huang Jinrong to 
support the relocation by promising to guarantee Huang’s interests in the new 
system, and Du did fulfil his promise (Bao 2010). Consequently, all the fish traders 
and the Zhoushan ‘fish barons’ (who owned the fishing fleets) were forced to 
conduct all transactions in the Shanghai Municipal Fish Market. 
Establishing new clubs 
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In order to get a legal basis for their activities, Shanghai Green Gang bosses 
established individual organizations. In contrast with the traditional Green Gang, 
new clubs avoided hierarchies in order to extend and consolidate Green Gang bosses’ 
diverse commercial and financial interests. Since the 1930s, a number of new clubs 
had been established, three of which were the most influential: Du Yuesheng’s 
Endurance Club (Heng She), Huang Jinrong’s Loyalty Club (Zhongxin she), and Zhang 
Renkui’s Benevolent Society (Ren She) (Martin 1996).  
Taking the Endurance Club as an example, Du obtained approval from the Chiang 
Kai-Shek government and registered this club in the French Concession in 1932. 
Members of this club were billionaires and politicians rather than 
displaced/unemployed migrants (Qin 2009). Du’s Endurance Club had 223 members 
in April 1934, among them 120 businessmen, 30 police officers, 27 government 
officials or party members, 11 military officers, and a number of bankers (He 2009a). 
Applicants preparing to seek membership in the Endurance Club needed to get 
recommendations from two club members, and qualification requirements and 
admission standards were strictly enforced before membership was granted. 
Furthermore, entry into the Endurance Club entailed elaborate initiation ceremonies 
(Guo and Fan 1986).    
In parallel with the Endurance Club, the Benevolent Society, established in 1935, and 
the Loyalty Club, established in 1936, adopted a similar organizational structure: 
rankings within new clubs were determined by influence rather than the 
‘generational hierarchy’ (He 2009a). This created favourable conditions for the 
Shanghai Green Gang to extend its influence into Shanghai’s economic and political 
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systems. The creation of new clubs by Green Gang bosses benefited from their close 
ties with the Kuomintang government, but it did not change the nature of the 
Shanghai Green Gang, as it still derived its main source of income from illegal 
businesses. 
3.3. Collusion between the Shanghai Green Gang and the Chiang Kai-
shek government 
The development of the Shanghai Green Gang was inseparable from the support 
given by Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), the military and political leader who served as 
Chairman of the National Military Council of the Nationalist government of the 
Republic of China (ROC) from 1928 to 1948. Chiang joined the Shanghai Green Gang 
at the invitation of Yu Qiaqing, an influential businessman, and became a ‘pupil’ of 
Huang Jinrong in 1922. Huang Jinrong rescued Chiang from a debt crisis and provided 
financial support for Chiang to join the movement fighting against the northern 
warlords (Su 2010).  
The relationship between Huang Jinrong and Chiang Kai-shek was a private teacher-
student friendship, and the collusion between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the 
Shanghai Green Gang did not begin until April 12, 1927 (Su and Chen 2004). The 
Shanghai Green Gang functioned as the key enforcer in Chiang Kai-shek’s seizure of 
state power in the April 12 Incident of 1927 as well as Chiang Kai-shek’s move to 
achieve financial control of the Commercial Bank of China (Zhongguo Tongshang 
Yinhang).  
The April 12 Incident, also known as the Shanghai massacre, involved the violent 
suppression of Chinese Communist Party organizations in Shanghai by both Chiang 
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Kai-shek and the Shanghai Green Gang, during which many prominent communists 
were imprisoned or massacred (Coble Jr 1979). This incident enabled Chiang Kai-shek 
to destroy the communist-dominated labour unions in Shanghai and restructure his 
power base. The Shanghai tycoons became the enforcers of the Chiang Kai-shek 
government and prospered greatly therefrom.  
With the help of Shanghai Green Gang boss Du Yuesheng, the Kuomintang (KMT) 
successfully gained control of the Commercial Bank of China (Zhongguo Tongshang 
Yinhang) in 1935. The Commercial Bank of China was the first modern Chinese-
owned bank, established on 27 May 1897 by Sheng Xuanhuai. From 1919 to 1935, Fu 
Xiaoan, the subordinate of Sun Chuanfang who was the head of the Zhi clique of 
warlords16 (‘直系军阀’), was the bank’s president (Hu 1999). The relationship 
between Fu and Sun, however, led to Fu’s estrangement from the Kuomintang (KMT), 
because the Kuomintang was a military competitor of the Zhi clique of warlords. As a 
result, Fu Xiaoan and his bank suffered a serious crisis after the Kuomintang (KMT) 
took control of Shanghai.  
In 1935, a run on the bank engineered by Chiang Kai-shek and Du Yuesheng put the 
Commercial Bank of China on the verge of collapse, creating a good opportunity for 
the KMT to gain control of it (He 2009a). Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Bank of China 
and the Communication Bank to buy a large sum of bank bonds clandestinely issued 
by the Commercial Bank of China. Meanwhile, Du Yuesheng instructed a large 
number of Green Gang members to deposit significant amounts of money into the 
Commercial Bank and then all withdraw their deposits at the same time (Hu, 1999). 
                                                          
16
 The Zhi clique of warlords was the most powerful in East China in the early 1920s. 
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A bank run led to an unprecedented economic collapse, forcing Fu Xiaoan to ask the 
Kuomintang government for help. A capital injection from the Bank of China and the 
Communication Bank transformed the Commercial Bank of China from a private 
bank into a state-owned bank. In return, Du Yuesheng was appointed by the 
Kuomintang government as the new president of the Commercial Bank of China. 
Mutually-beneficial networks between the Shanghai Green Gang and the Chiang Kai-
shek government deteriorated after Japan lost the war in 1945. This was due to a 
combination of reasons. The formal return of most concessions to the Kuomintang 
government meant that the Shanghai Green Gang could not continue to earn its 
living through exploiting the vacuum created by the colonial governments. 
Meanwhile, the Chiang Kai-shek government was strong enough to control Shanghai 
through its military and the police rather than obtaining help from gangsters. In the 
other words, the end of the war with Japan signalled that the Shanghai Green Gang 
was no longer important for the Kuomintang government. As Du Yuesheng said, 
‘Chiang Kai-shek treats me as a urinal device: he only comes to me when he is in 
need, otherwise he puts me under the bed’ (Guo 2004: 38).  
4. The end of ‘three Shanghai tycoons’ and the disappearance of 
Chinese secret societies (1945—1978) 
The victory of China in the war with Japan was a turning point for Chinese secret 
societies. State power was finally strong enough to fulfil the social obligations which 
the Green Gang had previously fulfilled in Shanghai. The Green Gang was no longer a 
useful partner for the Kuomintang government. The Chinese government now 
viewed the Green Gang as a deviant social organization, damaging public order and 
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the fundamental functions of the financial system. The Chinese civil war (1945-1950) 
between the Kuomintang government and the Communist Party of China did not 
bring any hope for the Green Gang. The communist conquest of China marked the 
end of Chinese secret societies.  
Du Yuesheng left Shanghai for Hong Kong in 1947, dissatisfied with the unequal 
treatment by the Kuomintang. Du held secret talks with the communists in order to 
weigh the advantages and disadvantages of cooperating with the Communist Party 
or the Chiang Kai-shek government, finally deciding not to cooperate with either. He 
refused to return to Shanghai after the Communist Party of China occupied the city; 
he was fearful of potential reprisal from the communists because of his involvement 
in the April 12 Incident (Xiao 2001). Du also refused to fly to Taiwan because the 
Chiang Kai-shek government would not appoint him to an important position. He 
settled in Hong Kong, where mental stress and lower living standards brought him 
serious health problems and he died on 10 August 1951 (Lu 2004). 
Huang Jinrong did not leave Shanghai for two reasons. First, Huang would lose 
everything he possessed because most of his followers and his properties (e.g. 
entertainment centres and gambling dens) were based there. Second, Huang was 
persuaded by the Communist Party of China that they would protect his safety and 
property (Lu 2004; Xiao 2001). But the Party did not keep its promise. Huang Jinrong 
was forced to close all his illegal businesses. The Party was also keen to suppress the 
Green Gang and ordered Huang, the Green Gang boss, to write a statement of 
repentance (Wang 2006). This statement of repentance persuaded most Shanghai 
Green Gang members to give up all resistance to the Communist Party. Huang 
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Jinrong died on June 22, 1953 and this marked the end of the ‘three Shanghai 
tycoons’. From 1949 to 1953, the Chinese Communist Party succeeded in eradicating 
secret societies (Banghui) in mainland China. They managed this through a series of 
campaigns:  
 Eliminating anti-communist Banghui. Working closely with the Kuomintang, 
Banghui members played an important role in anti-communist activities. In 
this case, cracking down on anti-communist Banghui was an important task 
for the Chinese Communist Party. From the establishment of new China in 
1949 until June 1950, over one million gangsters were arrested (Tan and Peng 
2002).  
 The prohibition of the opium trade. During the late Qing dynasty and the 
period of the Republic of China, the opium trade was the main source of 
finance for Chinese secret societies, especially the Green Gang (Qin 2009). 
After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the central 
government adopted a series of strategies to prohibit drug trafficking and 
illicit use of drugs, such as establishing drug rehabilitation centres, providing 
compulsory treatment for drug abuse and launching wars against drug 
trafficking (He 2009a; Tan and Peng 2002).  
 Forbidding the prostitution industry. Before the establishment of New China 
in 1949, tens of thousands of brothels located in different cities and 
provinces resulted in the spread of sexually-transmitted diseases. 
Prostitution was also considered as incompatible with equality for women. 
From 1949 to 1960, the Communist Party of China launched a series of 
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campaigns that prohibited prostitution in mainland China (Ma 1993). 
Meanwhile, a large number of correctional institutions were created in order 
to accommodate these prostitutes, treat their illnesses and help ex-
prostitutes back into society. In the late 1950s, an overall victory was 
achieved in combating prostitution and controlling the transmission of 
sexually-transmitted diseases (Su and Chen 2004). 
He (2009a) explores the reasons why the Chinese Communist Party succeeded in 
eradicating long-standing Banghui. The main factor contributing to its success, 
according to He, is that anti-crime was based on large-scale ‘mopping-up’ campaigns 
as well as violent repression. In contrast with He’s viewpoint, this thesis interprets 
the apparent extinction of organized crime in the Mao era as a result of the 
disappearance of large-scale ‘floating’ populations (displaced and homeless 
immigrants).  
Shortly after the Communist takeover in 1949, senior Banghui members who refused 
to cooperate with the Communist Party of China or engaged in anti-communist 
campaigns were massacred (also see: Qin 2009). A large number of gang members 
and prostitutes were sent to reform centres and re-entered society as workers after 
the accomplishment of their socialist transformation. As a result, a great number of 
gangsters and sex workers were transformed from displaced/homeless persons to 
qualified builders of socialism.  
The political-criminal nexus was destroyed because Banghui was a class enemy in 
Mao’s China rather than a political enforcer under Kuomintang rule. Furthermore, 
citizens lost all their private property rights after the socialist transformation of 
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agriculture, handcrafts, industry and commerce. Drawing on Gambetta’s (1993) and 
Varese’s (2001) theories, it can be argued that the great transformation in society 
and the establishment of the centrally-planned economy eliminated what some 
argue to be the soil for breeding organized crime in relation to the supply of extra-
legal protection.  
The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the period 1966 – 1976, however, threw 
the country into a state of anarchy. As Tsou argues, the Cultural Revolution ‘has not 
only destroyed the Party organization and badly disrupted the government 
bureaucracy, but has also inflicted serious damage on the relationship of authority 
which had been established in Communist China’ (Tsou 1969: 90). Most scholars and 
the Chinese authorities believe that organized crime did not exist in mainland China 
during the period of the Cultural Revolution. In contrast with the mainstream 
viewpoint, Qiu17 suggests that a certain type of protective association (or extra-legal 
protection group) could emerge in a state of anarchy so as to offer protection and 
social services for needy persons.  
The socialist transformation of industry and commerce and the collectivization of 
agriculture resulted not only in the disappearance of private property and 
commercial transactions, but also in the extreme poverty of the common people. 
This may imply that openings existed for mutual-aid associations which guaranteed 
the basic living needs of helpless citizens. The resurgence of mutual-aid associations 
and their activities during the Cultural Revolution could offer a new direction for the 
study of extra-legal protection in China.  
                                                          
17
 Qiu Geping, personal communication, e-mail message to author, 15 December 2010. 
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5. The resurgence of Chinese organized crime in post-Mao China  
Radical changes have taken place in mainland China since China adopted reform and 
opening up policies in 1978. Alongside the Chinese economic miracle, organized 
crime has been returning to Chinese society. ‘The evolution theory of organized 
crime’ suggested by He Bingsong argues that the rebirth of Chinese organized crime 
has undergone an evolutionary process in the past three decades, shifting from 
ordinary criminal groups to criminal syndicates with an underworld nature 
(organizations with the character of black society), to fully-fledged black societies 
and finally to transnational organizations (He 2001). The evolutionary process of 
Chinese organized crime, according to He, can be divided into three stages: the 
proliferation of criminal groups and the first ‘strike hard’ campaign from 1978 –1989; 
the development of organizations with an underworld nature as well as the political-
criminal nexus in the 1990s; and black societies as businesses and the involvement of 
police officials in the criminal underworld in the new century.  
5.1. The proliferation of criminal groups and the first ‘strike hard’ 
campaign 1978 – 1989 
Since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms in 1978, organized crime 
has re-emerged in mainland China (He 2001). In the period 1978 – 1989, China 
witnessed a climbing crime rate, the growth of violent crime, and an increase in 
youth violence. Available statistics for this period suggest that ‘the overall period 
from 1975 through 1983 was still interpreted as the most severe “high tide” of crime’ 
since the founding of new China in 1949 (Tanner 2000: 100).  
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As a response, China’s law enforcement agencies, under the leadership of the 
Politics and Law Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China, embarked upon a nationwide anti-crime campaign named Yanda (‘严打’) or 
‘strike hard’ in July 1983. Tanner (2000) argues that the quick decision to start the 
Yanda campaign reflected a deep fear among the leadership that ‘without a decisive 
show of state force, not only would criminals not be deterred from crime, but 
ordinary citizens would also be unwilling to give the state the popular assistance it 
needs to maintain social order’ (p. 94).  
‘Strike hard’ is an extreme form of anti-crime policy based on ‘severity and swiftness’, 
seeking to achieve the objective of maintaining social and public order. According to 
Susan Trevaskes, ‘“severity” applied as a sentencing rationale involves meting out 
comparatively harsh punishment within the scope of the law; “swiftness” is the 
speeding up of criminal procedure to deal with targeted criminals in a timely manner, 
often within two weeks of their arrest’ (2007: 24).  
The first nationwide Yanda campaign started in 1983 and lasted for three and a half 
years. It consisted of three major periods. The first initiative cracked down on over 
100,000 criminal groups; then 31,000 criminal groups were destroyed and 130,000 
members were rounded up in the second period; finally, the third period focused its 
attention particularly on cracking down on organizations with an underworld nature 
(Bakken 2005). As a result of the first nationwide Yanda campaign, around 197,000 
criminal groups with 876,000 members were destroyed (He 2001); 322,000 members 
were sent to ‘education through labour’ camps, while more than 15,000 underage 
law-breakers were sent to the detention centres for youths (Xia 2006: 159). 
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Surprisingly, more than 30,000 people were sentenced to death, including some 
sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve (Tanner 2005: 175).  
In addition to street crime and violent crime, Chinese organized crime groups 
increasingly engaged in transnational or trans-provincial crime, for example drug 
trafficking and human (women and children) smuggling. Organized criminal groups 
which engaged in drug trafficking formed complicated networks with drug kingpins 
in the Golden Triangle, one of Asia’s two main opium-producing areas, overlapping 
Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Thailand (He 2009a). Employing sophisticated weapons as 
well as modern communication and transportation tools, traffickers were able to 
control the purchase, transport, storage and distribution of illicit drugs in mainland 
China. Moreover, cooperating with drug dealers in Southern China, triad societies 
from Hong Kong and Taiwan set up a transportation route on the mainland which 
enabled them to transport drugs from the ‘Golden Triangle’ at the border with 
Myanmar (Burma) to Hong Kong and Taiwan via the Yunnan frontier and southeast 
China (Qiu 2011).  
Trafficking in women from inland China to coastal provinces was another profitable 
business controlled by trans-provincial organized crime groups (He 2001). For 
instance, one criminal gang led by He Dushu in Sichuan province trafficked 180 
women from eight cities, including Chongqing and Luzhou, in Sichuan province to 13 
southeast coastal cities including Haikou and Wenchang. The majority of trafficking 
victims came to coastal cities in search of a better life for themselves or their families, 
but when they arrived they found themselves at the mercy of human traffickers, 
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who through threats and violence used them for sexual exploitation or forced labour 
(He 2009a; Wang 2013a).   
5.2. The development of organizations with an underworld nature as 
well as the formation of the political-criminal nexus in the 1990s 
Senior officials from the Ministry of Public Security demonstrated that the first 
nationwide ‘strike hard’ campaign achieved great success:  
‘There was a dramatic downturn in officially reported criminal cases, particularly 
in the first three months of the campaign. “Major” cases declined by 36 per cent 
from August to September 1983, and by 28.5 per cent more in October 1983. 
The decline continued through the first eight months of 1984, with the total 
number of criminal cases between January and August down 31 per cent from 
the same period in 1983’ (Tanner 2000: 122).  
The ‘strike hard’ campaign, as a strategy of crime prevention and social control, has 
been criticized as the ‘bloodiest chapter in post-Mao Chinese politics’ (Tanner 2000: 
93). However, the rebound in crime rates after 1986 suggests that the first national 
‘strike hard’ campaign failed to achieve its initial aim of creating necessary 
conditions for economic development. The crime rate was again on the rise by the 
late 1980s. For example, the number of criminal cases reached 1,616,879 in 1993, an 
increase of more than 164% in comparison to the 1983 figure. The number of 
destroyed criminal groups grew from 120,000 in 1992 to 150,000 in 1993. The 




In the early 1990s, loosely-knit and less-influential criminal groups accelerated their 
transition to complex and sophisticated criminal groups obtaining illegal control over 
a sizable portion of businesses in a particular area or a sizable portion of one type of 
business. These criminal groups are identified by the Chinese government as 
‘organizations with an underworld nature’ or ‘organizations with the character of 
black society’. Meanwhile, a close nexus had been established throughout China 
between gang members and local officials, especially these from the criminal justice 
system (He 2009a; Qiu 2008). The mutually-beneficial relationship between 
organized crime groups and corrupt officials enabled gang bosses to stay safe in anti-
crime campaigns and to extend their influence in political and economic domains. 
What was noteworthy was that the first organization with the character of black 
society in the mainland was officially recognized and subsequently destroyed by the 
government in November 1992 (He 2001, 2009a).    
The Pingyuan case: The first officially-recognized organization with the character of 
black society—the Pingyuan gang—was a transnational criminal organization 
originating from Pingyuan in Yunnan province. According to the national census 
conducted in 1990, the population of the Pingyuan area totalled 114,182, including 
34,254 Hans, the majority ethnicity, and 79,928 ethnic group members (He 2009a). 
As Dong (2006) suggests, the Pingyuan gang was a quasi-governmental organization 
consisting of many subgroups, and all the members were from ethnic minorities and 
organized under the cloak of religion. The gang controlled not only 23 mosques but 
also part of the political power in Pingyuan. Many local officials were reported to be 
senior members of the gang (He 2009a). The objective of the Pingyuan gang was to 
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elect a local government which represented ethnic minorities and protected their 
interests. Drug and firearm trafficking offered financial resources for the gang (Dong 
and Ye 1993). 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pingyuan was a crucial transit centre for both 
transnational drug trafficking and firearm trafficking. At least 10 drug trafficking 
groups in Pingyuan had established long-term production-supply-marketing relations 
with drug traffickers from Hong Kong and Taiwan, as well as drug kingpins in Burma 
(Dong and Ye 1993). From 1989 to August 1992, 834 drug trafficking cases were 
resolved by the prefectural-level government and 113.38 kilograms of heroin and 
982.44 kilograms of opium were confiscated. It was shown that all the heroin and 
half the opium were from Pingyuan. Moreover, the Pingyuan gang supplied illicit 
firearms and ammunition for criminal groups from over 20 provinces. From 1988 to 
1991, the Public Security Bureau of Wenshan Autonomous Prefecture launched a 
campaign to crack down on firearm trafficking, resulting in the confiscation of 1599 
illegal firearms, 20,000 bullets and 160 grenades (Cai 2002).  
Since 1992, Chinese society, as Xia (2005: online) argues, ‘has entered the stage of 
high crime and disorder’. A crime explosion in the late 1990s severely challenged the 
vital principle of the Chinese government—‘stability overrides everything’ (wending 
yadao yiqie ‘稳定压倒一切’) (He 2001, 2009a). In response to that challenge, the 
central government launched the second national ‘strike hard’ campaign on 20 April 
1996. This round aimed to crack down on organizations with an underworld nature 
and hooligans (Broadhurst 2013). Cutting the ties between criminals and 
government officials was regarded as necessary in the war against organizations with 
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the character of black society. From the beginning of the campaign in April 1996 to 
August 1996, more than 1,090,000 criminal cases were cracked.18  
The second ‘strike hard’ campaign, however, failed to suppress organized crime, and 
the political-criminal nexus between gangsters and public sector officials became a 
serious problem for most cities. The Ministry of Public Security launched another 
nationwide campaign known as ‘operation in winter’ (dongji xingdong ‘冬季行动’) 
from December 1996 to February 1997 (He 2001). Criminal cases revealed by this 
campaign suggest that many Chinese crime groups transformed themselves from 
street and violent gangs into well-financed and well-structured syndicates which 
obtained police protection through the establishment of the political-criminal nexus. 
Moreover, criminal syndicates increasingly adopted legal fronts and invested in 
legitimate businesses (Chen 2002). The involvement in both legal and illegal 
businesses provided financial resources for organized crime groups to bribe 
government officials.  
From 1992 to 1999, more than a million criminal groups consisting of 3.76 million 
members were destroyed (Xia 2005). The fast growth of the economy and the 
increasing number of market transactions were not fully protected by the formal 
legal system, which enabled a number of criminal groups to earn their profits from 
the businesses of dispute resolution and debt collection.19 Moreover, many gang 
                                                          
18
 Over 130,000 criminal groups with 670,000 members, among them 900 organizations with the 
character of black society with 5000 members, were destroyed in this four-month ‘strike hard’ 
campaign. For more, please see: M. Xia, 'Assessing and Explaining the Resurgence of China's Criminal 
Underworld', Global Crime, 7/2 (2006), 151-75. 
19
 Qiu Geping, personal communication, e-mail message to author, 27 August 2012. 
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bosses who possessed legal fronts succeeded in infiltrating the political system by 
becoming police officers or members of people’s congresses or members of people’s 
political consultative conferences. Their legal status allowed them to create 
extensive networks with legitimate businesses and government officials. 
The Liang Xiaoming case: The Liang Xiaoming20 gang was defined by the Chinese 
government as one of the most powerful organizations with the character of black 
society. It engaged mainly in homicides, robbery, blackmail, extortion, kidnapping, 
gambling and prostitution (He 2009a). Moreover, Liang Xiaoming and his followers 
were involved in the provision of extra-legal protection, e.g. debt collection and 
dispute resolution. Extra-legal protection services provided by this criminal group 
were, however, of poor quality. For instance, in 1994, the Liang Xiaoming gang was 
invited by businessman Liu Baogen to enforce a loan repayment. After the 
enforcement, the gang demanded Liu pay 580,000 RMB as a service fee rather than 
the 50,000 RMB (33.3 per cent of the enforced repayment) they initially agreed 
(Zhou 2001).  
In June 1994, Liang Xiaoming was invited to settle a dispute in Changchun between a 
real estate development company and a construction company. The failure to reach 
an agreement was followed a violent incident which resulted in 12 staff from the 
construction company being injured. Based on their ability to resort to organized 
violence, the Liang Xiaoming gang established an outstanding reputation in the 
criminal underworld.  
                                                          
20
 Liang Xiaoming has another name Liang Xudong. 
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In order to obtain sufficient protection for his illicit businesses, Liang employed his 
social networks and money to become a police officer in the city of Changchun (He 
2009a). Being a police officer enabled Liang to set up extensive social networks with 
government officials (Zhou 2001). A number of bank officers and entrepreneurs, 
including real estate developers, construction company owners and hotel managers, 
were extorted by Liang’s followers (He 2009a). Liang and his police colleagues 
shielded these criminal activities from legal punishment. In addition, Liang Xiaoming 
invested the money gained through his illegal businesses in purchasing firearms, 
buying new cars, and establishing his own legal enterprises (Lin et al. 2000). 
Private entrepreneurs were frequently forced by Liang and his gangsters to 
participate in gambling parties. Any refusal would result in revenge. In December 
1996, Liang Xiaoming organized a gambling party in the Shangri-la Hotel and a 
number of businessmen were told to attend. Businessman Mr Zhou, who was invited 
but did not show up, had his legs broken as a result (He 2009a). Organized 
prostitution was under the charge of Du Rongjun, who was one of Liang’s key 
members. Liang and Du controlled two big nightclubs through the use of threats and 
violence. Controlled by the Liang Xiaoming gang, massage girls were forced to 
participate in prostitution and give their earnings to Liang and Du (Ibid).  
In order to expand his sphere of influence in Changchun’s criminal underworld, Liang 
Xiaoming adopted various strategies to eliminate competitors (Lin et al. 2000). For 
example, Yu Yongqing, another influential ‘godfather’ in Changchun, was murdered 
by Liang in 1998 because the emergence of Yu Yongqing’s gang challenged Liang’s 
position in illegal markets. The organizational structure of Liang’s gang was complex 
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but had a clear division of labour from top to bottom. A set of rigid principles was 
laid down by Liang and any members who violated these rules would be severely 
punished (Zhou 2004).  
In August 2000, a local court in Changchun sentenced Liang Xiaoming and his six 
followers to death. Of the remaining 28 gang members standing trial, all were given 
prison sentences of between two and 20 years (Li and Gao 2000). Meanwhile, 35 
government officials or party members, including five prosecutors, four judges and 
15 police officials who protected the Liang Xiaoming group, were also given prison 
sentences (He 2009a). 
5.3. Gangs as business entities and the changing role of corrupt police 
officers in the new century 
In December 2000, the Ministry of Public Security ran a specialised campaign called  
‘dahei chue’ (striking organized crime and eradicating evil forces) in order to increase 
its ability to control public order, which faced grave threat from serious organized 
crime. The number of organizations with the character of black society that this 
campaign destroyed was 66, and the number of arrested gang members was 1466 
(Qiu 2010b). In April 2001, this specialised campaign became the third nationwide 
Yanda (‘strike hard’) campaign in April 2001 which targeted three kinds of criminality: 
organized criminal groups (including black societies and organizations with the 
character of black society), violent crime (e.g. murder, aggravated assault, rape and 
robbery), theft, and other frequently-occurring crimes (Xie 2013). The first year of 
this campaign witnessed much success, and continuing operations focused police 
resources on the crackdown on black societies and organizations with the character 
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of black society as well as on the political-criminal nexus (Broadhurst 2013; Qiu 
2010b; Trevaskes 2012).  
On 25 March 2002, the Central Politics and Law Commission of the Communist Party 
of China held a national video- and tele-conference, which aimed to mobilize the 
masses to take part in the third national ‘strike hard’ campaign. From March 2002 to 
April 2003, the property owned by black societies/organizations with the character 
of black society amounting to 530 million RMB was confiscated; 646 enterprises 
established by black societies/organizations with the character of black society were 
closed; and a large number of economic entities, including 909 gambling houses, 144 
trade markets, 144 construction works and 154 mines, were destroyed (He 2009a).  
In 2006, the Central Politics and Law Commission of China carried out a nationwide 
campaign titled dahei chu’e (striking against organized crime and eradicating the 
dark forces). Between February 2006 and September 2009, a total number of 1267 
black society cases were investigated, 13000 black societies/organizations with the 
character of black society were destroyed, with over 89,000 suspects arrested by the 
public security organizations. During that period, several hundred influential criminal 
syndicates were also destroyed, the majority of which each owned assets worth 
more than 100 million yuan (Qiu 2010a). Moreover, 163 public officers or staff from 
the criminal justice system were sentenced to prison because they were accused of 
offering illegal protection for these black societies (Qiu 2010b; Wang 2011).  
From June to December 2010, the Ministry of Public Security launched the fourth 
round of the ‘strike hard’ campaign in order to create a safe environment for the 
2010 Shanghai World Expo and the 2010 Guangzhou Asian Games (Xie 2013). 
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Particular attention was paid to cracking down on a list of criminal 
activities/organizations: serious violent crime, human smuggling and trafficking, 
black societies/organizations with the character of black society, prostitution, 
gambling, drug trafficking, telecommunications fraud, robbery, theft and crime 
involving firearms and explosives. The authorities launched a series of ‘strike hard’ 
campaigns and nationwide specialized drives against organized and gang crime. 
These campaigns worked well against unsophisticated violent crime but failed to 
gain control over black societies/organizations with the character of black society 
and their networks within the public sector (Trevaskes 2012).  
Following the establishment of the ‘market economy with Chinese characteristics’ in 
1997, China witnessed a sharp rise in the number of entrepreneurial gangs (Qiu 
2010b), some of which adopted an advanced approach: acting as mediators or 
enforcers in the new market (Wang 2011; Zhao 2012). Using these legal fronts allows 
gang bosses to infiltrate China’s economic system and achieve their main goal—
capital accumulation. The introduction of gang-style sanctions, such as threats and 
violence, into the production and distribution of goods and services allows 
entrepreneurial gangs to obtain comparative advantages over legal competitors. As 
Arlacchi (1986: 89) suggests, the entrepreneurial gang ‘has been (and still is) able, 
like any other innovatory company, to produce a profit which it monopolizes to the 
exclusion of other economic units’.  
The Liu Yong case: Liu Yong was an influential gang leader in Shenyang’s criminal 
underworld. Liu was also an outstanding private entrepreneur, a member of the local 
Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, a senior 
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member of China Zhi Gong Party (Public Interest Party), and an active member in the 
Poverty Alleviation Program of the city of Shenyang. As the president of Jiayang 
Group, Liu controlled 26 subsidiaries, 2500 employees, and fixed assets of 700 
million RMB (He 2009a). Liu’s incredible success was due to his ability to incorporate 
gang methods into his legal businesses and to establish solid connections with public 
officials. 
Liu established his legal businesses through the use of threats and violence. In 
September 1995, in order to set up his supermarket in a shopping centre located in 
the heart of Shenyang, Liu ordered his gang members to beat up the shopping centre 
owner—Mr Wu—and threaten his family members. As a result, Mr Wu sublet a 470-
square-meter shopping centre, which cost him 2 million RMB for decoration, to Liu 
Yong, gaining only 50,000 RMB in compensation. In October 1999, Liu proclaimed 
himself the exclusive distributor of two brands of cigarette in Shenyang (Xinhua 
2003). All other cigarette distributors were then forced by Liu and his followers to 
leave the market. Any rejection resulted in reprisals. For example, Liu ordered a 
dozen gangsters to beat to death those competitors who refused to leave (He 2009a). 
Moreover, in the late 1990s, Liu entered the real estate business. After gaining the 
development rights to one commercial street in June 1999, Liu used threats and 
violence to demolish houses or buildings where his project was located (Lin 2003).  
Many strategies were applied by Liu to establish mutually-beneficial relationships 
with government officials. As Chin and Godson (2006: 26) argue, criminals know 
‘how to exploit individual vulnerabilities by judging when money is mostly needed’. 
In order to enter a local committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
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Conference, Liu established a close connection with Gao Mingxian, the party chief of 
the Labour Bureau in Heping District in Shenyang. Liu offered money on two types of 
occasions: the traditional festivals, like the Spring Festival, and one-off celebrations 
such as the wedding of a family member (Xinhua 2001). Membership in a people’s 
political consultative conference offered Liu a legal front and allowed him to create 
extensive networks with senor public officials including Ma Xiangdong, deputy mayor 
of Shenyang from 1998 to 1999.  
With the help of Ma Xiangdong, Liu Yong obtained the rights to develop21 a parcel of 
land valued at 350 million RMB by giving Ma a two million RMB bribe (Qiang 2004). 
Moreover, Liu Yong established wide connections with criminal justice officials in 
Shenyang using the influence of his father, who was a chief judge in Shenyang 
intermediate court. Many local police officers and judges became Liu Yong’s 
protectors (Zhou 2004). For example, many police officers were involved in resolving 
a dispute between Liu Yong and Li Junyan, another powerful gang leader in 
Shenyang. Liu Yong used a gun provided by a mid-ranking police officer to shoot Li 
Junyan in front of three other officers, after which those officers arrested not Liu 
Yong but Li Junyan (He 2009a). 
Liu Yong established himself not only as an influential ‘dragonhead’ in the criminal 
underworld but also as a successful businessman in three ways: creating a 
hierarchical organization structure, introducing gang methods to enable him to 
monopolize legal markets, and establishing mutually-beneficial relationships with 
                                                          
21
 In the PRC, land is owned by the state. Businesses pay not for the land itself but for the right to 
develop the land. 
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government officials (Lan 2006). However, the political-criminal nexus did not help 
Liu Yong avoid legal punishment when his criminal activities attracted attention from 
the central government (Ning 2003).  
On 11 July 2000, Liu Yong was detained by the Shenyang Public Security Bureau. On 
22 April 2003, the Supreme Court finally sentenced Liu Yong to death and he was 
executed on the same day (Lu and Miethe 2007). On 10 October 2001, more than a 
dozen key officials were convicted for providing protection and business 
opportunities to Liu Yong. Among them Mu Suixin, the mayor of Shenyang, was 
sentenced to death with a two-year reprieve and Shenyang's vice mayor, Ma 
Xiangdong, was also sentenced to death (Kuhn 2001). 
Since the late 1990s, when the socialist market with Chinese character was 
established, the Chinese state has shifted its role from the redistributor of social 
resources to the regulator of the economy. This gives rise to two consequences: on 
the one hand, party/state officials are closely associated with rent-seeking activities 
in order to maximize their own interests (Lu 1999); on the other hand, private firms 
tend to seek alternative safeguards through political connections ‘in which the 
market is less developed and the government wields more power in allocating 
economic resources’ (Chen et al. 2011: 240). Today, abuses of police power such as 
rent-seeking are also common among mid- and high-level officials (Chin and Godson 
2006). Such behaviour offers favourable conditions for the development of the 
criminal underworld. 
Gang leaders adopted various strategies to establish partnerships with local police 
officers to obtain business opportunities and illegal protection. This was especially 
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true in the late 1990s but also holds true now. The new century saw an increasing 
number of public officials, especially local-level police officers, engaging in illicit 
businesses (e.g. gambling and drug trafficking) in direct or indirect ways, 
transforming from extra-legal protectors to ‘godfathers’ in the criminal underworld 
(Qiu 2008). The rise of police-led organized crime groups reveals the changing 
objectives of corruption in China. These objectives have shifted since 1949 from 
pursuing official promotion to seeking a luxurious life and capital accumulation (Qiu 
2008).  
During the Mao period (1949-1978), political and family backgrounds were the two 
determining factors for the promotion of government officials (Wu 2003). Senior 
public officials and their family members were entitled to special treatment including 
housing, health care and education. The aim of corruption in that period was 
obtaining promotion through establishing close connections with high-ranking 
government officials (Qiu 2008).  
From the beginning of economic reform in 1978 to the early 1990s, great 
breakthroughs were made in economic reform and opening up. In that period, public 
officials controlled most economic resources which they had the power to allocate 
on behalf of the government. Entrepreneurs had an objective in pursuing political 
connections: accessing government-controlled resources (Lu 1999). Officials who 
had spent most of their lives pursuing communist ideals began to seek better living 
standards. Since the 1990s, exchanges between power and money have become a 
serious social problem undermining public trust in government, and official ‘wining 
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and dining’ (gongkuan chihe) has become an important part of officials’ life (Qiu 
2008; Wu 2003). 
Since the 1990s, China’s economic reform and market liberalization has gained 
tremendous ground. As Oi and Walder (1999: 3) show, China has ‘spurned ambitious 
privatisation programs, yet it has been one of the fastest-growing economies in the 
world’. The new ideology preaching ‘to get rich is glorious’ provides a guide not only 
for businesses but also for government officials. In other words, most government 
officials pursue predominantly economic objectives. As Qiu (2008) argues, more and 
more government officials achieve social superiority by dealing in power and money.  
The phenomenon that corrupt government officials, especially police officers, exploit 
their power to provide illegal protection for organized crime groups and illicit 
enterprises is not uncommon in the new century. Furthermore, in order to obtain 
more profits, police officers engage directly in illegal businesses and abused their 
power to protect their own criminal activities (Qiu 2008). The transition from extra-
legal protectors to gang leaders enables corrupt government officials to monopolize 
illegal markets and achieve capital accumulation (Wang 2013b).  
The Wang Shibin case: Wang Shibin, the former deputy police chief of the Yongzhou 
Public Security Bureau (PSB), was appointed as the leader of a series of anti-crime 
campaigns in the city (L. Z. Liao 2006a). It was at that time unknown that Wang was 
the ‘dragonhead’ of four influential gangs consisting of over one hundred gangsters. 
Selling extra-legal protection was not the main business for Wang; instead, he 
achieved monopoly profits by engaging directly in illegal businesses including 
gambling, extortion and loan sharking. By abusing his power, Wang succeeded in 
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establishing himself as the most powerful gang boss in Yongzhou’s criminal 
underworld (Xinhua 2006).  
The Wang Shibin group adopted a hierarchical organizational structure, with a 
sophisticated division of labour. To be specific, Wang stood at the top; the second 
layer consisted of Mr Huang, Wang’s private driver, who was the financial officer and 
the ‘chief executive officer’ for the Wang group, and four gang bosses who directly 
managed all Wang’s illegal businesses. The lowest rank consisted of over 100 rank-
and-file gang members who carried out routine tasks (Liao 2006b). Initially, four gang 
bosses were appointed by Wang to take charge of his gambling and loan sharking 
businesses. Later, Wang managed these illegal businesses by himself in order to 
maximize profits (Xinhua 2006). For example, Wang himself ran a 45 million RMB 
loan sharking business targeting gamblers (Liao 2006a). As a result, Wang was called 
the ‘president of Yongzhou’s underground bank’. 
Compared with other locally-based criminal groups, which survived through the use 
of organized violence and the creation of the political-criminal nexus, the Wang 
Shibin criminal syndicate was able to flourish because of the abuse of police power. 
Take Wang’s gambling business for example: wealthy local businessmen were 
frequently ‘invited’ to participate in gambling parties organized by Wang (Liao 
2006b). Invitees who refused to attend, failed to bring enough money for gambling, 
or were unable to pay gambling debts, would either receive threats of or actual 
violence or be arrested by the police. Wang used Yongzhou’s municipal detention 
centre to punish these ‘violators’. As a result, more than thirty multimillionaires lost 
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their entire fortune (Qiu 2008). In June 2008, the People's High Court of Hunan 
province sentenced Wang Shibin to 11 years in prison (Han 2011).   
6. Conclusion  
This chapter provides a general understanding of organized crime by discussing three 
influential models: the Cressey model, the enterprise model and the network model. 
It also explains how the Chinese government defines ‘black society’ and 
‘organizations with the character of black society’. The distinction between 
organized crime and mafia suggested by Varese (2010a) is particularly emphasized in 
order to narrow the focus of this doctoral research. Most importantly, this chapter 
posits two terms—the Red Mafia and the Black Mafia—in order to distinguish two 
distinct types of extra-legal protectors in contemporary China. 
The historical aspects of Chinese organized crime in this chapter provide a useful 
resource for those wishing to better understand how the cycles of Chinese organized 
crime have risen and fallen from the Qing dynasty until now, and explains how 
organized crime can be countered in the post-Mao era. The discussion of Chinese 
organized crime from a historical perspective suggests that organized crime in post-
Mao China differs from secret societies (the Feudal Banghui) which flourished from 
the late Qing dynasty and the Republic of China period. As this chapter argues, the 
Shanghai Green Gang behaved as a quasi-government institution, providing 
protection not only for Green Gang members but also for all businesses in the French 
Concession and the International Settlement. The Shanghai Green Gang therefore 
can be categorized as a powerful organization similar to the Sicilian mafia.  
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Compared with the Shanghai Green Gang, which established close ties with the 
Chiang Kai-shek government and exerted a significant challenge to national security, 
organized crime in contemporary China appears at first sight to be a local problem. 
Even though the political-criminal nexus between locally-based organized crime 
groups and local police officers has been widely established, there is no evidence 
that gang bosses established mutually-beneficial links with the central government.22 
It is obvious that the resurgence of organized crime and the close link between the 
growth of organized crime and public sector corruption is an emerging social threat, 
challenging the legal status of the Chinese Communist Party. Chinese criminologists 
have explored various aspects of organized crime by producing a large number of 
research papers, books and reports each year. Chinese organized crime, however, is 
still a new area for international scholars. Moreover, the way in which locally-based 
gangs produce and sell private protection is an unexplored area for both Chinese and 
international scholars. 
  
                                                          
22
 There is one exception: the cooperation between Hong Kong triads (primarily Sun Yee On triad 
society) and the central government of the People’s Republic of China in the late 1990s. In order to 
avoid the threats posed by triad societies to the political and social stability of Hong Kong, the central 
government, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, adopted a united front tactic by playing on the 
triads’ feelings of patriotism towards Beijing. For more information, please see: T.W. Lo, 'Beyond 








Since the mid-nineteenth century, the word ‘mafia’ has frequently been adopted by 
social scientists to refer to powerful Sicilian families (e.g. the Cosa Nostra and 
the ’Ndrangheta) that embrace subculture values and share a common code of 
conduct (Blok 1974; Gambetta 1993; Hess 1973). Studies of the mafia during the past 
four decades have emphasized ‘the economic dimension of the mafia and the role 
played by mafiosi on both the domestic and international illegal markets’ (Paoli 2002: 
57). The ‘property rights theory of mafia emergence’ suggested by Diego Gambetta 
in The Sicilian Mafia is an important tool for interpreting the relationship between 
state failure and the rise of mafias. Thus, Gambetta’s economic theory has been 
gradually adopted by many scholars (Federico Varese, Yiu Kong Chu, Peter Hill, David 
Skarbek, and Marina Tzvetkova, among others) to characterize a kind of organized 
crime that engages in the business of private protection, such as the Italian American 
mafia, the Russian mafia, the Japanese Yakuza, and the Hong Kong triads.  
The literature on mafia emergence illustrates how people rely on mafia groups to 
help them settle disputes, enforce contracts, and protect property rights rather than 
resort to public courts and state law. Three books, Gambetta’s The Sicilian Mafia 
(1996) as well as Varese’s The Russian Mafia (2001) and Mafias on the Move (2011a), 
articulate how the mafia emerges as a substitute for the state or achieves its 
transplantation in a new territory where the widespread creation of private property 
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rights is not accompanied by state enforcement mechanisms. The literature, 
however, has a few limitations. The ‘property rights theory of mafia emergence’ 
narrows its focus to the relationship between state failure and the rise of mafias. In 
other words, Gambetta’s and Varese’s studies into mafia emergence focus attention 
on mafia’ domination of weak states but neglect the economic function of 
alternative means of enforcement that may offer property rights protection and 
contract enforcement. It is important to relate the mafia emergence literature to the 
larger literature on private ordering. 
This chapter considers two theoretical frameworks: the ‘property rights theory of 
mafia emergence’, and private ordering theory. The ‘private ordering’ theory 
compares state-sponsored law enforcement with alternate enforcement 
mechanisms. It emphasizes that each type of private contract enforcement has 
unique advantages and can provide a subset of enforcement services. That is to say, 
the inability of the state to supply adequate or equal protection for its citizens may 
not be a sufficient condition for mafia emergence, since other private enforcement 
mechanisms can enter the market. Therefore, an updated theory of mafia 
emergence may be necessary in order to advance the ‘property rights theory’.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. It firstly explores two 
important issues regarding the economic theory of the mafia: one the one hand, it 
presents the basic features of these organizations in order to develop an in-depth 
understanding of what is sometimes glibly called the ‘mafia’; on the other hand, it 
discusses the ‘property rights theory of mafia emergence’ which focuses on the 
relationship between the state and the birth of local and/or newly arrived mafias. 
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The alternative relationship between state failure and mafia emergence is the thread 
which ties together the whole theory, and the limits of Gambetta’s construct are also 
analysed. It then discusses the growing private ordering literature. This literature 
explores the substantial advantages of private enforcement systems which generate 
efficiencies over overloaded and procedure-laden public courts. Finally, it suggests a 
possible route for developing a positive economic theory of the mafia by combining 
the two outstanding literatures: ‘property rights theory’ and ‘private ordering’.  
A through discussion of these two important literatures demonstrates that the study 
of Chinese mafias needs to examine two types of illegal protectors: private-illegal 
(the Black Mafia) and state-illegal (the Red Mafia). This chapter therefore proposes 
the following hypothesis: extra-legal protection mechanisms—private-illegal and/or 
state-illegal—can emerge and sustain a long-term existence as a result of 
comparative advantage over rivals including both state law enforcement and 
legitimate private enforcement mechanisms.  
1. An economic theory of the mafia: state failure and the rise of mafias 
Scholars such as Tomas Schelling and Diego Gambetta, who write on the economics 
of organized crime, have focused their attention on two main aspects: the 
commodity that is most closely associated with the mafia, and the relationship 
between the state and mafias. ‘Protection’ suggested by the economic theory of the 
mafia is the commodity traditionally and most closely associated with mafia groups. 
Regarding state failure and the rise of mafias, both the ‘property rights theory of 
mafia emergence’ and the ‘property rights theory of mafia transplantation’ are 
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discussed in order to make clear how mafias manage their core business—selling 
protection—both locally and abroad.  
1.1. Defining feature of the mafia: ‘protection’ or ‘violence’?  
Golden triangle structure, archaic codes, the obligation of silence, violence, the 
bonding aspect of social capital, and blood ceremonies are defining features of the 
mafia, which have always been widely accepted not only by ordinary people but also 
by most sociologists and criminologists (Paoli 2003). In recent decades, the most 
vehement debate on the understanding of the mafia has focused on two rival 
doctrines: ‘violence’ and ‘protection’. Regarding mafia emergence, much sociological 
analysis has focused on ‘monopoly of violence’ as the core feature of the mafia, 
which is analysed exclusively from the standpoint of the economics of organized 
crime. Leopoldo Franchetti, in La Sicilia nel 1876, suggests that the state’s failure to 
completely control the use of force in southern Italy left space for the mafia to 
achieve its ‘monopoly on violence’, which is the most significant feature in defining 
the mafia in that region (Franchetti and Sonnino 1877). This definition has been 
principally supported by historical sociologists and economic historians.  
Argument on the hypothesis that ‘violence is a key defining feature of the mafia’ is 
crucially based on Max Weber’s studies on the use of violence and the role of the 
state. Weber argues that the state is regarded as an agency which was established 
through the process of the territorial monopoly of physical force (Weber 1970: 77-
78). Following Weber’s historical sociology, German sociologist Norbert Elias in The 
Civilizing Process argues that the formation of the state in early modern Western 
Europe can be identified as a consequence of continuous warfare rather than a 
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result of state-building by powerful princes (Elias 2000; Tilly and Zophy 1975). 
Moreover, Volkov (2002b: 83) suggests that ‘combined with fiscal monopoly, the 
monopoly of force made possible the central function of the state: the enforcement 
of universal law and order and the exercise of justice’.   
Paoli (2003) in Mafia Brotherhoods demonstrates that the mafia, as one type of 
quasi-government institution, should be characterized as an agency that performs 
varying functions, and what can differentiate it from non-mafias is based on one 
feature: ‘the ability to use violence’. As Paoli argues, it seems not only irrational but 
also extremely difficult to single out a single function (for instance, Gambetta’s 
‘industry of private protection’) in the definition of the mafia. She further states that:  
‘Far from merely “selling” protection, mafia groups and their members are 
actively involved in a plurality of business activities: they do not only trade in a 
variety of illegal commodities, but they also exploit violence and intimidation to 
occupy some of the spaces in the legitimate economy’ (p. 174). 
It is particularly difficult for the author to assess whether Paoli’s argument can 
successfully challenge Gambetta’s standpoint, as she presents her argument from a 
sociological point of view. Paoli characterizes Gambetta’s theory as a ‘functionalistic 
approach’, by which she means ‘the evolution and organization of a social 
phenomenon can be deduced from the functions it plays’ (Paoli 2003: 143). 
Gambetta’s emphasis on the most important function (i.e. protection) traditionally 
played by mafia groups in Sicily does not mean that his argument disregards the 
wide range of activities in which the mafia engages.  
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In fact, the dominant model of interpreting the mafia (raised by Gambetta and then 
developed by Varese) stresses the economic aspects of the use of organized violence, 
which has been widely accepted by international scholars as a rational way of 
understanding mafias in various countries (Gambetta 2011). Dependent on historical 
and empirical evidence, Gambetta (1996: 76) and Varese (2010) suggest that the 
mafia in southern Italy is defined as an industry (or ‘economic governance’) involving 
a set of firms which mainly produce and sell private protection or guarantees. 
Gambetta and Varese’s economic theory of the mafia can be traced back to a central 
tenet of Nozick’s thought about ‘State-of-Nature Theory’.  
Nozick’s work provides insight into the ‘protection’ that Gambetta frequently talks 
about in his study of the Sicilian mafia. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick (1974) 
argues that the key legitimate function of the state is the supply of protection 
against force, theft, fraud, and the enforcement of contracts. Self-enforcement of 
individual rights against an offender will inevitably lead to ‘an endless series of acts 
of retaliation and exactions of compensation’ (Nozick 1974: 11). Therefore, mutual 
protection associations emerge and gradually develop into groups with a precise 
division of labour—some entrepreneurs are organized to produce protection, and 
some members are hired as businessmen focusing on selling different kinds of 
protective services at varying prices. When the locally-dominated protective 
association is more effective at enforcing the rights of individuals than other 
enforcement, a minimalist state will inevitably emerge. As Nozick argues,  
‘The first transition, from a system of private protective agencies to an ultra-
minimal state, will occur by an invisible-hand process in a morally permissible 
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way that violates no one’s rights. Secondly, the transition from an ultra-minimal 
state to a minimal state morally must occur. It would be morally impermissible 
for persons to maintain the monopoly in the ultra-minimal state without 
providing protective services for all, even if this requires specific “redistribution”’ 
(p. 52). 
The monopolization of the protection market (i.e. producing, selling, and distributing 
protection) through legitimised violence has been regarded as the quintessential 
activity of modern government. For instance, Lane (1958) maintains that ‘protection’ 
is a specific service that should be provided by violence-controlling enterprises, i.e. 
governments. According to Gambetta (1996), the mafia can be regarded as extra-
legal government that shares an identical basis to the state. Protection, guarantees, 
and enforcement are the most specialised commodity that the mafia produces and 
sells (Gambetta 1988). Moreover, regarding the mafia as ‘the industry of violence’ 
(which has been supported by Leopoldo Franchetti and Letizia Paoli) places a one-
sided emphasis on violence in the process of interpreting the mafia, because 
‘violence is a means, not an end; a resource, not the final product’ (Gambetta, 1996: 
2).  
Gambetta further points out that protection offered by the mafia is a commodity 
rather than a public service, and what makes a person a mafioso is that ‘he is 
capable of protecting himself against cheats and competitors’ (Gambetta, 1988: 130). 
In this case, the mafia differs from a minimal state in two crucial aspects: first, the 
mafia makes no attempt to provide protection for everyone in its domain; second, 
the mafia appears to allow private enforcement of one’s rights within its boundaries. 
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In ‘War making and state making as organized crime’, Tilly (1985) argues:  
‘The word “protection” sounds two contrasting tones. One is comforting, the 
other ominous. With one tone, “protection” calls up images of the shelter 
against danger provided by a powerful friend, a large insurance policy, or a 
sturdy roof. With the other, it evokes the racket in which a local strong man 
forces merchants to pay tribute in order to avoid damage—damage the strong 
man himself threats to deliver’ (p. 170).  
In parallel with Tilly’s argument, the mafia literature demonstrates that the 
protection generated by mafias has both positive and negative results. Schelling 
(1971) claims that an organized crime group is a purely predatory agency. Peter Hill 
shows that there is ‘a tendency for mafias to engage in extortion in legitimate 
markets and protection in criminal ones’ (Hill 2003: 20). Contrary to the viewpoints 
of Schelling and Hill, mafia groups often do provide genuine protection for 
customers not only in criminal markets but also in legitimate ones. Chu (2000) 
maintains that the mafia is usually invited by business entrepreneurs to deter new 
competitors and assist their monopolisation in the market. Varese (2010b) builds his 
theory on extensive evidence and concludes that mafias do provide various kinds of 
genuine services, as he argues:  
‘Mafias are able to supply genuine services like protection against extortion, 
protection against theft and police harassment; protection in relation to credit 
obtained informally and the retrieval of loans; and the settlement of a variety of 
social disputes. The Mafia offers protection services to entrepreneurs of illegal 
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commodities, such as protection for thieves, prostitutes, loan sharks and drug 
dealers. Mafiosi also protect their clients against law enforcement’ (p. 17). 
Protection offered by mafias is the kind of commodity that requires individuals to 
pay ‘tax’ in order to exercise the right to use private/criminal services. It thus brings 
negative consequences to those who do not want to buy. For instance, self-
protected insiders have to expose themselves to harm or danger (Gambetta, 1996). 
From this perspective, the real service that the mafia offers, apart from ‘protection’, 
is pure extortion. Varese (2010) suggests that ‘extortion and protection are a matter 
of perspective’ (p. 18). The dual character of mafias’ protection is suggested by Chu 
(2000) in his analysis of the penetration of Hong Kong triads into legal markets. 
‘The business community is not necessarily the victim of triad societies; 
companies that employ triads to settle their business conflicts are in fact the 
direct beneficiaries. The victims are those who are forced out of markets by the 
triads. Consumers may suffer too because they pay a higher price for relatively 
low-quality goods or services’ (p. 123). 
Like other kinds of organized crime groups, the essential goal of the mafia is 
maximising its profit by producing and selling protection services. The choices (e.g. 
extortion or protection, high or low quality of services) are made principally with an 
eye to the prosperity or stability of the protection business. Mafias tend to provide 
protection with high quality (and even at low cost) if they foresee the protection 
business generating long-term regular income. Otherwise, protection from mafia 
groups will turn to extortion in order to increase immediate profits, regardless of 
long-term interests. Time seems to be the most important factor that determines 
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the extent to which mafias will sell bogus protection (Gambetta, 1996; Chu, 2000; 
Varese, 2001, 2010; Hill, 2003). Therefore, there is ambiguity between protection 
and extortion, and it is extremely difficult to distinguish real protection from that 
which is bogus.  
1.2. The ‘property rights theory of mafia emergence’ 
The economics of organized crime reveal that the emergence of the mafia is directly 
linked to a weak state where the legal framework is confusing, the definition of 
property rights ambiguous, the judicial system weak, enforcement limited, and 
corruption rampant. Focusing on Sicily, the ‘property rights theory of mafia 
emergence’ generated by Gambetta (1996) in the Sicilian Mafia might be the most 
successful theory that explains how the mafia has emerged in transitional countries. 
Gambetta’s argument centres on the two most significant factors traditionally and 
directly related to the rise of the mafia, namely, a demand for protection and a 
supply of the same.  
Private property rights were widely established when Sicily began its transition from 
a feudal society to a modern society. This transition inevitably increased the number 
of property transactions and what followed was a huge demand for protection 
because private property owners exposed themselves to great danger in the 
atmosphere of deep distrust that pervaded Southern Italy. However, property rights 
could not be properly defined and efficiently protected in the absence of credible or 
effective systems of justice and law enforcement. In other words, the legal 
framework and state-sponsored institutions failed to provide sufficient protection 
for property rights and commercial transactions. Consequently, a private 
110 
 
enforcement mechanism that could fill the power vacuum was urgently needed. The 
mafia as a profit-motivated protection and enforcement mechanism emerged as a 
substitute for the state, providing private protection in a majority of market 
transactions. 
Moreover, the conditions for mafia emergence suggested by Gambetta appear not 
to be unique to nineteenth-century Sicily. The existing literature illustrates that the 
‘property rights theory of mafia emergence’ has exerted a great influence in the 
study of mafias around the world, for instance, that of the Hong Kong triads (Chu 
2000), the Russian mafia (Varese 1994, 2001), the Japanese Yakuza (Hill 2003), mafia 
transplantation (Varese 2006, 2011b, 2011a), extra-legal protection in Bulgaria 
(Tzvetkova 2008), prison gangs (Skarbek 2011), and the Chinese mafia (Wang 2011, 
2013b).  
Chu (2000) demonstrates that the main business of triad societies in Hong Kong is 
providing real protection services in legal, illegal, and international markets. Triad 
members sometimes perform two roles in the market (protector and entrepreneur) 
at the same time, making it difficult to distinguish between the protector and the 
entrepreneur. Chu suggests that individual triad members usually spend the 
‘protection capital’ in the business, in which case, triad members are professional 
protectors; if a triad member is involved in legal or illegal business without exploiting 
the reputation of his triad society, he can be simply regarded as an ordinary 
entrepreneur.  
Following in the footsteps of Gambetta, Varese’s study of the Russian mafia 
successfully transplants the ‘property-right theory’ to interpret the rise of the mafia 
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in another transitional country. He emphasizes that the development of property 
rights in Russia’s economic transition from a command economy to a market 
economy is the key factor that prompted the birth of the Russian mafia. Similar to 
the Sicilian case, the economic transition brought ‘a dramatic increase in the number 
of property owners and in transactions among individuals with property rights’; 
however, the Russian government failed to establish well-functioning institutions, 
including ‘a system of clearly defined property rights, a swift and effective court 
system, and a credible police that deters crimes’. As a result, the Russian mafia 
emerged and engaged in supplying private protection for both legal and illegal 
markets.  
The economic theory of mafia emergence has also been applied to post-feudal Japan 
where mafia-like organizations developed from a common starting point. Hill (2003) 
maintains that the Yakuza in Japan emerged in a significantly weakened state in 
which the social, legal, and economic environments had undergone tremendous 
change. The collapse of a bubble economy, and the inefficient formal mechanisms of 
enforcement and dispute resolution, created a favourable situation for the 
development of criminal protection associations such as Yakuza. In parallel with Hill’s 
viewpoint, Milhaupt and West (2000) suggest that organized crime in Japan emerged 
in an environment where formal legal structures were inefficient, thus it became the 
dark side of private ordering, providing property rights enforcement and protection 
services (Milhaupt and West 2000b).  
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1.3. The ‘property rights theory of mafia transplantation’ 
After finishing his first book, The Russian Mafia, Varese (2011a) made a further 
breakthrough by applying the economic theory of the mafia to research into mafia 
transplantation. Academic studies conducted by both Peter Reuter and Diego 
Gambetta, two leading experts in the field of organized crime, suggest a negative 
viewpoint about the phenomenon of mafia transplantation. Reuter (1985) in The 
Organization of Illegal Markets: An Economic Analysis suggests that mafias are 
rather stationary. Gambetta (1996: 251) in The Sicilian Mafia maintains that ‘the 
mafia is a difficult industry to export’, because the mafia is always heavily dependent 
on a special combination of resources (e.g. information collection and advertising) 
that are expensive to produce in a new territory.  
Drawing on the ‘property rights theory of mafia emergence’, Varese’s framework 
about mafia transplantation centres on a ‘supply—local conditions—demand for 
mafia services’ scheme (Varese 2006, 2011b, 2011a). According to Varese, these 
factors related to mafia transplantation can be gathered into two boxes: (a) supply, 
which refers to how a “supply” of criminals ends up in a new territory; (b) demand, 
which refers to a demand for the services that the incoming criminals are able to 
offer. The extent to which local conditions facilitate a demand for the services 
supplied by newly arrived mafia groups is explored in two works by Varese, ‘How 
Mafias Migrate’(2006) and Mafias on the Move (2011). Important local conditions, as 
Varese suggests, include the level of trust, the presence or absence of criminal 
competitors, the size of the locale, the size of the illegal market, and the type of 
economic system.  
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Two key findings of Varese’s work are: (a) mafias are usually forced to leave their 
territory of origin by mafia wars and police repression rather than choosing to do so; 
(b) the inability of the state to govern markets and the absence of mafia competitors 
are two significant factors that link cases of successful transplantation (Varese 
2011b). In other words, mafias might transplant in a sudden market expansion 
where the demand for protection cannot be properly regulated by the state and 
existing mafia competitors cannot meet demand (Varese 2011a).  
In parallel with Varese’s mafia transplantation, ‘The mobility of criminal groups’ 
(2011) written by Carlo Morselli and his colleagues suggests a framework regarding 
how criminal groups migrate or extend their powers across geographical locations. 
All elements in Morselli’s framework can be organized into two main categories: (a) 
push factors, which ‘refer to forces which drive criminal groups from a setting; (b) 
pull factors, which ‘refer to forces which draw criminal groups to a setting’ (C.  
Morselli et al. 2011: 165). In response to Morselli’s framework, Campana emphasizes 
that two key analytical issues—the nature of the movement as well as the nature of 
a criminal group—should be spelled out when scholars and practitioners are using 
the push/pull framework (Campana 2011b). 
Campana (2011a) develops Varese’s ideas by suggesting the theory of ‘mafia 
diversification’. Using an in-depth study of a Neapolitan Camorra group, Campana 
demonstrates that the core function of a mafia group is supplying protection and 
enforcement services in its territory of origin, but expansion abroad sometimes 
follows the lines of a functional diversification. In other words, a mafia group creates 
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branches in order to carry out specific activities rather than move its core business 
and the common fund. 
To sum up, the economic theory of the mafia suggested by Gambetta and 
subsequently developed by Varese illustrates that the mafia functions as an ‘extra-
legal government’ providing the state’s functions in countries or regions where the 
law enforcement is weak, where the definition of property rights is confusing and 
the legal framework is imperfect. It might be argued that the ‘property rights theory 
of mafia emergence/transplantation’ is a remarkably successful theory that can be 
used to interpret the birth of the local mafia or newly arrived mafia in a sudden 
market expansion that is not properly governed by the state. Thanks to Gambetta 
and Varese, the property right approach of interpreting the mafia has also had much 
influence on the study of alternative modes of economic governance (Dixit 2004). 
Therefore, it provides a foundation to relate the economic theory of the mafia to the 
broader literature on private ordering that significantly contributes to the 
development of the economic theory of the mafia.  
2. The private ordering literature: the emergence of private 
enforcement mechanisms under dysfunctional law enforcement 
As Gambetta and Varese have shown, a demand for criminal protection is the most 
important factor in the birth and growth of mafias. As has been demonstrated, if a 
weak state fails to provide sufficient protection for its citizens and settle disputes 
among market participants in the economy, this will lead to a great demand for 
alternative sources of protection. Similar to Gambetta’s economic theory, the central 
focus of the private ordering literature is to examine who is strong when the state is 
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weak. The private ordering literature explains the relationship between private 
contract enforcement and dysfunctional law enforcement. This section firstly 
discusses the relationship between private order and public order; it then focuses on 
the diversity of enforcement forms. Enforcement mechanisms can be divided into 
two main categories: violent and non-violent.   
2.1. Relationship between Private Contract Enforcement and 
Dysfunctional Law Enforcement 
The private ordering literature suggests that the relationship between private 
enforcement mechanisms and state enforcement mechanisms is both 
complementary and competitive. Modern government is a violence-controlling 
enterprise producing and selling a specific service named ‘protection’ (Dixit 2004; 
Gambetta 1993; McMillan and Woodruff 2000; F. Varese 2001; Volkov 1999, 2002b). 
The state plays an essential role in supporting economic activity, creating an orderly 
market, protecting economic transactions, and securing three essential prerequisites 
of market economies: ‘security of property rights’, ‘enforcement of contracts’, and 
‘collective action’ (Dixit 2009: 5).  
The existing literature also suggests the limitations of the state’s law enforcement. 
Williamson (2005: 14) emphasizes that ‘even in states that make best efforts to 
provide adequate protection of property rights and contract enforcement, the 
state’s access to information and the state’s protection and enforcement 
mechanisms are inherently limited’. Similarly, Rapaczynski (1996: 89) suggests that 
states must work with other protection and enforcement mechanisms because even 
the most ‘powerful, rational, and benevolent’ states cannot fully define or protect 
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these sophisticated forms of property and thus ‘good faith cooperation among a 
number of parties is needed and additional enforcement mechanisms that are 
necessarily more flexible than any legal rules are indispensable’. Shleifer (1995) 
argues that not all rights can be fully protected by the courts; for instance, citizens 
have to protect their physical rights23 privately rather than resort to public resources. 
Furthermore, as Williamson (2005: 14) states, ‘property and contractual hazards 
invite the use of private ordering to infuse order, therefore to mitigate conflict and 
realize mutual gains from trade’. In this case, it seems that non-state protection and 
enforcement mechanisms are sometimes an essential supplement in the building of 
a well-functioning enforcement system.  
A possible competitive relation between state enforcement and non-state 
enforcement does exist when certain kinds of services are available from both 
mechanisms. Non-state enforcement is sometimes preferable to overloaded public 
courts because it can produce faster, more accurate and more predictable outcomes. 
Private enforcement mechanisms have emerged, posing great challenges to public 
enforcement in circumstances where ‘state law is very costly, slow, unreliable, 
corrupt, weak, or simply absent’ (Dixit 2004: 3). 
For example, people who resort to the public legal system have to wait a long time 
to resolve disputes. The legal system finds it difficult to enforce judgements. 
Therefore, it sometimes may not be economical for a merchant to employ public law 
and state courts to enforce a contract that ‘involves small dollar amounts and is time 
                                                          
23
 Compared with a legal right that is protected by police and the court, the protection of physical 
rights cannot resort to legal resources. This is because many physical control rights are not legal.   
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sensitive’ (Richman, 2004: 2343). Inefficient state courts and rampant corruption of 
the judicial system may at times make alternative enforcement (e.g. the mafia) a 
more appealing choice to resolve these kinds of civil and economic disputes. In such 
cases, non-state enforcement becomes a strong competitor to state legal 
enforcement in the protection market. 
The failure of the state in providing sufficient/efficient protection and enforcement 
results in the emergence of various kinds of private enforcement mechanisms in the 
market. Shleifer (1995) maintains that organizations who are interested in efficient 
structures can emerge as an alternative approach to the state enforcement 
mechanisms if the state is unable or unwilling to protect rights and enforce contracts 
effectively. Moreover, Dixit (2004) emphasizes that the consequence of private 
ordering is foreseeable when state law is costly compared with other enforcement 
forms: 
 ‘Societies will attempt to evolve other institutions (for instance, self-protection 
or hired professional protection for property rights, networks of information 
transmission, and social norms and punishment for contract enforcement), 
albeit imperfect ones, to underpin their economic activity when state law is 
missing or unusable’ (p. 3-4). 
Building on the argument provided by Barzel (2002), Dixit (2004), and Williamson 
(2005), third-party enforcement can be categorized into two main aspects: non-
violent and violent. Physical power is not a necessary resource for producing 
protection and enforcement, because enforcers can make use of long-term 
relationships between the enforcer and the principals (Barzel 2002). For instance, a 
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council of elders governs the tribe by using the enforcement power that has been 
created by their outstanding reputation in dealing with disputes. However, the use 
of violence for enforcement has advantages over non-violent enforcement that is 
based on long-term relationship: it is often cheaper, and it can be more efficient 
through exposing direct cost (e.g. the threat of physical punishment, incarceration, 
and seizure of property); but violent means of enforcement are most effective in 
dealing with disputes that happen in the enforcer’s jurisdiction (Barzel 2002).  
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Figure 1 Diversity of enforcement forms 
 
2.2. Non-violent means of enforcement 
In certain circumstances, enforcers who build their power on the use of social mores, 
ideology or long-term relationships are more efficient than those who use violent 
means of enforcement. Private enforcement systems have the capability to employ 
tools that are unavailable to public courts to compel merchants to satisfy all 
conditions laid down in an agreement (Richman 2004). Trade partners from a specific 
industry tend to form themselves into a trade association in order to strengthen 
their collaboration. Trade associations, resting on reputation, are sometimes non-
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profit organizations governed by private order (named bylaw) and directed by one 
member from the same association.  
The community of Ultra-Orthodox Jews is one classic example used to suggest that 
private enforcement may be more effective than public courts. Three predominant 
characteristics of diamonds (i.e. portability, concealability, and precious value) make 
diamond transactions high risk, therefore a private mechanism which can efficiently 
deter theft and induce credit payment has emerged spontaneously (Richman 2005). 
New York’s diamond industry is chiefly governed by the rules of the Ultra-Orthodox 
Jews: ‘cheating on contractual obligations leads to exclusion from community 
religious practices, and flight from the community—the primary penalty in breached 
diamond credit sales—cuts off all possible religious participation’ (Richman 2004: 
2345). Therefore, non-violent means of enforcement, including ostracism from 
future transactions and the threat of non-economic sanctions, may be sufficient to 
ensure business transaction security.  
Arbitration is also frequently used to analyse the strength and weakness of the 
private ordering system when it is compared with public ordering. Arbitration is a 
legal technique which is frequently employed in the resolution of commercial 
disputes and employment contracts, including very large transnational ones. 
Arbitrators are industry insiders who are well equipped to serve as effective fact-
finders, make judgements specific to individual disputes, and impose appropriately 
punishing behaviour (Richman, 2004, 2005). The private arbitration system, as 
Richman (2004) argues, is able to act more swiftly and cheaply because arbitrators 
‘enjoy both a familiarity with the industry and specially tailored procedural rules 
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designed with a greater emphasis on speed than those that govern public courts’ (p. 
2342).  
2.3. Violent means of enforcement 
Violent means of enforcement are used in both legal and illegal markets to supply 
support or services for reasons that may be ideological or in order to maximize 
profits. As a profit-oriented protector in the legal market, the private protection 
company is an important form of private legal enforcement. Post-communist Russia 
has undergone the legalization of the protection business since the Law on Private 
Protection and Detective Activity was adopted by the Russian Federation in March 
1992, which created a vast private security industry (including private protection 
companies, private security services and private detective agencies) that 
compensates for inefficient law enforcement during the imperfect market transition 
(Volkov 2002a). These private security firms provide services including private 
security, contract enforcement, dispute settlement and debt recovery. They also 
offer legal advice, information collection and organizational consulting (Volkov 1999).  
The privatisation of the security industry and the growth of private protection 
companies have an unintended anti-mafia effect in that the increasing demand for 
security could be met by private security companies. However, the deficiencies of 
this kind of enforcement are obvious. As Varese (2004) argues, the scope of their 
services is constrained by the law, which means that these firms cannot engage in 
the provision of illegal protection or services, such as driving potential or current 
competitors out of the market and settling disputes outside the law. Nor can citizens 
or small business operators easily afford such an expensive service.  
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Mafias, as a dark side of private ordering, provide a commodity (which Varese 
identifies as ‘protection’ rather than ‘extortion’) for individuals and merchants in 
both legitimate and illicit markets, which is an issue that has been thoroughly 
discussed in the ‘property rights theory’ literature. Corrupt police officers and 
security forces provide another violent substitute for inefficient law enforcement, 
because individuals or entrepreneurs in both legal and illegal markets can easily get 
access to the commodity (protection) by corrupt means or simply by purchasing it. 
Volkov (2002) regards ‘units of state police and security forces who are acting as 
private entrepreneurs’ as ‘the state and illegal enforcement’. It seems rational to 
argue that state-illegal enforcement is a kind of private enforcement, because the 
activities of corrupt state police are individual behaviours rather than collective 
actions authorized by government.  
In an illegal market, the image of a ‘protective umbrella’ suggested by Chin and 
Godson means government officials, especially police officers, take bribes (e.g. 
money, expensive gifts, sex, and promotion) and in return provide protection for the 
criminals and their illegal activities (Chin and Godson 2006). Services provided by 
corrupt police officers include two main activities: protecting the criminals’ business 
and protecting the criminals from law enforcement authorities.  Depending on their 
skills in the unlawful use of organized force, corrupt public officials in a legitimate 
market may resemble organized crime groups in providing various functions for 
market participants, including dispute settlement, contract enforcement, transaction 
insurance, risk control and private security. As Varese (2004: 149) argues, ‘criminal 
protectors offer protection services beyond the limits set by the law, and some 
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policemen compete directly with criminals and double as racketeers or private 
protectors unconstrained by the law’.  
To sum up, the growing private ordering literature suggests that various kinds of 
enforcement mechanisms serve as substantial substitutes for building a well-
functioning enforcement system. It is important to emphasize that contracts would 
need to be enforced by non-state enforcement mechanisms only in two sets of 
circumstances: where the legal system does not provide certain kinds of contractual 
assurance, and where public contract enforcement exists but may not be cost-
effective. Drawing on the private ordering literature, it can be argued that the 
economic theory of mafia emergence is not a perfect one and limitations do exist. 
The theory developed by Gambetta and Varese fails to give sufficient attention to 
the competitive relationship between the mafia and other private protection and 
enforcement mechanisms.  
Moreover, the private ordering literature suggests that the study of extra-legal 
protection in mainland China needs to incorporate two types of illegal protectors: 
the Black Mafia (private-illegal) and the Red Mafia (state-illegal). Gambetta’s and 
Varese’s research does not take the state and illegal enforcement into consideration, 
as this type of enforcement does not exist or exerts a limited influence on the 
market. China, however, is different. The existence of absolute power and the 
absence of efficient monitoring provide favourable conditions for the rise of the Red 
Mafia—corrupt government officials involved in the provision of unlawful protection.  
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3. An updated economic theory of the mafia: ‘supply—market 
competition—demand for extra-legal protection’ 
The mafia literature is essential to the study of the relationship between state failure 
and the rise of the mafia, but it does not draw much attention to other forms of 
enforcement which can also fulfil the protection deficit created by a weak state or 
replace mafias as private protection suppliers. The private ordering literature focuses 
on different systems of private enforcement that can arise in two cases. First, private 
enforcement serves as a major supplement providing services for individuals and 
merchants where state-provided contract enforcement is unavailable. Second, 
private enforcement arises where state-sponsored enforcement is available but 
where private contract enforcement enjoys comparative advantages in the supply of 
protection.  
The private ordering literature does not, however, explicitly discuss the reasons why 
the extra-legal protection mechanism emerges rather than other forms of private 
ordering. Drawing on the mafia literature and the literature on private ordering, this 
chapter revises the ‘property rights theory of mafia emergence’ (Gambetta, 1996; 
Varese, 2001) by adding the new concept of ‘market competition’ that can address 
how people make choices among four distinct types of enforcement mechanisms—
state enforcement, private-legal enforcement (e.g. private protection companies, 
arbitration, trade association), private-illegal enforcement (e.g. mafia groups), and 
state-illegal enforcement (e.g. corrupt police officers). This updated theoretical 
framework benefits from the private ordering theory (Richman, 2005), which 
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compares the efficiencies and costs of private contract enforcement with traditional 
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Figure 2 suggests a new economic theory of the mafia by combining both the 
‘property rights theory’ and the theory of ‘market competition’. It illustrates the 
conditions that create the demand for alternative sources of protection and how 
people or merchants make their choice among different systems of enforcement in a 
free market economy. At the beginning, the direct outcome of the transition from a 
feudal society to a modern society is that the government or the monarch loses the 
monopoly over the means of production. As a result, private property rights become 
widely established and the number of market transactions increases dramatically.  
What follows is the increasing demand for protection that is used to secure citizens’ 
economic and individual rights, protect commercial transactions and foster a 
competitive market. The monopoly of the growing protection market is not inherent 
in the system of state law enforcement, especially in a country where public law 
enforcement and state courts are inefficient. Each enforcement mechanism has its 
own strengths and weakness, and the parties in either civil or criminal disputes also 
have different needs. Therefore, the demand for a certain kind of enforcement or 
protection is a result of rational choice. Citizens or merchants choose an 
enforcement mechanism according to their perception of cost-effectiveness.  
In order to provide a clear explanation of the ‘supply—market competition—demand 
for extra-legal protection’ framework, the following paragraphs offer an in-depth 
analysis of three main aspects of the updated framework.  
(1) Supply: The growing numbers of mafiosi or criminals who are better at 
providing violence than their protectees can be divided into two groups: local 
and newly-arrived (Gambetta 1993; Varese 2011a). Explaining the emergence 
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of local mafias in Russia, Varese suggests that a large number of newly-
unemployed people, including ex-soldiers, prison inmates, bandits and 
individuals who enjoy advantages in the use of violence, provide a pool of 
potential suppliers (Varese 2004). On the other hand, newly-arrived mafia 
groups who leave their territory of origin can become significant suppliers of 
private protection for local customers in a new territory (Morselli et al. 2011; 
Varese 2006, 2011a).  
In the case of mainland China, the Hong Kong triads are widely regarded as 
the newly-arrived mafia and are thought to play an important role in the 
private protection market. There is no doubt that triad societies have 
established themselves as visible actors in China’s criminal underworld (Lo 
2010). Since 2011, two influential theories—transplantation and 
mainlandisation—have been used to explain the emerging phenomenon of 
triad societies in mainland China. ‘Transplantation’, suggested by Varese 
(2006: 414), means ‘the ability of a mafia group to offer criminal protection 
over a sustained period of time outside its region of origin and routine 
operation’. According to Varese, the Hong Kong triads fail to transplant to 
mainland China for two major reasons: first, locally-based criminal syndicates 
which have established corrupt networks with government officials control 
the criminal underworld; second, corrupt fragments of the state apparatus, 
especially police officers, have become powerful extra-legal protectors 
(Varese 2011a). 
‘Triad mainlandisation’, suggested by Wing Lo and Sharon Kwok, refers to: 
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‘The process of making Hong Kong triad societies more reliant on mainland 
China for financial gain through social networking with Chinese officials, 
enterprises and criminal syndicates and taking advantage of legitimate and 
illegitimate business opportunities resulting from China’s economic growth 
and rising demand for goods and services’ (Lo and Kwok 2012: 83). 
Lo and Kwok argue that the Hong Kong triads are able to survive in a 
changing socioeconomic environment by collaborating with their mainland 
Chinese counterparts in win-win situations rather than by transplanting or 
competing with locally-based syndicates which are protected by government 
officials. This also demonstrates that triad societies fail to develop into a main 
protection supplier on the mainland. 
Moreover, the existing literature demonstrates that government officials, 
especially police officers, are actively engaging in the supply of illegal 
protection for illicit profits (Chin and Godson 2006; Qiu 2008). In China, the 
state and illegal enforcers (i.e. Red Mafia) might be the most significant 
unlawful protectors. In this case, the research into extra-legal protection 
needs to emphasize the role played by corrupt state police and security 
forces.  
Figure 3. The supply of extra-legal protectors 
Main types (a) Large number of unemployed people who enjoy violent activities 
in local markets 
 (b) Newly-arrived mafia groups  




(2) Demand for alternative sources of protection: Past research has tended to 
regard the demand for private enforcement as the outcome of weak law 
enforcement. The ‘property rights theory of mafia emergence’ posits a causal 
relationship between dysfunctional law enforcement and an increasing 
demand for alternative sources of protection (Y.K. Chu 2000; Gambetta 1993; 
Hill 2003; Tzvetkova 2008; F. Varese 2001; P. Wang 2011). The less trust 
people place in state law enforcement, the greater their demand for private 
protection services will be (Coleman 1994; Gambetta 2000b). Other 
contributing factors, for instance, newly-formed market economies and large-
scale illegal markets are also conducive to the birth of private protection 
agencies (Varese 2011b, 2011a).  
Figure 4. The demand for alternative sources of protection 
Contributing 
factors 
(a) Low level of trust 
(b) Newly-formed market economy 
(c) Dysfunctional law enforcement 
(d) Large illegal market 
 
(3) Demand for extra-legal protection through market competition: The ‘property 
rights theory of mafia emergence’ suggests that increasing demand for 
private protection is one fundamental contributing factor for the rise and 
transplantation of mafias. But it does not explain why it is mafias that arise 
rather than some other forms of non-state protection. This chapter explores 
why the service provided by a certain kind of enforcement mechanism is 
preferable to that offered by other systems of enforcement. The extra-legal 
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protection mechanism (either private-illegal or state-illegal) will emerge only 
when goods sold by extra-legal protectors enjoy comparative advantages in a 
competitive market. Five factors which could determine people’s choice are 
thoroughly discussed in the following. 




(b) Range of services 
(c) Availability of information  
(d) Ability to enforce sanctions 
(e) Accessibility of services  
 
(a) Cost-effectiveness. Cost-effectiveness analysis, which compares the relative 
costs and outcomes of two or more forms of protection and enforcement 
mechanism, is the most significant issue when people choose between 
various forms of enforcement. One type of enforcement mechanism can be 
widely used in ordinary business activities only if individuals believe that the 
benefits from the use of this enforcement mechanism exceed the cost. When 
the cost is greater than the sum of income, the commodity provided by 
enforcement organizations has transformed from ‘protection’ to ‘extortion’ 
(Gambetta, 1996; Varese, 2001). Private protection companies, state-illegal 
enforcers and mafias are private entrepreneurs who intend to maximise 
profits through a contract priced by mutual agreement between enforcer and 
enforced. Enforcers tend to supply services with higher quality and lower 
price for their customers if a stable relationship has been established (Varese, 
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2001; Chu, 2000). Some enforcers may supply services with a competitive 
price in order to gain market share. 
Efficiency of enforcement is to what extent an enforcer can produce an effect. 
Individuals or merchants adopt different strategies of enforcement to pursue 
efficiency and predictability in business relations (Hendley et al. 2001). 
Enforcers who possess specialized knowledge offer solutions tailored to 
individual disputes. An enforcement system which has the capability to act 
more swiftly with lower costs tends to succeed (Richman, 2005). As already 
seen, citizens sometimes reject help from law enforcement agencies because 
the process is exceptionally onerous and time-consuming.  
(b) Range of services. Each type of enforcement mechanism specializes in 
supplying a particular subset of enforcement services (Dixit 2004). The nature 
of disputes can determine the choice of enforcement mechanism. For 
example, not all disputes can be settled by police and the courts because the 
legal system may be unavailable at a time when physical rights are violated 
(Shleifer 1995). Private protection companies are independent agencies 
providing a range of services which are authorized by the government 
(Varese 2004). As this thesis will argue, both the Red Mafia and the Black 
Mafia in mainland China also specialise in the provision of private protection. 
(c) Availability of information. Information collection is a basic skill enforcers use 
to establish their reputation in the protection market. By becoming a 
customer of enforcers, a new trader can gain reliable information about 
previous cheating by trading partners, and information about the reliability of 
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the newcomer is spread through the community of traders in order to 
minimize the risk of being cheated. Ability to collect information can reduce 
the costs of monitoring and increase the speed of detecting violations 
(Gambetta 2000b). The other role of enforcement mechanisms is 
coordination, which is also based on information provision. Unfortunately, 
providing reliable information to customers about the cheating of trading 
partners is not always sufficient to prevent bad traders from cheating others. 
Therefore, enforcers should actively ‘coordinate their members’ responses to 
breaches of agreement and prevent free riding’ (McMillan and Woodruff 
2000: 24).  
(d) Ability to enforce sanctions. Imposing timely sanctions when a trader fails to 
fulfil a contract will increase the reputation of the enforcer, and several levels 
of sanction are available. Sometimes just the threat of punishment is enough 
to deter free-riding and cheating (Gambetta 2009), but often it is not enough. 
Enforcers resort to physical violence. For example, by using violence, mafias 
in legitimate markets are not only able to monitor compliance in cartel 
agreements, but can also effectively deter conspirators from cheating 
(Gambetta and Reuter 2000). Violence tends to be more effective than non-
violence, but the significance of non-violent means of enforcement cannot be 
dismissed completely. As Richman (2004) suggests, the threat of non-violent 
sanctions in merchant communities, such as the erosion of reputation, 
prohibition from future transactions and exclusion from community religious 
practices, are sometimes sufficient to induce compliance. 
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(e) Accessibility of services. As Barzel (2002) suggests, violent means of 
enforcement are only available within the enforcer’s jurisdiction. Mafia 
groups cannot advertise their services openly, because large-scale advertising 
will invite more police attention (Varese 2010b). Mafia groups therefore tend 
to provide services only for customers they are familiar with, which is a 
barrier to their further expansion.  
This chapter suggests an updated theory—the ‘market competition theory of mafia 
emergence’—which centres on the ‘supply—market competition—demand for 
extra-legal protection’ framework. It argues that extra-legal protection mechanisms 
(private-illegal and/or state-illegal) emerge as private enforcement in a state where 
the rule of law and state-sponsored institutions are weak and where alternative 
enforcement agencies do not possess competitive advantage over extra-legal 
protectors. In other words, unlawful protectors can establish their reputation in the 
provision of protection services if their services have relative advantages in the fields 
mentioned above.  
The ‘supply—market competition—demand for extra-legal protection’ model 
problematizes the economic theory of the mafia and suggests that, under different 
circumstances, another form of enforcement might develop as people attempt to 
resolve their disputes through the most cost-effective means.  
4. Applying the updated theory to interpret the rise of extra-legal 
protection in China  
The economic theory of the mafia suggested by Gambetta and Varese centres on a 
‘supply—demand for mafia services’ scheme, which suggests that the emergence of 
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mafias is directly linked to a weak state where the legal framework is confusing, the 
definition of property rights ambiguous, the judicial system weak, enforcement 
limited, and corruption rampant. The private ordering literature suggests various 
forms of enforcement mechanism can generate efficiencies over overloaded and 
procedure-laden public courts. Moreover, it points out that the study of extra-legal 
protection should not be limited to the mafia (private-illegal), because state-illegal 
enforcement should also be considered.  
Building on the two theoretical frameworks, a modified theory suggests that the 
inability of the state to supply protection for its citizens and settle commercial 
disputes may not inevitably result in the rise of extra-legal protectors. It suggests 
that extra-legal protection mechanisms will arise where state-sponsored protection 
enforcement is weak or absent, and private legal contract enforcers lose their 
competitive advantage over illegal protectors. 
The modified theory suggests that the demand for extra-legal protection is a result 
of the competitive advantage of unlawful protectors. Economic reform and market 
liberalization in China have achieved great success in the past 30 years, which 
inevitably attracts intense international attention. It is worth examining whether 
China’s great transformation is accompanied by the creation of a well-established 
legal framework and its accompanying public and private-legal enforcement. Based 
on the ‘market competition theory of mafia emergence’, the author proposes the 
following hypothesis:  
The rise of the extra-legal protection mechanism is the result of market 
competition. That is to say, Red Mafia (state-illegal) and/or Black Mafia (private-
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illegal) will emerge where the increasing demand for protection cannot be 
suitably fulfilled by state enforcement and where alternative enforcement 
agencies which make up the ‘protection deficit’ created by state failure are less 
efficient than extra-legal protectors. 
Since 1978, economic reform and privatisation in China have ended the state 
monopoly over the production and distribution of goods. The reforms also 
established private property rights, and private property owners expect their rights 
to be protected. Meanwhile, the growing illegal markets (e.g. gambling, prostitution 
and drug dealing) exponentially enlarge the demand for criminal protection. This 
thesis proposes that Chinese people have to rely on alternative enforcement 
mechanisms when state protection is insufficient. Figure 6 illustrates the basic 
features of the four main types of protection mechanism in mainland China, and 




Figure 6. Four types of third-party enforcement and their basic features in China 
(Gambetta 1993; Hendley et al. 2001; Richman 2004) 
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Drawing on the hypothesis mentioned above, he following chapters would present a 
methodological approach, and use fieldwork data to test the ‘market competition theory’ in 
the Chinese context. The efficiency of the Chinese legal system would be examined, after 
which special attention would be paid to various types of alternative protection mechanism, 
identifying the comparative and competitive advantage of each type of mechanism. 
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This project is an empirical study of extra-legal protection in mainland China since 
the economic reforms which began in the late 1970s. It examines the conditions 
under which extra-legal protection mechanisms (private-illegal and/or state-illegal) 
emerge. According to the ‘market-competition theory of mafia emergence’ 
suggested in chapter three, the main focus of this thesis is the method people in 
China use to resolve disputes, including state-sponsored law enforcement, state-
illegal enforcement, private-legal enforcement and private-illegal enforcement. It 
will follow a causal logic and employ qualitative methods, drawing on documentary 
and archival materials as well as interview data.   
This chapter firstly discusses the choice of methodology strategy and demonstrates 
why the case study approach is a preferred method. Secondly, it explains how this 
thesis uses a case study design, describes research sites, shows how the author dealt 
with the methodological problems that were encountered in the fieldwork, and 
illustrates the process of data analysis. Attention then turns to testing the hypothesis 
generated in chapter III, which argues that the rise of extra-legal protection 
mechanisms (Black Mafia and/or Red Mafia) in China is the result of market 
competition. In contrast, fieldwork fata suggests that economic behaviour of 
individuals (e.g. the choice of preferred enforcement mechanism) is embedded in 
social relations (i.e. guanxi networks). The divergence of interview data from the 
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original proposition encourages the author to propose alternative hypotheses by 
emphasizing the role of social relations in the emergence of extra-legal protection 
mechanisms.  
1. The choice of methodology 
Social-legal research uses several basic methodologies, including archival analyses, 
ethnographies, interviews and surveys. Each research strategy represents different 
ways of collecting, presenting and analysing empirical data. Each enjoys some 
advantages and disadvantages when compared with other strategies (Creswell 2009; 
Yin 2009). According to Yin (2009), three conditions finally determine the choice of 
strategy:  
‘(a) the type of research question posed, (b) the extent of control an 
investigator has over actual behavioural events, and (c) the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events’ (p. 5) 
Archival analysis is the preferred strategy for organizing older documents (Behrman 
and Davey 2001). The existing literature on dispute resolution in contemporary 
mainland China mainly focuses on the role of the judicial system in supplying private 
property protection and settling civil disputes. But literature relating to private forms 
of protection and enforcement, especially the extra-legal means of dispute 
resolution, is scanty. The scarcity of accessible extant documents encourages 
researchers to apply a diversity of approaches and techniques. 
Experimental or quasi-experimental studies can produce greater certainty than other 
strategies, but they are difficult to implement, as an investigator must be able to 
140 
 
manipulate all the remaining variables directly, precisely, and systematically (Boruch 
and Foley 2000; Montgomery 2009; Yin 2009). Experimental studies afford maximum 
control over behavioural events that cannot be duplicated in real life, leading to the 
need to find other ways to address common situations in which randomized field 
trials are used.  
Where a question is innovative, where the agents cannot be controlled, and where 
written records do not exist or only partially cover a topic, then ethnographies or 
interview methods are called for. Ethnography draws attention on the fact that ‘the 
ethnographer immerses him- or herself in a group for an extended period of time, 
observing behaviour, listening to what is said in conversations both between others 
and with the fieldworker and asking questions’ (Bryman and Teevan 2004: 402). 
Ethnographers gather data through interviews and the collection of existing 
documents in the course of their research, which is regarded as something separate 
from participant observation (Bryman and Teevan 2004; Taylor 1993). However, 
ethnographic fieldwork is inherently longitudinal in character because the observer 
usually spends a relatively long time, for example, two or three years, conducting 
participant observation in a social setting. Time constraints require the author to 
adopt interview methods. 
Investigators who aim to conduct a standard survey interview or structured 
interview need to have a full understanding of the research topic. Interviewers using 
the standard survey interview suffer greater risk of contaminating their respondents’ 
answers (Bryman and Teevan 2004; Oakley 1981, 1998). Bryman (2008: 463) 
suggests that the interviewer-interviewee relationship in a structured interview is a 
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form of hierarchical or power relationship as ‘interviewers arrogate to themselves 
the right to ask questions, implicitly placing their interviewees in a position of 
subservience or inferiority’. The standard survey interview or structured interview is 
inconsistent with data collection in mainland China as the author lacked a thorough 
understanding of extra-legal protection in China before the start of the fieldwork. 
Qualitative interviewing, including unstructured interview and semi-structured 
interview, is a powerful tool in socio-legal research. It enables interviewers to gain 
access to their participants’ expert knowledge on how people in mainland China 
settle their disputes and why they rely on extra-legal protectors. Qualitative 
interviewing is a reciprocal process, so interviewees might contribute information 
which seemed irrelevant before the interview but turns to be important. For 
instance, qualitative research, as Bryman (2008) suggests, frequently entails ‘the 
reconstruction of events by asking interviewees to think back over how a certain 
series of events unfolded in relation to a current situation’ (p. 466). The 
disadvantage of qualitative interviewing is that interviewers’ characteristics (e.g. age, 
race, and gender) may cause bias and response variance (Hox et al. 1991). In this 
case, interviewers who prefer to adopt qualitative interviewing methods are 
required to have training in both face to face and telephone interviewing so as to 
reduce the ‘interviewer effect’. In addition, the time-consuming nature of 
unstructured interviews suggests that the semi-structured interview combined with 
archival analysis is the preferable data collection technique for this study. 
Histories and case studies, both of which can use multiple sources of data—primarily 
archival data and interview data—are preferred research strategies that are 
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frequently used to conduct exploratory and explanatory studies, for example, 
dealing with ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin 2009). This doctoral thesis is an 
empirical study of extra-legal means of dispute resolution in mainland China, which 
aims to explore what is extra-legal protection in China, why extra-legal protection 
and enforcement mechanisms emerge, and how people in China mobilize various 
resources to respond to the increasing number of civil disputes in a socialist market 
economy. Histories and/or case studies were therefore approaches worth 
considering. 
Histories are the preferred strategy when dealing with the ‘dead’ past. They are 
conducted by utilizing primary and secondary sources, and cultural and physical 
artefacts (Hobbs 2000). For instance, studies concerned with the emergence of the 
Sicilian mafia are mainly based on archival research with interviews and 
conversations (Albini 1971; Blok 1974; Hess 1973). But the use of archival research 
with interviews is insufficient for this thesis as extra-legal protection is a previously 
unexplored area of research. 
The case study is the best research method for this project. As Robert K. Yin 
emphasized, the unique strength of the case study is that researchers can make use 
of a full variety of evidence. Case study enables in-depth analysis of complex 
configurations of factors in a finite setting. In other words, large areas of overlap 
between case studies and histories do exist, but two sources of evidence, including 
‘direct observation of the events being studied’ and ‘interviews with the persons 
involved in the events’ (an oral history might be an exception), are only available for 
the case study (Yin 2009: 8). In order to offer a clear picture of how scholars use case 
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study, this chapter firstly looks at the most recent and influential publications in 
criminology which rely on its use. 
2. Appropriate use of the case study method 
Bowling’s study of Policing the Caribbean (2010) is a classic example of the case 
study. Drawing on over 160 interviews (80 tape-recorded interviews and the same 
number of unrecorded interviews) as well as observing and interacting with chief 
police officers, customs officials and coastguards, as well as immigration, security, 
military, and government officials, Policing the Caribbean examines the emergence 
of policing practices that extend beyond the boundaries of the nation state in 
responding to drug trafficking and organized crime—a threat to the national security 
of the Caribbean as well as other parts of the world (Bowling 2010). An embedded 
case study is used in Bowling’s research: first, the general case of transnational 
policing, which includes ‘cooperation among Caribbean countries, and between 
them (individually and collectively) and Britain and North America’; second, specific 
cases, which include cooperation among law enforcement and security organizations 
in the local, national, and transnational spheres (Bowling 2010: 19). An embedded 
case study makes it possible for the author to use various sources of evidence, such 
as documents analysis, intensive interviews and observation.  
In Where there is no government: enforcing property rights in common law Africa, 
Joireman (2011) argues that privately-ordered institutions—customary leaders, 
bureaucratic entrepreneurs, nongovernmental organizations, and specialists in 
violence—persist in providing competing enforcement mechanisms for property 
rights in three common law countries (i.e. Uganda, Kenya and Ghana) where 
property rights are ill-defined and state law enforcement mechanisms fail to protect 
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individuals’ property. This book is a brilliant example of case study, using multiple 
sources of evidence—primarily document analysis, survey, and interviews—to 
describe and interpret the phenomenon of non-governmental mechanisms for 
property rights enforcement in common law Africa. Joireman chose these countries 
because their governments were willing to devote law-making effort and scarce 
resources to strengthening the role of the state in property rights protection and 
enforcement (Joireman 2011).  
Varese’s work on mafia movement offers a representative case study in the field of 
organized crime research (Varese 2006, 2011a, 2012b). In order to ascertain which 
factors make it possible for mafia groups to successfully conquer new territories, 
Varese (2011a) in Mafias on the move examines numerous cases in which long-
established mafia groups in different countries (or areas) transplanted themselves to 
new territories. The comparison of negative and positive cases of mafia 
transplantation enables Varese to specify the conditions that can lead to successful 
transplantation.  
The criteria for selection—cases where there was transplantation or indication that it 
was ever attempted—help Varese exclude irrelevant cases. Many intervening 
variables are considered by Varese in order to establish the conditions that can 
generate demand for services offered by newly-arrived mafias. Local conditions 
which facilitate mafia transplantation include advanced market economies or newly 
booming markets, the level of interpersonal trust and civil engagement, presence of 
local illegal protectors, as well as the level of corruption (Varese 2011a). Analysing 
both failed and successful cases of transplantation, Varese explains in detail how 
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transplantation works and why it sometimes fails, and successfully establishes an 
influential theory of mafia movement—the ‘property rights theory of mafia 
transplantation’.  
Based on both quantitative and qualitative evidence, the importance of case study as 
a research method should be emphasized as it can ‘accommodate a variety of 
methods with respect to the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific 
approaches to data analyses’ (Yin 2009: 14).  Bowling (2010: 18) further suggests 
that ‘this method uses multiple sources of evidence—but primarily document 
analysis, interviews, and observation—to describe and explain a social phenomenon 
in its real-life context’. The following paragraphs discuss the use of case study as a 
way of exploring the rise of extra-legal protectors in contemporary China. 
3. Research design 
In order to have an in-depth understanding of how extra-legal protectors achieve 
competitive advantage in China, this research adopts a case study design. According 
to Yin (2009), the unique strength of the case study is its use of multiple sources of 
evidence, such as document analysis, interviews and observation. In contrast with 
single-case designs, the evidence from multiple-case designs, as Yin argues, ‘is often 
considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being 
more robust’ (p. 46). This study uses an ‘embedded case study’ design. It consists of 
two distinct units of analysis: (1) extra-legal means of dispute resolution in the 
Chinese cities of Qufu and Chongqing; (2) specific cases: the use of the Black Mafia 
(private-illegal) by the local business community in Qufu and the Red Mafia (state-
illegal) in Chongqing.  
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Table 2: An embedded multiple case design 
 
3.1. Research sites 
The technical restrictions for both Chinese and Western scholars who attempt to do 
fieldwork in China are obvious: China is a vast territory that consists of 34 provinces, 
autonomous regions or municipalities with great variations in economic situation, 
landscape and climate. China also has a vast melting-pot of different nationalities 
with extremely diverse cultural traditions (Shen et al. 2010). Furthermore, financial 
costs and time constraints make empirical research in all regions of mainland China 
extremely difficult.  
All data for this study were collected from two cities: Qufu and Chongqing. Qufu is a 
small city and the hometown of the author. The author’s family members have 
established a social network, facilitating access to local businessmen, the police 
archive and local court files. The data collected from Qufu is used to explore why and 
how individuals and entrepreneurs resolve their troubles by using the extra-legal 
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protection and quasi law enforcement offered by street gangs. The main obstacle in 
Qufu is also obvious: evidence about government officials’ involvement in selling 
illegal protection is extremely difficult to access as there is little archive material, and 
in-depth interviews would pose significant risks. 
But Chongqing is different, because it seems easier to gain access to open sources 
about how the Red Mafia functions. Chongqing is one of the biggest cities in 
southwest China with a population of more than 30 million. The Chongqing 
government under the leadership of Bo Xilai24 achieved great success in its anti-
mafia and anti-corruption campaign. From June 2009 to November 2011, 77 
government officials, including over 20 senior police officers, were arrested for their 
involvement in corrupt networks and the supply of extra-legal protection to locally-
based crime groups (Jacobs 2009; Telegraph 2009; Xinhua 2011). The Chongqing 
case illustrates both the existence of corrupt police officers who sell protection to 
locally-based criminals and the emergence of corrupt guanxi networks within the 
criminal justice system. High-ranking officials distribute government appointments 
within guanxi networks and shelter corrupt transactions between mid- and low-
ranking officials and illegal entrepreneurs or criminals (Wang 2013b). 
                                                          
24
 Bo Xilai was a member of the Central Politburo and the Communist Party chief in Chongqing from 
2007 to 2012. He was removed from power in March 2012, accused of abusing power, taking bribes 
and violating party discipline. For more information, please see: BBC 'Bo Xilai: China Parliament Expels 
Disgraced Politician', (updated 26 October 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-
20091588>, accessed 13 March 2013. 
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3.1.1. The city of Qufu 
Table 3: Location of Qufu (from Google Maps) 
 
Qufu is a county-level city located in southwest Shandong province. Official 
documents show that Qufu covers 896 sq km, and has a population of 650,000 (Zhou 
2004). It is the hometown of Confucius, a Chinese thinker, educator and social 
philosopher of the Spring and Autumn Period (771 – 476 BC) (Hall and Ames 1987). 
Several famous tourist attractions, including the Three Memorial Edifices of 
Confucius (Three Kong 三孔)—the Temple of Confucius (孔庙), Confucius Mansion 
(孔府) and Confucius Forests (孔林)—and The Temple of Yan Hui (颜庙), occupy a 
large section of downtown Qufu (Zhou 2004). 
The tourism industry has always been the mainstay of the local economy; for 
example, Qufu can raise 165 million RMB each year from Three Kong’s ticket sales. 
Government documents reveal that the average per capita income of Qufu residents 
in the year 2010 was 14,011 RMB ($2,116), representing a 9.1% year-on-year growth. 
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The annual per capita consumption of Qufu residents in the same year averaged 
9,973.2 RMB ($1,506), up 19.5% on 2009 (Miao 2011).  
Qufu Economic Development Zone (EDZ) was set up in 1995 and advanced to 
provincial level EDZ in 2005. Qufu EDZ is divided into two main parts: Western Zone 
and Eastern Zone. By the end of 2010, the total number of enterprises in the two 
zones grew to 300. On 30 June 2011, the Shanghai-Beijing High-Speed Railway 
opened, which has contributed to the development of the local economy as Qufu 
East station is one of 24 stations on the line (Foster 2011).  
Since 2009, the ‘Socialist New Rural Construction Programme’ has been 
implemented in Shandong province (Utopia 2010). This project aims to establish new 
rural communities by dismantling farmhouses and merging several villages into one 
giant alliance village that usually consists of over 10,000 people. Most local 
construction companies in Qufu have taken part in this programme. Over 50 
construction enterprises employ a total of 16,100 employees in Qufu. In 2010, the 
output value of the construction sector was 1.727 billion RMB, up 35.1% year-on-
year. The four biggest construction companies dominated the construction market 
with a 39% market share (Liu 2011a).  
The booming construction industry is associated with the rise of various types of 
dispute. Street gangsters have become visible mediators or enforcers frequently 
invited by private enterprises and local authorities to deal with disputes that are 
deemed risky. For example, gang leaders are invited by real estate developers and 
local authorities to deal with the problem of ‘nail households’—residents who refuse 
to relocate.  
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Since 2007, an underground banking industry has flourished in Qufu. Although there 
are no official documents or published materials concerning this social problem, 
informal communication with the local business community suggests that these 
underground bank managers normally recruit professional enforcers or locally-based 
criminals to collect debt. The study of Qufu’s underground banking system will 
provide valuable material about how enforcement mechanisms work in the criminal 
underworld.  
3.1.2. The city of Chongqing 
Table 4: Location of Chongqing (from Google Maps) 
 
Chongqing is one of the four province-level municipalities in People’s Republic of 
China, with a population over 30 million as of 2012. It is divided into 40 county-level 
subdivisions. Since 1997, when it was separated from Sichuan province, Chongqing 
has become an important industrial area in Western China (Xinhua 2008). Jon 
Sigurdson and Krystyna Palonka (2008) state that massive financial support from the 
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Chinese Central Government has successfully transformed Chongqing into the 
largest economic, trade and financial centre in Western China, and ‘its industrial 
output (179 billion RMB) value ranked 11th among the 35 biggest city economies in 
China in 2000, though it ranked behind the top ten most industrialized coastal cities, 
all of which had attracted much greater foreign investment during the reform era’ (p. 
2). Benefiting from China’s western development strategy, Chongqing experienced 
tremendous economic growth in the past decade. In 2012, Chongqing's total GDP 
grew to 1146 billion RMB (US$181 billion) with GDP per capita of 39,083 RMB 
($6,191). The average per capita income of Chongqing residents in the same year 
was 22,968 RMB ($3,638) (Xinhua 2013).  
Chongqing’s rapid economic growth was, however, accompanied by the rise of 
locally-based crime groups and rampant corruption in the public sector. The 
crackdown on crime and corruption that followed, under the leadership of Bo Xilai, 
achieved extraordinary success. The Chongqing crime crackdown was directed not 
only at criminal groups but also at powerful officials who safeguarded locally-based 
criminals and illegal entrepreneurs, which is a marked departure from other anti-
mafia campaigns that only focused on combating gangsters (Branigan 2009; 
Economist 2009; J. FlorCruz 2009). From October 2009 to July 2010, thousands of 
suspects were questioned, 1544 suspects were arrested, including 19 suspected 
crime bosses, hundreds of criminal gangs, and over 20 corrupt police officers, 
including at least six district police chiefs and the city’s deputy police chief—Wen 
Qiang (BBC 2009).  
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Chongqing’s anti-Mafia campaign helped Bo earn national recognition. It made the 
public realize how the Red Mafia had emerged and how dysfunctional local 
government had become. However, the fall of Bo Xilai can be regarded as the biggest 
political scandal of 2012. His fall also gave rise to negative criticism of the Chongqing 
approach—‘singing red’ (‘changhong’) and ‘striking black’ (‘dahei’) (FlorCruz 2012; 
Lafraniere et al. 2012). This thesis does not, however, incorporate Bo’s fall in its 
analysis, for two reasons: on the one hand, the Bo Xilai incident is the result of 
political struggle, and the lack of reliable data makes it very difficult to monitor 
trends and offer useful conclusions; on the other hand, Bo’s fall does not influence 
the author’s understanding of the rise of the Red Mafia—corrupt government 
officials who derive their major income from the provision of unlawful protection. 
4. Challenges in data collection 
Fieldwork was conducted in two Chinese cities (Qufu and Chongqing) from 
December 2011 to early March 2012. Interpersonal relationship (guanxi) turned out 
to be the most important resource for the author in the entire research process, 
including getting research access, obtaining oral informed consent, and collecting 
reliable information.  
Benefiting from his family members’ guanxi network, the author obtained easy 
access to interviewees in Qufu. Data collection there involved 22 in-depth semi-
structured interviews with police officers, local government officials, entrepreneurs, 
private (illegal) bankers, lawyers and judges, as well as eight focus group discussions 
with a total of 23 interviewees including project managers from local construction 
companies, staff in local hospitals, and government officials. Entrepreneurs and 
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private bankers’ experiences, in particular, provided valuable sources of data on the 
performance of local law enforcement agencies, the rise of debt collection gangs, 
and the importance of social relations (guanxi) for private enterprises.  
During the fieldwork in Chongqing, political factors emerged as a major obstacle in 
gaining access to interviewees. With the help of Li Ren, an associate professor at 
Southwest University of Political Science and Law in Chongqing, the author drafted a 
list of potential interviewees in advance. In order to improve the quality of 
interviews, the author contacted potential subjects via telephone, email or instant 
messaging in order to make appointments before travelling to Chongqing, but all 
potential participants rejected the author’s invitation because they were afraid to be 
involved in discussing this sensitive political issue. As interviewees explained, 
‘according to the Chongqing government, government officials, academics, and even 
journalists are not allowed to make any criticism of Chongqing’s anti-mafia 
campaign’(Journalist B 2011; Journalist C 2011).  
The author arrived in Chongqing and started empirical work in December 2011. In 
the first couple of days, potential interviewees refused to accept any interviews 
concerning Chongqing’s strike black campaign because they suspected the author 
might be a plainclothes police officer from the Ministry of Public Security. Moreover, 
the author failed to gain access to any police reports or court files because officials 
from the criminal justice system did not trust any researchers from overseas 
institutions at all. However, with the help of Li Ren and Xu Pengxiang (a prosecutor in 
Chongqing), the author managed to conduct one focus group discussion with four 
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prosecutors and one police officer as well as nine semi-structured interviews with 
journalists, academics, prosecutors, taxi drivers, and a lawyer. 
It was not practical to provide an information sheet before each interview because 
all interviewees felt cautious and were reluctant to offer consent even orally after 
they read the information sheets. The difficulty of requiring participants to sign an 
informed consent form in China is also emphasized by the existing literature (Cornet 
2010; B. Liang and Lu 2006). Unlike western countries, there are no laws or 
regulations or a legal culture that can efficiently protect privileged information. 
Moreover, a confidentiality agreement or a mere promise of confidentiality may 
bring trouble for a researcher as it may lead participants to question the legitimacy 
of the research (Heimer and Thogersen 2006).  
Instead of offering interviewees an information sheet, the author explained the 
research orally (including aims of the research, principal research questions, and 
interviewees’ right of withdrawal). ‘Can I ask some questions?’, which was an 
informal way of expressing ‘can I interview you?’, was frequently used when the 
author attempted to obtain consent from potential interviewees. This is because the 
term ‘interview’ is such a formal word in Chinese, placing even more pressure on the 
potential interviewees. Most interviewees allowed the author or his assistant (Jingyi 
Wang) to take notes during interviews, but a recorder was strictly prohibited. 
In order to acquire more data on Chongqing’s anti-mafia and anti-corruption 
campaign, the author applied several strategies. First, a close teacher-student 
relationship enabled the author to conduct interviews with two criminology 
professors in Shanghai, Qiu Geping and Jin Qigao, who specialize in research on 
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Chinese organized crime and corruption. The comments from both professors 
provided valuable insights into Chongqing’s corrupt networks. The interviews were 
followed by frequent email communications with these two professors, which 
included thorough discussions on the emerging extra-legal protection market and 
corrupt guanxi networks in contemporary China.  
The author was invited by one criminology journal in China, Issues on Juvenile Crime 
and Delinquency, to organize a special discussion concerning extra-legal protection 
and mafia theories. Two leading criminologists, Diego Gambetta and Federico Varese, 
offered papers on the origin and development of mafia theories (Gambetta 2013; 
Varese 2013a). In response, two top legal scholars, He Bingsong and Qiu Geping, 
provided papers criticizing Gambetta’s and Varese’s papers and offering their own 
understanding of extra-legal protection in mainland China (He 2012; Qiu 2012). The 
author also submitted a paper about how to apply mafia theories to mainland China, 
which received a large amount of criticism from Chinese academics (Wang 2013c). 
Debates among Chinese and EU scholars enabled the author to obtain an in-depth 
understanding of mafia theories as well as Chinese-style extra-legal protection.  
The second strategy was to use open source data from China and foreign countries. 
The Chinese CNKI database provided the author with access to a large number of 
journal papers, news reports, conference papers, and doctoral theses about the 
Chongqing crime crackdown. These open materials offered rich details, but their 
limitation was obvious: almost all these publications lacked evidence of independent 
thinking due to strict media control in China. The author therefore turned to the 
viewpoints of Western media. In order to ensure the reliability of the information 
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from Western media, the author mainly focused on mainstream news reports or 
comments, such as those in The Times, BBC, The Economist, The Telegraph, The 
Guardian, The New York Times, and CNN. In particular, this research draws on a 
series of news articles written by notable journalists, such as Jaime FlorCruz and 
Malcolm Moore, who have lived and worked in China for many years. 
Third, after the removal of Bo Xilai as party chief of Chongqing in March 2012, the 
author attempted to gain access to police archives and court files. Similar to the first 
request during the fieldwork in Chongqing, government officials refused to offer any 
materials. The request for access to police records was also denied, which forced the 
author to adopt an alternative strategy: the acquisition of government records 
through private channels. A review of existing literature helped identify one law 
professor in Chongqing who had published a number of high-quality papers about 
Chongqing’s crime crackdown. A close relationship with the Chongqing government 
may be what allowed this professor to obtain police and court files. Li Ren employed 
his social networks to gain access to this law professor, but the professor refused to 
provide the data he possessed and even his email address. This indicates that 
Chongqing’s anti-mafia campaign is still a politically sensitive topic. 
Overall, the author carried out a total of 33 individual interviews, nine focus group 
discussions with a total of 28 participants, an extensive review of published materials 
and, most significantly, a number of email communications. In order to ensure 
coding reliability, all data were coded by the author. The coding process worked as 
follows: first, a series of valuable news articles and journal papers about China’s 
criminal protection were added to complement the fieldwork data. Second, the 
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author read through the materials in printed form and coded manually. Third, the 
data were arranged on a coding tree with three branches: ‘the Chongqing case 
(corrupt guanxi network)’, ‘quasi police organization’, and ‘the use of mafia services 
and guanxi by private enterprises’. Third, the author went back into the documents 
and coded them using NVivo. 
The analysis of interview data suggests that the choice of private-illegal and/or state-
illegal enforcement mechanisms is not purely determined by market rules. During 
the author’s fieldwork, the term guanxi was frequently and spontaneously 
mentioned by most interviewees. Guanxi was described by interviewees as an 
important mechanism employed by individuals to protect rights and facilitate 
transactions. Moreover, guanxi facilitates corrupt transactions and provides a secret 
channel for the buying and selling of extra-legal services offered by both the Red 
Mafia and Black Mafia. The new findings and viewpoints from fieldwork prompt the 
author to test the hypothesis generated in chapter III and propose new hypotheses 
by emphasizing the significance of social relations (guanxi) into the discussions of 
state weakness and the rise of extra-legal protectors.  
5. Social embeddedness: Questioning the ‘market competition theory 
of mafia emergence’ 
According to the ‘market competition theory of mafia emergence’ suggested in 
chapter III, the extra-legal protection mechanism (either private-illegal or state-
illegal) will emerge where the increasing demand for protection cannot be suitably 
fulfilled by state enforcement (i.e. public law and state courts) and where alternative 
enforcement agencies which make up the ‘protection deficit’ created by state failure 
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are less efficient than extra-legal protectors. This market competition theory 
emphasizes substitutive and complementary relationships between state and market 
in the provision of protection, and argues that a certain type of protection and 
enforcement mechanism will emerge if it achieves a sustainable competitive 
advantage over the competing products and services offered by other mechanisms.  
This market competition theory assumes a perfectly competitive market of private 
protection and its accompanying rationalizing behaviour by the actors in such a 
market. A perfect market (or perfect competition) is defined by several 
characteristics, including sufficient information, zero entry and exit barriers, 
intelligent buyers and suppliers, zero transaction costs (Arrow 1959; Robinson 1934). 
Market participants are always fully informed, perfectly logical, and able to deduce 
their optimum choice, no matter how complex their situation is (Simon 1955). The 
explanation of individual behaviour in purely rational terms is problematic because 
‘actual action is influenced by irrational factors’ (Weber 1978: 22). As Fligstein (1993: 
11) argues: 
‘[Actors] are assumed to construct rationales for their behavior on the basis of 
how they view the world. Their goals and strategies result from those views and 
are not the product of an abstract rationality’. 
Classical and neoclassical economics assume perfect individual rationality and 
focus on how people make choices (Becker 1976), while new economic 
sociologists argue that ‘economic action is embedded in structures of social 
relation, in modern industrial society’ (Granovetter 1985: 481). Economic action 
can be regarded as a subordinate and a special case of social action which is 
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constrained by on-going social relations (Avgerou and Li 2013; Granovetter 1992; 
Weber 1978). ‘Embeddedness’, as Granovetter (1992: 25) argues, refers to ‘the 
fact that economic action and outcomes, like all social action and outcomes, are 
affected by actors' dyadic (pairwise) relations and by the structure of the overall 
network of relationships’.  
In parallel with Granovetter’s argument on embeddedness, fieldwork data from 
two Chinese cities (Chongqing and Qufu) suggest that economic behaviour of 
individuals (e.g. the choice of preferred enforcement mechanism) is embedded in 
a particular social structural context—guanxi network—rather than dictated by 
purely economic considerations. Confronted with various choices (e.g. both legal 
and illegal enforcement mechanisms), economic actors often ‘lack adequate 
information, have difficulties in predicting consequences of decisions and 
therefore lack confidence in making strategic decisions’ (Lee et al. 2001: 55). 
Under such circumstances, the ways in which Chinese people seek protection and 
enforcement services tend to rely on interpersonal relationships. To be specific, 
people tend to rely on the information passed through guanxi networks as they 
are efficient and reliable (Luo 2000). Exchange behaviour in networks of 
interpersonal relationships emphasizes reciprocity, which means to return good 
for good as well as ill for ill (Chen and Chen 2004b). The reciprocal exchange 
largely discourages opportunistic behaviour including misrepresentation, 
manipulation, lying, cheating, and deception (Anderson 1988; John 1984; 
Williamson 1975).  
160 
 
The buying and selling of private protection requires a mechanism to deal with 
these opportunistic behaviours. This is fundamentally important in illicit markets 
of private protection which are characterized by high uncertainty about both the 
price of these illegal transactions and their results. The exchange of private 
protection services is embedded in the existing guanxi networks. Reciprocity, trust 
and reputation within guanxi networks will reduce illegal transaction costs, 
guarantee quality of service, and punish violators. 
China is characterized by the coexistence of two systems of order: the formal legal 
system and guanxi (Potter 2002). The influence of guanxi is not limited to business 
transactions.  An overview of guanxi literature and the analysis of fieldwork data 
suggest that law enforcement and judicial activities are also embedded in guanxi 
networks. This thesis will argue that the embeddedness of police and judicial 
activities in social relations make China’s legal system ineffective, unequal, and 
corrupt. Fieldwork data suggests that the ‘market competition theory of mafia 
emergence’ is useless, which encourages the author to incorporate guanxi—
Chinese style social relations—into Gambetta’s classical argument on state failure 
(or weakness) and the rise of mafias. This line of thinking gives rise to a list of 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: the coexistence of guanxi and the formal legal system or the 
embeddedness of police and judicial activities in guanxi networks means that 
state-sponsored law enforcement agencies are unable to provide equal and 
sufficient protection for private property owners. 
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Hypothesis 2: guanxi networks facilitate corrupt transactions within and 
between public and private sectors, resulting in collective corruption within 
political establishments and the rise of state-illegal protectors (i.e. the Red 
Mafia). 
Hypothesis 3: corruption and inequality within law enforcement agencies—the 
key features of state weakness—prompts private property owners to seek 
alternative sources of protection (e.g. the Black Mafia). 
Hypothesis 4: the buying and selling of black mafia services is dictated by the 
trust and reputation within the guanxi network. 
Drawing on existing literature and fieldwork data, the following chapters will test 
these hypotheses. Chapter V is a theoretical analysis of the coexistence of the formal 
legal system and guanxi. It describes the gradual establishment of the rule of law, 
discusses the changing significance of guanxi before and after economic reform, and 
most importantly examines the effect of guanxi on legal institutions. Empirical data 
from Chongqing are used in Chapter VI to examine the corruption-facilitating role of 
guanxi. It emphasizes the importance of guanxi in the creation of illegal job markets 
(the buying and selling of public appointments) and the emergence of corrupt 
networks between law enforcers and locally-based criminals. The Chongqing case 
provides valuable insights into the Red Mafia’s structure, the way in which it 
functions, and major services it provides. Based on interview data from Qufu, 
Chapter VII examines the rise of the Black Mafia—street gangs specializing in the 
provision of extra-legal protection and quasi law enforcement—and stresses the 
importance of guanxi in the buying and selling of private protection. The analysis of 
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Chinese mafias (both red and black) criticizes the absolutization of the market, and 
demonstrates that Granovetter’s theory on the embeddedness of social action—
including police and judiciary activities as well as the exchange of private 
protection—can complement Gambetta’s economic theory that builds on the supply 






















The guanxi network operating as a governance mechanism is an important aspect of 
daily life as it can widely affect company performance and individual behaviour (Gu 
et al. 2008). Within the emerging literature on guanxi, two issues are emphasized by 
China scholars: the historical and cultural roots of guanxi, and the shifting patterns of 
guanxi practice (Chen and Chen 2004a; Gold et al. 2002b; Guthrie 1998; Lovett et al. 
1999; Luo 2000; Yang 2002). Much empirical research highlights the enduring 
significance of guanxi in Chinese society where business behaviour revolves around 
personal relationships (guanxi) and China’s legal system is heavily influenced by 
guanxi. This demonstrates that people’s behaviour is not only influenced by 
economic considerations and legal institutions, but also circumscribed by their 
guanxi networks (Michelson 2007; Redding 1993; Zhan 2012).  
Meanwhile, many of the world’s foremost legal scholars and social scientists have 
explored China’s judicial reform, discussed the growth of law and legality, criticised 
China’s global road to judicial independence, and identified the challenge of rule of 
law reforms (Orts 2001; Peerenboom 2009; Potter 1999; Woo and Gallagher 2011). 
Drawing on the existing research on the legal institutions as well as the guanxi 
network, a series of scholars have conducted extensive research on the co-existence 
of and interactions between these two most influential systems (Li 2003; Schramm 
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and Taube 2003a; Xin and Pearce 1996). However, there is no existing literature 
examining whether the co-existence of both systems can sufficiently support 
economic activities and fully meet the current demand for protection.  
China’s economic reform is associated with the revival of private property and the 
establishment of a socialist market economy. This, however, has not been 
accompanied by the creation of an effective legal system that assures truth, justice, 
rectitude, efficiency and effectiveness (Gong 2004; Li 2012). Under such 
circumstances, Chinese people tend to use guanxi—a Chinese form of social 
network—‘to make up for the lack of the rule of law and transparency in rules and 
regulations’ (Dunfee and Warren 2001: 197; Zhang et al. 2009: 492). Most China 
scholars stress the positive side of guanxi by discussing the substitutive and 
complementary relationships between the guanxi network and the legal system (Luo 
2000; Peng 2003; Xin and Pearce 1996). But the existing literature neglects the 
negative influence of guanxi practice on China’s legal system. The Chinese 
government, as this chapter will argue, lacks the ability to solve the problem of 
corruption that is embedded in the guanxi network.  
The first hypothesis predicts that the embeddedness of judicial and police activities 
into guanxi networks undermines China’s newly-formed legal system. The aim of this 
chapter is to examine the extent, nature and impact of the coexistence of both 
systems (guanxi and law) on Chinese society. Consistent with the first hypothesis, a 
thorough review of the existing literature in this chapter will argue that the 
coexistence of the legal system and the guanxi network does not necessarily result in 
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a positive outcome. In other words, guanxi in contemporary China damages the 
performance of the legal system (Gu et al. 2008).  
The structure of this chapter is as follows: section 2 describes how private property 
rights are created, and discusses the process of recognising private property and 
constructing the legal system in China. Section 3 focuses on the definition issues of 
guanxi, and analyses the changing roles of the guanxi network since economic 
reform began. Section 4 develops a framework for studying the institutional 
interactions between guanxi and the formal legal system. It adopts an institutional 
approach to assess the ability of their coexistence to protect property rights, enforce 
contractual or relational agreements, secure business transactions, and resolve 
disputes. The concluding section emphasizes that guanxi in contemporary China has 
transformed from a complementary institution to an informal institution that both 
destroys the formal legal system and contributes to the rise of extra-legal protectors.   
1. The reassignment of property rights and the establishment of 
China’s formal legal system in the economic reform era 
In contrast to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, which followed the 
‘shock therapy/big bang’ path, China’s economic transition from a centrally planned 
to a market-oriented system adopted a gradual approach and has achieved 
spectacular growth since 1978 (Holz 2008; Lin et al. 1996; McMillan and Naughton 
1992; Naughton 1996). Economic growth and the construction of a market economy 
require the state to establish an institutional framework offering stable and 
predictable property rights and contracts, and provide effective mechanisms for 
addressing disputes and conflicts (Clarke et al. 2006; Nee 2000; Xu 2009c). In order 
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to understand how China’s reform has been carried out, this section centres on 
three aspects: the wide creation of private property rights, the recognition of private 
property rights and the growing importance of China’s legal institutions.  
1.1. Reform as a reassignment of property rights25 
From the Qin Dynasty (221-206 BC) to the last Emperor in 1911, China was a country 
where people recognised the supreme authority of the emperor. The emperor had 
absolute power to determine people’s way of life, rights and obligations. Imperial 
power could easily reach every corner of the country (Zhang 2008c). After the 
establishment of the new China in 1949, Mao Zedong, the founding leader of the 
People’s Republic of China, adopted Soviet-style socialism and regarded Marxism-
Leninism as the ruling ideology of the country (Lifton and Mao 1969). ‘Public 
ownership’ in Chairman Mao’s theory was the core element of socialism, and 
‘private ownership’ was characterised as ‘evil’ (Xu 2009c; Zhang 2008c). At the 
beginning of the country’s first five-year plan in 1953, the government stepped into 
the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, and accomplished the socialist 
transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce in 
late 1956 (Mao et al. 1992). As a result, private property was completely abolished 
by the Communist Party, and private enterprise almost completely disappeared (Qin 
and Zhou 2008). 
                                                          
25
 Walder and Oi also used this as the subtitle in their co-authored book chapter. Please see: Walder, 
A. G. and Oi, J. C. (1999), ‘Property rights in the Chinese Economy: contours of the process of change’, 
in Andrew G. Walder and Jean C. Oi (eds), Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Stanford 
University Press).  
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After the death of Mao in 1976, Deng Xiaoping and his followers organized a 
nationwide discussion called ‘Practice as the Sole Criterion for Testing the Truth’ to 
question Mao’s socialist theory, re-evaluate Mao and his legacy, and help the victims 
of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) regain their power (Lee 1991; Zhang 2008c). 
The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist Party Congress held in 1978 
marked the Party’s shift from ‘class struggle’ (against capitalism and the bourgeoisie) 
to ‘economic development’, signalling the beginning of the reform era (Qian 2000). 
One significant change brought by the economic reform was the end of the single-
public-ownership structure of the country (Zhang 2008c). In contrast to other post-
socialist countries, China’s economic reform is characterised by extensive 
reassignments of property rights without wholesale privatisation. As Walder and Oi 
(1999) argue: 
Reform in China has proceeded through the gradual reassignment of specific 
property rights from higher government agencies to lower government agencies, 
or from government agencies to enterprises, managers, families, or individuals. 
This has occurred gradually, and different ownership forms have held sway in 
different parts of the economy at different times (p. 6-7). 
According to Smyth (1998) and Xu (2009c), a ‘revival’ of private property has been 
associated with China’s economic reforms in three ownership sectors since 1978: (1) 
the agriculture reforms; (2) reforms in the non-state sector; (3) reforms in the state 




Huang (1998) divides China’s agricultural revolution into three stages: land reform in 
the 1950s, the establishment of the household responsibility system in the early 
1980s, and market reforms in the early 1990s. After the collectivisation of agriculture 
in 1956 and the establishment of People’s Communes in 1958, the daily activities of 
China’s agriculture were organized under the production team system for about 20 
years (Lin 1988; Schultz and Yi 1999). The production team was the basic agricultural 
collective unit for production and distribution. The production team system also 
adopted a work point system, which was used to assess the quality and quantity of 
work done and ‘collective income at the end of the year was determined by the 
number of work points accumulated plus the value of each work point’ (Perkins 1988: 
605). The political working point system infringed on ‘the right of peasants either to 
sell or otherwise utilise their own labour’ (Smyth 1998: 237). Moreover, in order to 
subsidise industrial development, the Unified Purchase and Marketing System 
(UPMS) monopolised grain purchases and marketing and forced farmers to sell 
agricultural products to the state at low prices (Smith 1998). In addition, the majority 
of peasants were forced to work for various public construction projects, such as 
dam construction, without payment (Smyth 1998).  
The major change was the introduction of the ‘household responsibility system’, 
which was officially allowed to exist in poor areas in the fall of 1979 and was almost 
fully adopted in 1983-1984 (Huang 1998). The implementation of the new system 
has been recognised as the first successful reform in China, which necessarily put 
peasants in a better socio-economic position. Under the responsibility system, 
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households were entitled ‘partial’ property rights. It means the government gave 
households the right to use and the right to appropriate the surplus from the land, 
while not recognising the right to transfer the land (Qian 2000; Yang et al. 1992). This 
gave rise to two major consequences. Firstly, it became increasingly difficult for the 
UPMS to exercise monopoly power over grain purchasing and marketing, as farmers 
were less likely to accept prices that were less than the marginal cost of production 
(Huang 1998). Secondly, a set of agricultural reforms, starting in 1978, not only 
dramatically increased the food supply, but also produced a large surplus labour 
supply. Meanwhile, an unequal pace of economic development between rural and 
urban areas motivated people to migrate for a better life. These two factors gave 
rise to the emergence of the floating population in China (Liu 2011b; Seeborg et al. 
2000). 
The third stage was agricultural market liberalisation. Under the household 
responsibility system, the household was assigned to pay a fixed tax to the 
government. After fulfilling the obligation, the household was free ‘to produce and 
sell whatever it considered profitable, and to retain any profit’ (Qian 2002: 18). 
Huang (1998) argues that 99% of counties had adopted price liberalisation by the 
end of 1993, but the increase in the price of grain after 1994 led to a pull-back from 
market reform. Thus the third revolution was not complete in the 1990s. Since 2000, 
in order to ease the financial burden on peasants and avoid the political costs of 
collecting off-budgetary revenue, the central government ‘took bolder steps to 
prohibit illegal land seizure and abolished all surcharges in 2001 and agricultural 
taxes in 2006’ (Liu 2012b: 318). 
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Reforms in the non-state sector 
Ito (2006: 168) suggests that Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs or xiangzhen qiye) 
can be categorised into two broad aspects: ‘collectively owned enterprises (COEs) 
run by township or village governments’ and ‘non-public enterprises established by 
farmers solely or jointly after the Open Door Policy in 1978’. Guo (1999a) argues that 
‘each level of government administration has a specified category of xiangzhen qiye’. 
Based on Ito and Guo’s arguments, COEs can be further divided into three major 
types: county-run COEs, township-run COEs, and village-run COEs.  
The non-state sector has increased in importance since China began its economic 
reform in 1978, and the collective sector became the dominant part of the non-state 
sector and of the local economy in the late 1980s and 1990s (Smyth 1998).  For 
instance, private enterprises contributed around 15% of national industrial output in 
1993, while collectively owned enterprises contributed 42% of national industrial 
output in the same year (Qian 2002).  
The contribution of COEs to national gross industry output reached a turning point in 
1997. At that time, both the central government and the local government raised 
their concerns about the future economic health and long-term sustainability of 
China’s township enterprises (Li and Rozelle 2003). As Into (2006) and Sun (2002) 
suggest, three major factors drove the process of privatisation in the non-state 
sector. Firstly, in order to reduce growing fiscal burdens, the community government 
was reluctant to use government resources ‘to cross-subsidize its COEs and to 
guarantee more loans for them’, thus the bad performers were the first to be 
privatised (Sun 2002: 257). Secondly, the nationwide introduction of the 
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Shareholding Cooperative System (SCS) in the late 1980s resulted in dispersed COE 
property rights, which was regarded as the beginning of a privatisation initiative. 
Finally, the tax structure was significantly changed when the central government 
started its Tax Sharing System (TSS) in 1994, which ‘posed new challenges to local 
cadres because collective assets became liable to state-controlled taxation’ (Into 
2006: 172).  
Moreover, due to the lack of restraints from county government, the increasing 
number of community-run TVEs significantly facilitated excessive government rent-
seeking and corruption (Sun 2002). In order to deal with these problems, since the 
mid-1990s, rural China has experienced a fundamental and widespread privatisation 
movement. Li and Rozelle (2003) suggest the most significant features of this process 
are that: (1) local government sold most firms—92%—to insiders, especially to 
managers; (2) complex methods were applied to assess the value of the firm’s assets 
and debts. According to China Statistics Yearbook, the percentage of industrial 
output contributed by COEs increased from 22.37% in 1978 to 39.39% in 1996 and 
then experienced a significant decline in the following years and was down to 6.65% 
by 2003 (Lu et al. 2010). 
Reforms in the state sector 
Experimenting with state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform began even earlier than 
agricultural reform. From 1978 to 1983, the central government introduced a series 
of reforms, such as expanding enterprise autonomy, introducing profit retention 
schemes, and implementing the ‘economic responsibility system’ (Qian 2000; Smyth 
1998). But the SOE reform was disappointing. The Third Plenum of the Twelfth Party 
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Congress held in October 1984 adopted a decision on China’s economic reform, 
resulting in a significant change in ideology from ‘plan as a principal part and market 
as supplementary part’ to ‘planned commodity economy’ (put plan and market on 
equal footing) (Qian 2000). The Chinese Communist Party made two primary reform 
programs: ‘the dual-track approach to market liberalisation’ and ‘contract 
responsibility system’ in SOEs. The basic principle of the dual-track approach, 
emphasized by Qian (2002), is as follows:  
Under the plan track, economic agents are assigned rights to and obligations for 
fixed quantities of goods at fixed planned prices as specified in the pre-existing 
plan. At the same time, a market track is introduced under which economic 
agents participate in the market at free market prices, provided that they fulfil 
their obligations under the pre-existing plan (p. 15). 
The government experimented with the Contract Responsibility System (CRS) in the 
early 1980s and all the SOEs gradually adopted it to govern relationships between 
themselves and the state. Hassard et al. (2010) argue that there were two forms of 
state-enterprise contracts: ‘enterprises would either turn over a fixed percentage of 
their profits each year to the state or turn over a set amount of profits annually’ (p. 
502).  In this case, there is no privatisation in the state-owned sector at all until the 
mid-1990s. Although the central government accepted a set of reforms of the state-
owned sector, the programme as a whole was deemed a failure (Hassard et al. 2010; 
Siqueira et al. 2009). In 1992, the Chinese Communist Party reset the ‘establishment 
of a socialist market economy’ as the ultimate goal of economic reform. In 1995, the 
CRS was officially terminated and Chinese SOEs moved towards marketization by 
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adopting two different strategies: privatisation of small SOEs and ‘corporatisation’ of 
medium and large SOEs. 
The privatisation of small SOEs and widespread lay-offs from SOEs were two of the 
most significant features of Chinese society in the late 1990s. Under the slogan 
‘grasping the large and letting go of the small’ (zhuada fangxiao), the central 
government and the local governments engaged in ‘selling off small and medium 
SOEs to private individuals and keeping the large SOEs’ (Siqueira et al. 2009: 209). 
During this process, a great number of profitable SOEs were privatised or had their 
assets stripped. Qian (2000) discloses the details of this large-scale privatisation: 
One interpretation of “grasping the large” is to keep about 1,000 large 
enterprises as state owned…by the end of 1996, up to 70 percent of small SOEs 
had been privatized in pioneering provinces and about half were privatized in 
many other provinces (p. 22-23). 
Meanwhile, two related models of reform, the Modern Enterprise System (MES) and 
Group Company System (GCS), were launched to replace the CRS programme 
(Hassard et al. 2010). This reform process for SOEs was designed to promote the 
‘corporatisation’ of medium and large SOEs (Hassard and Sheehan 1997). To be 
specific, the primary aim of the MES programme was to promote new enterprise 
management mechanisms, whereas the GCS was intended to create large 
internationally-competitive companies (Hassard et al. 2007).  
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1.2. Recognition of private property rights in China 
Private property rights have been widely established in mainland China through 
three sets of reforms: agricultural reform, privatisation in the non-state sector, and 
reform in the state sector. Economic transformation requires an appropriate set of 
corresponding legal frameworks centred on the protection of property rights, the 
enforcement of contracts, and the provision of physical and organizational 
infrastructure (Dixit 2003; Posner 1998). However, private property rights were not 
officially recognised as one kind of constitutional right until the fourth amendment 
of the 1982 Constitution in 2004 (Xu and Murphy 2008; M. Zhang 2008c). It took 26 
years from the beginning of the economic reform to the official recognition of 
private property rights for many reasons, but ‘the most significant one is perhaps the 
clash between the drives for socialism and the concerns about capitalism’ (Zhang 
2008c: 8). 
Since the establishment of new China in 1949, it has had four constitutions: the first 
one was adopted in 1954, and then it was rewritten in 1975, 1978, and 1982. The 
1982 Constitution was further amended in 1988, 1993, 1999 and 2004 (Ibid). 
Constitutional amendments pertaining to the selective rehabilitation of the ‘private’, 
summarised by Xu (2009c), are listed as follows: 
Acknowledgement of the ‘individual economy’ (geti jingji) (1982); acceptance 
that a private economy (siren jingji) would be allowed to develop within the 
limits prescribed by law; recognition of urban land use rights transfer (1988); 
establishment of a ‘socialist market economy’ (1993); acceptance of the 
individual and private economy as important components of the socialist 
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market economy (1999); and finally recognition of important private property 
rights (2004). (p. 97) 
At the outset of the reform era, the law had a new and important role to play—
regulating the operation of state-owned enterprises (Clarke et al. 2006). A prime 
example was the Bankruptcy Law, passed in 1986. The great expansion in the 
number and importance of privately-owned enterprises required the legal system to 
provide sufficient protection and effective enforcement for safeguarding economic 
activities, but the legal system did not provide much in the early 1980s (Clarke et al. 
2006: 8). Nevertheless, formal legal institutions became more responsive over time. 
Clarke et al. (2006: 8) also suggest that the co-evolution of economics and the law 
can be ‘exemplified in the sphere of foreign interactions’. China’s domestic legal 
system in the early reform-era was an obstacle for attracting foreign investors, which 
persuaded the Chinese government to establish a separate legal system for 
foreigners. The Chinese government found that the divided legal system confused 
foreign investors; this confusion was the major contributing factor to the decision to 
unify the separate legal regimes. The whole period of economic reform saw a 
mountain of laws and regulations enacted at the central and local levels. The 
absence of a systematic statement of the law of property was commonly regarded as 
one significant gap in China’s legal structure governing economic activity before 
2007. 
After the adoption of ‘Decision on Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist 
Market Economic Structure’ by the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party in 1993, two teams, headed by Wang Liming and Liang 
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Huixing respectively, were organized by the central government to draft the 
Property Law. After a 14-year legislative marathon, the Property Law of China was 
passed by the National People’s Congress on 16 March 2007. The Property Law put 
private property on an equal footing with public property for the first time since 
1949 (Zimmerman 2010). Zhang (2008c) underlines the significance of the Property 
Law by pointing out that: 
The Property Law is a significant piece of legislation in China because it on the 
one hand fills in the ‘legal blank’ in the country with regard to private property, 
or property in general. On the other hand, it helps enhance the legal 
infrastructure of the country by establishing a framework that is badly needed 
for the regulation and protection of property rights. More importantly, the 
Property Law reinforces the ‘inviolable’ nature of private property, a concept 
that was constantly denied in the country until 2004 when the 1982 
Constitution was amended the fourth time. (p. 5) 
1.3. The growing importance of China’s legal system 
In order to support economic growth and restore and maintain public order, the 
Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 
held in late 1978, reached a consensus about the need to build a legal system (Potter 
2004). After this plenum, China’s legal system developed in three main ways: 
legislative drafting, institution building and the growth of the legal profession, and 
the adoption of specific measures to strengthen enforcement (Lubman 1999; 




During the initial period of legislative drafting (1978-1984), China’s top legislature, 
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, focused its attention on 
areas of crime and punishment, public security, taxation, foreign investment, and 
contracts (Potter 2004). The second stage of legislative drafting included the 
adoption of the General Principles of Civil Law, the 1998 amendment of the 
Constitution, the passage of the Administrative Litigation Law, and the laws relating 
to state-owned enterprises and foreign business (i.e. the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, 
the Foreign Economic Contract Law, the Law on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, 
and the Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law) (Lubman 1999; Peerenboom 
2002b). China’s law-making in the third period, from 1989 to 1992, was slowing 
down as the June Fourth Incident26 in Tiananmen Square in 1989 had disastrous 
effects on China’s economic and legal reforms.  As Clarke et al. (2006: 13) show:  
This period saw a brief attempt by the leadership under Li Peng (the Chinese 
Premier) to roll back reform, recentralize, and strengthen central planning, but 
the logic of reform soon reasserted itself.  
                                                          
26
 The June Fourth Incident, also known as the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, refers to student-
led popular demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, the centre of Beijing, China’s capital city. The 
demonstrations aimed to enhance individual freedom and urge the Chinese government towards 
greater accountability. The protests were forcibly suppressed when hard-line leaders ordered the 
military to enforce martial law on 4 June 1989. For more information, please see: David A Ralston et 
al., 'Pre-Post Tiananmen Square: Changing Values of Chinese Managers', Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, 12/1 (1995), 1-20. 
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The fourth and current stage, from Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Southern Tour’27 (nanxun) in 
January 1992 until now, witnessed the construction of the legal infrastructure for 
China’s socialist market economy, and most recently, the new objective of building a 
harmonious society (Clarke et al. 2006). The changes in formal law and legal process 
in this stage included the amendments of the Constitution in 1999 and 2004, the 
amendment of the Economic Contract Law in 1993, and the passage of a series of 
laws, such as the Law Against Unfair Competition (1993), the Foreign Trade Law 
(1994), the Price Law (1997), the Partnership Law (1997),  the Anti-Dumping and 
Anti-Subsidy Regulations (passed in 1997 and reissued in 2001), the Administrative 
Licensing Law (2003), and the Property Law (2007).  
To sum up, thirty-four years of Chinese legal reform saw a continuing succession of 
legal changes and the passage of a series of major laws. As Peerenboom (2011: 118) 
states, ‘between 1979 and 2005, 805 laws, 4,156 State Council administrative 
regulations, 58,797 ministry-level rules, and 115,369 provincial people’s congress 
regulations were passed’. 
Institution building and the development of the legal profession 
The transition to a market economy required legal institutions to serve ‘as the 
mediators of the law and as the site for the performances of law’ (Woo and 
Gallagher 2011: 7). Meanwhile, it stimulated the demand for legal practitioners. 
                                                          
27
 The reason why Deng Xiaoping started his ‘Southern Tour’, as Zhao (1993) argues, is that ‘Deng 
resigned from his last office after the Tiananmen massacre; he had to come to the fore in early 1992 
in defense of the reform policy he had launched thirteen years earlier at the third plenary session of 
the Eleventh Central Committee’. Please see: Suisheng Zhao, 'Deng Xiaoping's Southern Tour: Elite 
Politics in Post-Tiananmen China', Asian Survey, 33/8 (1993), 739-56. 
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Apart from legislative drafting, China’s legal reforms also aimed at establishing the 
institutions and educating legal actors for implementing the rule of law. As Woo and 
Gallagher (2011) argues: 
The Chinese state has implemented and encouraged the development of a wide 
array of competing legal institutions, ranging from the judiciary, the justice 
offices, and the legal affairs office to legal journals and periodicals—as well as a 
wide array of legal actors including judges, private lawyers, legal-service 
workers, and legal-affairs workers. (p. 7) 
According to the Organic Law of the People’s Courts (passed in 1980 and revised in 
1983) and the 1982 State Constitution, China established four levels of courts in the 
general administrative structure. At the top of the structure is the Supreme People’s 
Court; below it are the 32 Higher Level People’s Courts (HLPC); below the HLPCs are 
409 Intermediate Level People’s Courts (ILPC); and at the bottom are the 3117 Basic 
Level People’s Courts. 28 In addition to the establishment of the court system, China’s 
economic reform saw ‘the increase in the size and professionalism of the legal 
profession’ (Peerenboom 2011: 118). 
Law schools that were closed during the Cultural Revolution were reopened in the 
late 1970s, and the number of law schools has increased from 2 in 1976 to 183 in 
1999, and around 559 in 2005 (Su 2006). The number of law students has increased 
from 233 in 1977, to 25,000 in 1991, and 450,000 in 2005 (Peerenboom 2011). As a 
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 See The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Renmin fayuan jianjie’ [The 




result, the number of judges has shot up, from around 60,000 in 1981 to about 
106,000 in 1995, and over 190,000 in 2010.29 At the same time, ‘the number of 
lawyers has increased from a few thousand in the early 1980s to more than 130,000 
today’ (Peerenboom 2011: 117).  
Given the lack of judges and the dearth of lawyers in the early years of economic 
reform, the professional requirements for becoming a judge, a prosecutor or a 
lawyer were quite lax. As Clarke (1996) suggests, in the 1980s and 1990s, officials in 
China’s judicial system were generally poorly educated, especially in Basic Level 
People’s Courts, where a large proportion of judges were retired military officers. 
The year 2001 was the turning point of legal education and the legal profession. In 
that year, the amendments of the Judges Law, Prosecutors Law and the Lawyers Law 
required all candidates for the State Judicial Exam to have a college degree except 
those from certain poor areas (Ji 2005). Peerenboom (2011) describes the 
development of the legal profession in China: 
In 1997, only 33 percent of lawyers had college or graduate degrees. By 2004, 
two-thirds had such degrees: 11 percent had graduate degrees, 44 percent had 
bachelor of law degrees (LL.Bs), and 12 percent had undergraduate degrees in 
other subjects…by 2004, 52 percent of judges were college graduates, up from 7 
percent in 1995, and 44 percent of prosecutors and 51 percent of notaries also 
had college or graduate degrees. (p. 117-18) 
                                                          
29
 Ibid.  
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Increasing law enforcement and the trend towards more litigation 
The most notorious problem in China’s court system is that of execution—the courts’ 
inability to enforce their own judgements.30 This inevitably results in individuals and 
enterprises being unwilling to resort to the judicial system (Clarke 1996). While the 
recent publications evaluating the performance of the legal system show that 
enforcement of judicial decisions has significantly improved in urban areas, but it 
remains a problem in township and rural areas (Peerenboom 2011; Jingwen Zhu 
2007). Regarding the enforcement of commercial judgements, He (2008) notes that 
the majority of creditors or plaintiffs in urban courts who seek compulsory 
enforcement are able to receive all or partial payment.  
Evaluating the efficiency of contract enforcement by tracking the time, cost and 
number of procedures involved from the beginning of a lawsuit until actual payment, 
the World Bank’s Doing Business 2009 survey states that China ranks 18th out of 181 
countries in contract enforcement.31 He and Peerenboom (2009: 15) demonstrate 
that ‘enforcement in China may be less problematic than in many jurisdictions, 
including rich countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, or Russia’. 
Past research on the general perception of official justice shows increasing public 
confidence and trust in the judiciary. For instance, Michelson and Read (2011), 
analysing survey data from Beijing (2001) on popular perceptions of official justice, 
report that over 60% of Beijing respondents have a positive perception of courts and 
                                                          
30
 In mainland China, execution chambers (zhixing ting) have been set up by the great majority of 
basic level and intermediate level people’s courts to take charge of the execution of judgments. 
31
 World Bank & International Finance Corporation, Doing Business 2009: Comparing Regulation In 
181 Countries 6 tbl.1.3, 97 (2008). 
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police. In a national survey (2003-4) of public trust in 13 public and legal institutions 
in China, respondents ranked their trust in the courts fourth (behind the Chinese 
Communist Party, National People’s Congress and the procuracy) (Landry 2008). 
To sum up, this section explores China’s experience with gradual privatisation and 
continuing changes in the legal system. Private property rights have been established 
through agricultural reforms, reforms in state-owned enterprises and the 
privatisation of collectively-owned enterprises. The revival of private property 
requires post-Mao China to enact legal reform and create at least modestly effective 
legal systems. Recent studies show increasing public confidence and trust in Chinese 
legal institutions, which can be a positive outcome of three decades of legal reforms 
aiming at legislative drafting, institution building, improving the professionalism of 
the judiciary, and enhancing law enforcement capability. 
2. The guanxi network before and after the 1978 economic reforms 
It has been widely acknowledged that guanxi (simply translated as ‘connections’ or 
‘relations’) is one of the major dynamics in Chinese society (Luo 1997). According to 
conventional wisdom among Chinese and foreigners, guanxi in the People’s Republic 
of China is essential to the success of business deals and plays a significant role in the 
daily lives of people (Gold et al. 2002b). For instance, guanxi networks play an 
important role in China’s emergent labour markets (Bian 1994a, 2002; Hanser 2002), 
in the emergence of lending and trade relations among firms (Keister 2002), and in 
creating business-state and business-government relations in China (Wank 2002). 
A growing body of literature over the past three decades centred on two main 
questions: what type of phenomenon does guanxi represent in Chinese society? How 
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can we explain its significance as China’s economy continues to develop? After long 
debates between cultural scholars and institutional theorists, China scholars have 
failed to reach a consensus on these enduring questions. Cultural scholars see guanxi 
as ‘a unique type of relationship or a behavioural pattern deeply rooted in Chinese 
history and culture, where “particularistic ties” have long been used for instrumental 
purpose’ (Chang 2011: 315). Culture-based elements, such as family, kinship ties, 
friendship circles, local conditions, and social norms and values from Confucianism 
have largely influenced the social interactions involved in the guanxi network 
(Dunning and Kim 2007; Fei et al. 1992; Hwang 1987; Jacobs 1979; Kipnis 1997; Tsui 
and Farh 1997; Yan 1996b). According to this perspective, guanxi retains its 
importance in China’s political, social and economic life regardless of economic and 
political changes. 
In contrast to the culture-based argument, institutional theorists suggest that guanxi 
practice should be reified as a reflection of broader institutional and historical 
changes (Gold et al. 2002a). People tend to rely more on guanxi practice where 
social and economic resources are wholly controlled by the central government, and 
the legal protection of property rights and the judicial enforcement of contracts are 
far from sufficient to meet the increasing demand (Gold 1985; Guthrie 1998; Potter 
2002; Xin and Pearce 1996).  Institutional theorists demonstrate that personal 
connections are used to ‘bypass officially sanctioned, and onerous, bureaucratic 
procedures, solicit protection from more powerful actors, and acquire otherwise 
unavailable resources’ (Chang 2011: 316). In this view, social and economic changes 
in China can greatly contribute to the evolution of guanxi practice (Ledeneva 2008).  
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This section presents a comparative study of guanxi practice before and after 1978. 
It aims to examine three hypotheses generated by China scholars: (1) as cultural 
scholars suggest, guanxi is embedded in China’s culture and the Chinese way of life, 
thus economic forces and institutional changes are not sufficient to bring about 
major changes in its practice; (2) China’s economic reform shows the resilience of 
guanxi and its latest developments (Yang 2002); (3) some institutional theorists 
argue that guanxi becomes less vital for Chinese people as a competitive market and 
a more developed legal system are established.  
In order to explore guanxi practice before and after the 1978 economic reforms, 
three main aspects are incorporated in this section. The first part reviews the 
definition and intrinsic features of guanxi and outlines what distinguishes guanxi 
from relationship, social capital, and Western networking. The second part discusses 
guanxi practice before 1978, offering a general description of guanxi practice in 
Mao’s China. The final part focuses on guanxi practice after 1978, exploring the role 
of guanxi and how it works in the new environment.  
2.1. Definitions 
The term guanxi does not have a precise English equivalent. It has traditionally been 
roughly translated as relationships between people, but it means more than this (Lee 
2010; Michailova and Worm 2003). The Chinese word guanxi consists of two 
characters: guan and xi. The first character ‘guan’ as noun originally meant ‘door’, 
but today often refers to ‘a barrier’ or ‘a pass’; ‘guan’ as verb refers to ‘closing’, and 
its extended meaning is ‘doing someone a favour’ (Fan 2002a; Luo 1997). The second 
character ‘xi’ as noun means ‘system’ or ‘formalisation’ or ‘hierarchy’, as verb means 
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to ‘tie up’ or ‘extend into relationships’, it is also sometimes used to refer to 
‘maintaining long-time relations’ (Ambler 1994; Luo 1997).  
The existing literature shows no consensus on the definition of guanxi. Jacobs (1979) 
interprets guanxi as connectedness or particularistic ties. Pye (1982) regards guanxi 
as friendship sustained by the continuing exchange of favours. Gold (1985: 660) 
defines guanxi as ‘a power relationship, as one’s control over a valued good or 
access to it gives power over others’. Hwang (1987) adds that guanxi is a type of 
reciprocal relationship. Osland (1990: 8) notes that ‘the term [guanxi] refers to a 
special relationship between a person who needs something and a person who has 
the ability to give something’. Bian (1997: 369) suggests that guanxi literally means 
‘relationship or relation, but its essence is a set of interpersonal connections that 
facilitate exchanges of favours between people’. According to Bian (1994b), the term 
guanxi has multiple meanings: it can refer to the ‘existence of a relationship between 
people’ (‘indirect relationship’ or jianjie guanxi) (p. 974), or ‘actual connections or 
contact between people’ (‘direct relationship’ or zhijie guanxi) (p. 975). Drawing 
from a comparison of three types of guanxi (i.e. family guanxi, helper guanxi, and 
business guanxi), Fan (2002a) suggests a new definition: 
Guanxi is the process of social interactions that initially involves two 
individuals…the process will move on involving more parties, and stop only 
when a solution is finally found or the task is abandoned. (p. 549, 551) 
The Modern Chinese Dictionary indicates that a set of specialised terms derives from 
the word guanxi (Yang 1994). Guanxixue is identified as the art, technique, or study 
of establishing and manipulating guanxi (Gold 1985). If guanxi was defined as an 
186 
 
established relationship, then guanxixue is the science or study of how to utilise and 
sustain this special relationship (Chen 2000). Gold et al. (2002a: 6) point out the 
negative connotation of this term that implies ‘“going through the back door” to get 
something done, though it undeniably performs a positive function as well, 
especially if there is no formal “front door” available’. Guanxihu refers to people who 
possess strong connections or power to achieve a desired goal for themselves or 
other individuals (Bian 1994b). A Guanxiwang or a network of guanxi is the sum total 
or extent of one’s guanxi, comprising of both vertical and horizontal connections 
(Gold 1985). Guanxi practice is occasionally used interchangeably with guanxi 
exchange; both of them share identical meaning with guanxixue. As Yang (1994: 6) 
explains, guanxi practice involves a series of social interactions involved in guanxi 
networks, like ‘the exchange of gifts, favors and banquets; the cultivation of personal 
relationships and networks of mutual dependence; and the manufacturing of 
obligation and indebtedness’. Moreover, Li (2011b: 4) summarises the equivalent 
Chinese expressions of guanxi practice as follows: ‘Gao (to make/play) guanxi’, ‘la 
(to pull) guanxi’, ‘zou (to go through) guanxi’, ‘tuo (to seek for/pursue) guanxi’ or 
‘guanxi yunzuo’ (operation of guanxi).  
Four characteristics of guanxi, suggested by Jiang et al.(2012), are reciprocity, 
utilitarianism, transferability and intangibility. First, Chinese have ‘a strong sense of 
reciprocity for developing friendship and saving face for themselves’(Su and 
Littlefield 2001: 201); a person will be viewed as untrustworthy if he/she violates the 
principle of reciprocity. Second, guanxi relations are maintained through mutual 
exchange of favors. Guanxi is a mixture of ganqing (sentiments) and renqing (favors). 
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Renqing, the precondition for establishing guanxi, ‘provides a moral foundation for 
the reciprocity and equity that are implicit in all guanxi relationships’ (Luo 2000: 15). 
Ganqing, as the ‘affective component’ of guanxi, is defined by Wang (2007: 82) as 
‘refer[ing] to feelings and emotional attachment among members of networks, 
[which is] often an indicator of closeness of guanxi’. Third, guanxi is transferable. As 
Luo (2000: 10) explains, ‘if A has guanxi with B and B is a friend of C, then B can 
introduce or recommend A to C or vice versa’; during this process, B functions as a 
middleman. Fourth, guanxi practice follows an invisible and unwritten code of 
reciprocity and equity (Yan 1996b). 
Guanxi is a special relationship, but relationship cannot be equal to guanxi 
It is commonly believed that guanxi cannot be established without a pre-existing 
guanxi base (relationship). As Jacobs (1979: 242) states, ‘the existence or non-
existence of a guanxi base determines the existence or non-existence of a guanxi’. 
Tsang (1998) points out that a guanxi base is composed of two types: blood 
relationship and social interconnection. The former includes ‘family members, 
distant relatives, and even sharing the same surname’, whereas the latter is created 
because of having gone to the same school, lived in the same community, worked 
for the same organization, or served in the same camp (Yi and Ellis 2000: 26). 
Furthermore, Fan (2002a: 547) divides social base (interconnection) into two types: 
relationship by nature and relationship acquired. The former includes ‘locality (from 
the same town or province)’, ‘classmates or alumni’, ‘teacher-student’ ‘co-worker’, 
‘neighbour’, and ‘in the same profession’. The latter includes ‘acquaintance’, 
‘intermediary’, ‘friend’, and ‘sworn brotherhood’.  
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However, the existence of a guanxi base (relationship) alone is not sufficient to 
establish strong guanxi, or produce (active) guanxi (Fan 2002a). Other factors or 
triggers are required to activate guanxi. For example, interacting, exchanging favours, 
building interpersonal trust, and working together over a period of time are 
necessary conditions for individuals to establish and maintain guanxi networks 
(Dunfee and Warren 2001). Moreover, Fan (2002a) argues that a guanxi can be 
developed between two strangers who do not have a guanxi base, which challenges 
the conventional definition. Compared with the development of guanxi between two 
individuals with a guanxi base, this guanxi process without pre-existing relationships 
may be more difficult and time-consuming, but is not uncommon in contemporary 
China (Ibid). In this case, a guanxi base (relationship) should be understood as a 
matter of fact, but guanxi is the result of using of the guanxi base for a specific 
purpose (Ibid).  
Distinguishing guanxi from a generalised notion of social capital 
In a very general sense, guanxi is a form of social capital (Bourdieu 1986) or social 
investment (Butterfield 1982). Guanxi is sometimes defined as ‘interpersonal 
investment relationship that can be built on long-term and sequentially reciprocal 
exchanges’ (Lee 2010: 333). The necessary conditions for the interpersonal 
investment to take place are the degrees of both ability and loyalty of recipient. The 
concept of social capital suggested by Bourdieu (1986: 248-49) is as follows: 
Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are 
linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized 
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—or in other words, to 
189 
 
membership in a group—which provides each of its members with the backing 
of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in 
the various sense of the word. 
However, Yan (1996b) emphasizes that it is necessary to distinguish guanxi from a 
generalised notion of social capital. Gold et al. (2002a: 7) point out two important 
aspects of guanxi that set it apart from social capital: (1) the central role of the 
notion of reciprocal obligation and indebtedness in the system of guanxi; (2) the 
importance of gangqing (affect/sentiment) in guanxi. Firstly, guanxi differs from 
social capital by involving a reciprocal obligation, which is the most important 
characteristic of guanxi (Bian and Ang 1997; Brunner et al. 1990). Luo (1997) argues 
that any individual who does not follow the rule of reciprocal obligations to respond 
to requests for assistance will lose face (mianzi)—an intangible form of social 
position—and be regarded as untrustworthy. As Gold et al. (2002a) note, guanxi is ‘a 
system of gifts and favors in which obligation and indebtedness are manufactured’ 
rather than simply an issue of interpersonal and social connections. Repayment is 
socially binding and without any time limits (Michailova and Worm 2003). Secondly, 
ganqing (affect/sentiment) is a core factor in the practice of guanxi production. As 
Kipnis (1997: 28) states, ‘practices of guanxi production rely on strategic and more 
and less successful attempts to generate ganqing and manipulate obligation’. Strong 
ganqing can produce a closer, more dependable and valuable guanxi, whereas weak 
or absent ganqing results in more distant and unreliable guanxi (Kiong and Kee 1998).  
Comparing Chinese guanxi with Western networking 
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The literature on the growth of the firm identifies networking as one of three major 
strategies of growth; the other two are generic expansion and acquisition (Chandler 
1962, 1990; Child 1972; Nelson and Winter 1982; Williamson 1985). The motivations 
for Western firms to adopt the strategy of growth through network formation vary, 
but include gaining access to core technologies and the resources of other network 
members, sharing risk, and entering into new markets (Thorelli 1986). Peng and 
Health (1996: 497) point out that such a strategy for growth reflects ‘the focal firm's 
inability to possess all the necessary resources to undertake generic expansion alone 
or to merge and acquire other firms’, and represents ‘the firm's efforts to reduce 
environmental uncertainties through development of interorganizational 
relationships’. The peculiarly Chinese concept of guanxi also includes the above 
features of Western networks. But there are actually significant differences between 
guanxi and Western networking. 
Firstly, although both concepts emphasize that networks are continuous 
relationships with the active and reciprocal involvement of both parties, the Chinese 
concept of guanxi can be ‘distinguished from networking in the West chiefly by its 
focus on the utilitarian reciprocation of favors in an unequal dyad’ (Yi and Ellis 2000: 
25). Guanxi, at the individual level, links two persons of unequal rank or social status 
in such a way that exchanges always favour the weaker partner (Dunning and Kim 
2007). Reciprocity in Western networks often entails exchanges of roughly 
equivalent value (Powell 2003), while the guanxi network in China facilitates 
exchanges between two people ‘without an equal level of reciprocal obligation’ (Park 
and Luo 2001: 457). 
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Secondly, in contrast to Western networking that is closely associated with 
‘commercially-based corporate-to-corporate relations’, exchanges within the guanxi 
network are ‘not solely commercial, but also social, involving the exchange of 
renqing (social and humanized obligation) and the giving of mianzi (face in the 
society) or social status’ (Luo 1997: 47). Because of this difference, many Western 
businessmen fail to understand the cultural roots of guanxi and attempt to build 
guanxi only by wining, dining, and gift-giving. Luo emphasizes that guanxi is not 
simply a ‘fee-for-service’; rather it is used to ‘strengthen personal relationships, 
which may or may not be called upon in the future’ (Ibid). 
Moreover, networking in the Western management literature shows its significance 
in the growth of firm at the organizational level, whereas guanxi emphasizes the 
creation and development of personal relationship (Luo 2000; Yi and Ellis 2000). As 
Luo (1997: 44) suggests, ‘guanxi between organizations is initially established by and 
continues to build upon personal relationship; when the person leaves, the 
organization loses that guanxi as well’. Ambler (1994) states that guanxi and Western 
networking can be distinguished by identifying whether transactions lead to 
relationships or vice versa; as he says, ‘the Chinese believe that one should build the 
relationship [first] and, if successful, transactions will follow, [whereas] Westerners 
build transactions [first] and, if they are successful, a relationship will follow’ (p. 71). 
Last but not least, many China scholars believe that a person or an organization in a 
western network tend to serve as an intermediary out of self-interest. By contrast, a 
party in the guanxi network who serves as a middleman is normally motivated by the 
perception of social obligation (Li and Wright 2000). It is commonly recognised that 
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the individual who has a close relationship or has ‘saved face’ (you mianzi) with at 
least one party can be an intermediary ‘providing the familiarity, trust, and 
obligation needed to tie together the help seeker and the potential helper’ (Bian and 
Ang 1997: 985). Therefore, guanxi is transferable.  
2.2. Guanxi practice under the political and institutional conditions of 
the pre-reform system 
Mayfair Yang’s book Gifts, Favors, and Banquets (1994) explores the significance of 
the guanxi network and guanxi practice in Communist China. She views guanxi as 
social relations, and regards guanxi practice as an institutional system offering an 
alternative path to the state-defined system (Yang 1994). Guthrie (1998: 256-57) 
summarises Yang’s work on the concept of guanxi practice: it refers to ‘the use of 
these social relationships [or guanxi] to make exchanges, manufacture indebtedness, 
or accomplish tasks’ rather than the use of formal bureaucratic processes and 
procedures.  
Under the central planning system, Chinese society was characterised by both low 
occupational and low spatial mobility because of the creation of a number of 
institutional arrangements, such as the production team system, the working point 
system, the work unit system, and the hukou (household registration) system (Lin 
2002). Consequently, the reach of personal networks was seriously constrained and 
social exchanges were only available within short spatial distance, ‘making it possible 
and likely to intensify the social interaction among members of this small community’ 
(Lin 2002: 63). Moreover, given the extreme scarcity of opportunities (e.g. 
employment and career development) and resources (e.g. scarce goods) that could 
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not be supplied through alternative channels, a person would find it extremely 
difficult to survive without cultivating and maintaining guanxi with those who took 
charge of benefit and opportunity allocations, with those who could serve as an 
intermediary facilitating the help seeker to gaining access to the potential helper, 
and even with potential spoilers who could completely destroy one’s career or end 
one’s life by using reasons like ‘removing capitalists’, ‘reacting to the reactionaries’ 
and ‘cleaning traditional elements’ of the Communist Party of China (Lin 2002). In 
this case, ‘there was a high degree of non-substitutability for a large part of one’s 
guanxi networks’ (Lin, 2002: 64). 
Yang (1994) argues that the increasing importance of guanxi practice during the 
period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) can be attributed to two factors. First, 
people had to rely on the use of personal relationships rather than state-sponsored 
frameworks to secure everyday survival when China’s traditional social order was 
wholly destroyed by the Cultural Revolution (Ibid). Guthrie (1998) discloses the 
details about what happened in that period and how people responded to those 
changes: 
In the chaos of the Cultural Revolution, people faced the prospect of their 
children being sent down to remote areas of the countryside, the constant 
threat of denunciation, and, at the close of the Cultural Revolution, the prospect 
of trying to find jobs for the displaced youth as they returned to urban areas. 
Individuals relied on the exchange of gifts and favours among personal 
connections to find ways to deal with these social crises. (p. 257) 
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Second, in response to extreme politicisation and red terror (mass campaigns of 
the Red Guards in China), practitioners of guanxixue (the art of guanxi) engaged in 
social exchanges according to the moral and social principles of reciprocity and 
obligation to ‘protect themselves from state control and reduce their dependency 
on the state for material resources and social sustenance’ (Yang 1994: 158). 
2.3. The resilience of guanxi and its new sites of operation in the reform 
period 
The market transition theory shows that a transition to markets in a socialist 
economy involves the decline of political power and connections in the post-socialist 
context and the establishment of markets with fully legitimated and well-defined 
private property rights (Cao and Nee 2000; Nee 1989, 1992; Szelenyi and Kostello 
1996). Given institutional changes and socioeconomic development brought by 
economic reforms, there is considerable disagreement among scholars over the 
effect and fate of guanxi in the reform period. A theory of the declining significance 
of guanxi suggested by Douglas Guthrie posits that the construction of rational-legal 
institutional mechanisms at the state level is the major force in the diminishing 
importance of guanxi practice (Guthrie 1998, 1999, 2002; Kennedy 2005; Kung 1999). 
The main arguments in support of the declining significance of guanxi can be 
summarised as follows: on the one hand, the emerging legal structures that govern 
the practices and economic activities of industrial organizations make the practice of 
guanxi obsolete; on the other hand, economic and political actors in a competitive 
market environment focus more attention on the rise of quality and efficiency than 
on the norms of guanxi practice (Guthrie 1998). In parallel with Guthrie’s viewpoint, 
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Hanser (2002) examines the importance of guanxi in youth job searches in urban 
China. He concludes that the old system of centralised job allocation that placed 
significant reliance on guanxi has been largely dismantled by these economic and 
social changes in the reform era. As a result, most young urbanites are more likely to 
find jobs on their own rather than via the use of guanxi.  
Peerenboom (2002a: 6) emphasizes the shortcomings of exclusive reliance on 
personal connections in China by arguing that: ‘as the economy grows…reliance on 
relationships rather than generally applicable laws and formal legal institutions 
becomes less effective’. As he explains, a greater number of transactions coupled 
with increased complexity make the guanxi network less useful for conveying 
information and less efficient for resolving disputes (Peerenboom 2002a). Moreover, 
the formal legal system possesses the ability not only to protect property rights and 
enforce contracts, but also to make it more difficult and risky for people who rely on 
guanxi practice to circumvent legal requirements (Ibid).   
However, theoretical arguments for regarding the importance of guanxi as 
decreasing because of the creation of an appropriate legal structure and a market 
economy are challenged by many China theorists (Bian et al. 2005; Gold 1985; Hsing 
1998; Ledeneva 2008; Michelson 2007; Yang 2002). Nee (1992) states that 
widespread uncertainties in changing institutional environments force individuals 
and enterprises to invest heavily in personal connections (guanxi). Based on two 
years of ethnographic field research in the private economy in Xiamen, Wank (1999, 
2001) suggests that guanxi plays a significant role in the business decisions of private 
entrepreneurs, and emphasizes that particularistic identities and personal 
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obligations are extremely important in an environment where courts are considered 
corrupt. Regarding the effect of guanxi on job assignment, Bian (1997: 366) suggests 
that personal networks in post-Mao China ‘are used to influence authorities who in 
turn assign jobs as favours to their contacts, which is a type of unauthorized activity 
facilitated by strong ties characterized by trust and obligation.’ 
In responding to Guthrie’s arguments, Yang (2002) insists, again from an 
ethnographic perspective, on the enduring importance of guanxi in Chinese society, 
and demonstrates that old contexts of guanxi usage—the acquisition of consumer 
goods and provision of everyday needs—decline, but new ones emerge. As Yang 
(2002: 463) indicates, ‘guanxi now flourishes in the realm of business and the urban-
industrial sphere, whether in dealings among private entrepreneurs, between 
private entrepreneurs and state managers, or between entrepreneurs and officials, 
especially local officials’.  
Furthermore, a rapidly increasing phenomenon in the reform period is the conflation 
of guanxi with corruption and bribery (Yang 2002). For example, Zhan (2012) 
examines the corruption-facilitating roles of the guanxi network. She explores how 
transactional corruption through particularistic ties was realised through the three 
functions of the guanxi network: communication, exchange and normative functions. 
Li (2011b) investigates guanxi-practice functions as ‘alternative operating 
mechanisms’ in the process of initiating corrupt transactions between the bribers 
and the bribed. As Li (2011b: 20) argues, the participants in corruption adopt 
‘guanxi-practice as an enabling operating mechanism’ to overcome the legal, moral 
and cognitive barriers.  
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As mentioned above, it is rational to view guanxi as ‘an institutionally-defined 
system’ rather than ‘a deep-seated cultural fact of Chinese society’ (Guthrie 1998: 
255). The implementation of economic policies by the Chinese Central Government 
has resulted in immense changes in Chinese society, including the change of guanxi 
practice. A theory of the declining significance of guanxi fails to predict the fate of 
guanxi during the post reform period, thus it is problematized by a lot of China 
scholars. This chapter agrees with Yang’s (2002) argument that guanxi lose its 
importance in traditional areas of the acquisition of consumer goods and provision 
of everyday needs, but guanxi now flourishes in new sites: the realm of business, the 
urban-industrial sphere, and corrupt exchange. The resilience of guanxi and the 
creation of a rational-legal structure stimulate research into how these two systems 
coexist in contemporary China. Moreover, as China’s legal framework and markets 
change continuously and quickly, it is important to examine how guanxi works in 
Chinese society after the 1978 economic reform.  
3. Guanxi and the legal system in contemporary China: virtuous circle 
or collision course? 
In order to explore whether the juxtaposition of these two systems produces a 
positive outcome, it is necessary for scholars to focus on the interactions between 
these two sets of institutions. Based on a theory of formal-informal institutional 
interaction, this part explores how the institutions substitute, complement or 
undermine each other (Brinks 2003; Chavance 2008; Helmke and Levitsky 2004). 
Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 728) develop a typology of four patterns of formal-
informal institutional interaction: ‘complementary’, ‘accommodating’, ‘competing’, 
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and ‘substitutive’. They define informal institutions as ‘socially shared rules, usually 
unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially 
sanctioned channels’, while formal institutions are regarded as ‘rules and procedures 
that are created, communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as 
official’, for example, state institutions (courts, legislatures, bureaucracies) and 
state-enforced rules (constitutions, laws, regulations) (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 
727). Where the informal rule leads to a substantively similar result from that 
‘expected from a strict and exclusive adherence to formal rules’, the formal-informal 
institutional relationship is either substitutive or complementary (Helmke and 
Levitsky 2004: 728). Where the two outcomes are substantively different, the 
formal-informal institutional relationship is either competing or accommodating 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2004).  
In examining the interactions between formal and informal institutions, existing 
typologies have assumed that an effective legal framework has been established 
(Helmke and Levitsky 2006). However, such typologies in transitional settings are less 
helpful (Grzymala-Busse 2010). Formal institutions in transitional settings are 
characterised by instability since ‘these are constantly being abolished, transformed, 
and established anew’ (Grzymala-Busse 2010: 313). Therefore, the best laid plan of 
examining formal-informal institutional interactions in transitional regimes focuses 
on the influence of informal rules on formal institutions.  Regarding the co-existence 
of guanxi and the formal legal system, it is logical to focus on the impact of guanxi on 
the functioning of formal rules in post-Mao China where legal institutions are in a 
state of flux.  
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Drawing on Helmke and Levitsky’s (2004, 2006) study of informal institutions and 
comparative politics, the relationship between guanxi and formal institutions is 
either substitutive or complementary, since guanxi practice produces outcomes 
compatible with formal rules. Similarly, a series of publications from China scholars 
also view the Chinese guanxi network as informal institution that substitute or 
compensate for legal institutions (Potter 2002; Xin and Pearce 1996; Zhang and Keh 
2009). However, arguments about guanxi and the formal legal system functioning as 
substitutes or complements ignore the fact that guanxi, to a large extent, distorts 
China’s legal framework.  
This section includes two primary parts. The first part emphasizes that China’s 
economic development and legal reform create a virtuous circle of efficient and 
mutually supportive co-existence between guanxi and the legal framework. It bases 
itself on the existing literature on guanxi, and interprets the substitutive and 
complementary relationship between guanxi and a formal legal system. By contrast, 
the second part challenges the popular viewpoint on the juxtaposition of these two 
systems, and suggests that guanxi networks are on a collision course with the formal 
legal institutions. It emphasizes the ‘symbiotic’ or ‘parasitic’ relationship between 
the guanxi network and corruption, and develops a new perspective: that guanxi 
distorts or subverts the Chinese legal system.  
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3.1. Guanxi and the formal legal system: From substitutivity to 
complementarity 
3.1.1. Guanxi as a substitutive informal institution 
Informal institutions can replace formal institutions in environments where formal 
rules are not routinely enforced and fail to protect its citizens (Grzymala-Busse 2010; 
Helmke and Levitsky 2006). In this case, ‘substitutive informal institutions achieve 
what formal institutions were designed, but failed, to achieve’ (Helmke and Levitsky 
2004: 729). Xin and Pearce (1996) emphasize the rule of connections (guanxi) as 
‘structural support’ which is highly valued by enterprise managers. China’s 
transitional economy is characterised by ill-defined property rights, a weak market 
structure, institutional uncertainty, and incomplete institutional foundation (Nee 
1992, 2000). This was especially true in the 1980s and 1990s, but still holds true 
today. Under such circumstances Chinese private companies have difficulty gaining 
access to state resources and getting capital. Furthermore, in a country with poorly-
specified property rights, private firms are subject to threatening interference and 
arbitrary extortion by party and governmental officials since society lacks a reliable 
rule of law (Peng 2003; Xin and Pearce 1996).  
Luo (2007) suggests that enterprise managers perceive the court system in China as 
weak due to two major sources: first, less-developed areas are generally 
characterised by insufficient legal protection, weaker law enforcement, and poorer 
legal services, in which the judicial system and the local governments suffer more 
from corruption than do others. Second, interpersonal or interorganizational 
connections with government authorities and local judiciary play a pivotal role in 
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China; thus managers with fewer political connections or ties will perceive poor legal 
enforceability.  
When managers perceive that the legal system is not trustworthy and cannot protect 
their interests, they are more likely to rely on ‘relational reliability’ (guanxi) to 
safeguard transactions (Zhou and Poppo 2010). Depending on interviews with 
executives from three types of Chinese organizations—state-owned, privately-
owned, and collective-hybrid companies—Xin and Pearce (1996: 1644) find that 
‘guanxi is more important to mangers with great need for a substitute for formal 
structural support’. Guanxi as a substitute for formal institutional support facilitates 
executives, especially those from private companies, to counteract liabilities caused 
by their organizations’ youth and smallness, to get access to state resources, and to 
defend themselves against threats (e.g. appropriation, extortion) from governmental 
officials (Xin and Pearce 1996).  
In parallel with Xin and Pearce’s argument, Park and Luo (2001) posit that guanxi has 
significant effects on company performance in China. In a transitional economy with 
ambiguous property rights and weak competition policies, ‘Chinese firms develop 
guanxi as a strategic mechanism to overcome competitive and resource 
disadvantages by cooperating and exchanging favors with competitive forces and 
government authorities’ (Park and Luo 2001: 455). 
In regions where the legal system is experienced as untrustworthy or unpredictable, 
guanxi networks are frequently adopted by individuals and enterprises to safeguard 
market exchanges characterised by non-trivial hazards, including environmental 
uncertainty, behavioural uncertainty, and asset specify (Zhou and Poppo 2010). The 
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transaction cost theory indicates how guanxi-based exchange deals with these 
governance problems (Standifird and Marshall 2000).  
Firstly, the guanxi network facilitates the transfer of knowledge, which can largely 
reduce transaction costs caused by environmental uncertainties (Standifird and 
Marshall 2000: 30). The broad information concerning potential exchange partners 
provided by guanxi addresses the governance problem of adaptation. This is because 
guanxi can reduce costs relating to screening and selecting partners, and reduce 
expenses derived from ‘communicating, negotiating and coordinating transactions, 
as well as maladaptation and/or a failure to adopt’ (Standifird and Marshall 2000: 
31).  
Secondly, guanxi possesses the capability to reduce transaction costs related to 
behavioural uncertainties, as Standifird and Marshall (2000: 31) argue, ‘a failure to 
uphold obligations is destructive to all members because of the interlocked nature of 
a guanxi network’. Moreover, opportunistic behaviour is less prevalent in the guanxi 
network that is well developed. As Strandifird and Marshall explain:  
Opportunistic behaviour with one exchange partner can be easily interpreted as 
opportunistic behaviour with the entire network…in a guanxi network, the cost 
of opportunism is the potential loss of exchange opportunities with all members 
of the guanxi network. (p. 32) 
Last but not least, a well-developed guanxi network in China can efficiently reduce 
opportunism associated with asset specificity (Artz and Brush 2000; Standifird and 
Marshall 2000). As Standifird and Marshall (2000: 27) explain, governance 
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problem arises ‘when a decision-maker deploys specific assets to an exchange and 
fears its partner may opportunistically exploit these investments’. When the 
guanxi network is well developed, the threat of opportunistic behaviour within 
guanxi-based exchanges is significantly reduced (Standifird and Marshall 2000). 
The decreasing threat of opportunism comes from two sources: first, exchange 
partner is reluctant to sacrifice the initial investments or sunk costs that are used 
to establish initial relationship when he enters into a guanxi network; second, it 
seems impossible to re-enter a guanxi relationship that has been severed (Yau 
1988).  
In the reform era, guanxi and the legal system are working together to manage 
changing social and economic conditions. The interactional relationship between 
guanxi and the legal system continues to evolve as the rule of law and legal 
institutions become more important to response to changing conditions. As Potter 
(2002: 183) argues, the role of guanxi in the course of China’s on-going legal 
reforms and economic development ‘may increasingly be seen to operate as a 
complement to rather than a substitute for the role of formal institutions’. 
3.1.2. Guanxi as a complementary informal institution 
In recent years, scholars show their intense interests in comparing guanxi networks 
with the codified law system. ‘The information structure’ identified by Li (2003) is 
one important factor in distinguishing guanxi-based governance from rule-based 
governance. Guanxi-based governance largely relies on ‘club information’ only 
available to individuals from the guanxi network, while rule-based governance 
largely relies on publicly verifiable information (Ibid). Schramm and Taube (2003a) 
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regard transaction security provided by guanxi networks as a club good, while 
viewing transaction security provided by the legal system as a public good. They 
further state that the guanxi network is characterised by high initial investment or 
sunk costs (in order to be a member of the club) and marginal transaction costs 
relating to searching transaction partners. While there are no fixed costs in a 
codified legal system, the costs of enforcement are high if the judiciary is not 
sufficiently independent or effective (Schramm and Taube 2003b).  
The limitations of guanxi-based governance have become obvious since China 
gradually strengthened its legal framework and its socialist market has dramatically 
expanded. Firstly, the guanxi network has to increase its size in order to meet the 
increasing demand from its members. When the guanxi network exceeds its optimal 
size, the ability to sanction misbehaviour is challenged and the costs of informing 
club members of the trustworthiness of all others increase (Schramm and Taube 
2003a). Secondly, as the market expands and the number of business partners 
increases, the costs of screening and testing a new partner also increase and 
switching to a new partner becomes riskier (Li 2003). However, transaction security 
offered by an institutional legal system can effectively deal with this problem 
(Buchanan 1965). In a well-established legal system, ‘the marginal costs of enforcing 
an (additional) contract between an (additional) transaction pair are negligible due 
to the fact that the contract is explicit, impersonal, and standardized, and that the 
police are on standby’ (Li 2003: 657). As a result, when the average cost of a guanxi-
based system surpasses the average cost of a codified and institutional legal system 
in the process of market development and judicial reform, the guanxi network will 
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not be able to compete with the formal legal institutions (Li 2003; Schramm and 
Taube 2003a). 
Similarly, the theory of institutional interactions indicates that ‘as markets develop, 
formal institutions based on law and contracts should supplant a traditional reliance 
on informal mechanisms, such as personal relationships or trust’ (Poppo and Zenger 
2002; K. Z. Zhou and Poppo 2010: 864). This theory further demonstrates that 
complementary informal institutions ‘fill the gaps either by addressing contingencies 
not dealt with in the formal rules or by facilitating the pursuit of individual goals 
within the formal institutional framework’ (Helmke and Levitsky 2004: 728). In order 
to present a clear understanding of the increasing role of China’s formal legal system 
and the changing interactional relationship between guanxi and the legal framework, 
it is worth offering an general description of Potter’s (2002) study of the changing 
attitude towards the legal system in the 1990s as well as Zhang and Keh’s (2009) 
study of how organizations, in the new century, rely more on the rule of law and 
legal institutions than the guanxi network to secure their transactions.  
Potter (2002) examines the complementary relationship between guanxi and formal 
legal institutions through three case studies: ‘attitudes about guanxi in domestic 
legal relations’, ‘guanxi and foreign-related dispute resolution’, and ‘guanxi and 
judicial behaviour’. The first case study focuses on how private entrepreneurs 
responded to the enforcement of loan agreements in 1994. It suggests that judicial 
action would be sought only after the respondent failed to persuade the debtor to 
perform by using relational dynamics, which shows ‘growing acceptance of formal 
law requirements on formation and enforcement’ (Potter 2002: 184).  The second 
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case study of the rule of guanxi in resolving foreign-related disputes suggests ‘the 
increased willingness of Chinese parties to turn disputes over to lawyers and other 
professionals’ (Potter 2002: 188). The third case study concentrates on the emerging 
complementarity between guanxi and the legal framework in the judicial behaviour 
of lawyers and legal officials. Potter (2002) states that there is increased recognition 
among law makers and high-ranking governmental officials of the need to provide 
clear formal rules governing the behaviour of lawyers and legal officials and the need 
to protect judicial decision-making mechanisms from the demands of guanxi 
networks. In his conclusion, Potter (2002: 195) points out that although the role of 
guanxi is limited by the rule of law and China’s legal institutions, legal reforms 
remain incomplete and the traditional Chinese practice of guanxi still ‘plays an 
essential role in providing predictability to legal actors’. In this case, the 
complementary relationship between China’s socialist legal system and guanxi will 
continue its existence in the foreseeable future. 
Based on institutional theory, resource dependence theory, agency theory, and 
evolutionary theory, Zhang and Keh (2009) analyse how organizations in China—
state-owned, privately-owned and foreign-invested enterprises—choose governance 
mechanisms in terms of formal contracts and informal guanxi, and predict the 
evolution of governance mechanisms with institutional change. By studying 
interactions between different organizational forms and between institutions and 
organizations in the late 2000s, Zhang and Keh’s (2009) viewpoint contradicts the 
popular perception of the significance of guanxi in managing interorganizational 
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relations (Park and Luo 2001; Xin and Pearce 1996). As Zhang and Keh (2009: 143) 
state: 
Guanxi remains a potent governance mechanism. With the exception of FIEs 
[foreign invested enterprises] that largely favour contractual governance, guanxi 
is still prevalent among SOEs [state-own enterprises], POEs [private owned 
enterprises], and HKMTEs [Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan-invested 
enterprises]…but forces [like institutional change, market competition, and the 
risk and disruptive result of guanxi utilization] are driving interorganizational 
governance mechanisms toward more formal means. 
Intuitively, it seems right to argue that institutional changes, market competition and 
the limitations of guanxi-based governance will result in a rapid and complete 
replacement of guanxi by the formal legal system in the foreseeable future. It is not, 
however, true. Firstly, a high initial investment in social capital for a membership in 
the guanxi network brings an inherent incentive for an economic actor to maximise 
possible transactions. As Schramm and Taube (2003a) argue, the individual 
economic actor will persist in using a once-established system of order (i.e. the 
guanxi network) until the costs of maintaining the existing system surpass markedly 
the costs of using the Chinese legal system. Secondly, guanxi as the major cultural 
feature of China is embedded, and remains embedded, in every aspect of Chinese 
social life (Yan 1996a); thus economic efficiency considerations are far from enough 
to predict the reduction of the importance of guanxi networks. Most importantly, it 
is still not clear whether the performance of China’s legal system is superior to the 
guanxi network or that it will be in the foreseeable future. It has been widely 
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acknowledged that China’s legal reforms have failed to resolve many problems, 
including corruption (Manion 2004; Sun 2004; Wedeman 2012a), the lack of judicial 
independence (Balme 2009; Henderson 2009; Peerenboom 2009), the gap between 
the law in the book and the law in action (Li 2012), and the unequal protection 
between public property rights and private property rights (Zhang 2008c). 
Consequently, guanxi networks cannot be rapidly replaced by the legal system and 
the complementary relationship between these two systems will continue to exist 
for a long time. 
Guanxi in the reform era fills the gaps created by China’s imperfect legal framework. 
The co-existence of these two systems of order brings great benefits to Chinese 
society since it provides two distinctive and complementary systems of protection 
and enforcement. The guanxi network will continue to play a vital role, for instance, 
fulfilling ‘protection deficits’ caused by the formal legal structure and facilitating the 
pursuit of individual goals within the legal framework. This might imply that the long-
time coexistence between guanxi and the formal legal framework could guarantee 
that economic actors receive sufficient support, allowing China to smoothly continue 
its reformation of the economy and judiciary. However, the following section offers a 
very different picture. It posits that the juxtaposition of guanxi-based governance 
and rule-based governance produces fewer positive outcomes. The resilience of 
guanxi networks undermines and distorts the legal framework, making China’s 
judicial system problematic. As a result, individuals distrust the judicial system, 
perceiving the judiciary as corrupt, unequal and inefficient. 
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3.2. The subversive effects of guanxi and corruption on formal 
institutions 
Guanxi, as an informal institution, starts off by substituting and complementing 
formal rules, but it eventually subverts new formal institutions. A theory of 
institutional interaction suggests that informal institutions, in some circumstances, 
undermine and contravene the newly-formed or existing formal institutions (Böröcz 
2000; Grzymala-Busse 2010; Lauth 2000). The negative impact of the guanxi network 
on formal institutions is derived from the increasing intertwinement between guanxi 
and corruption (Luo 2008).  
The establishment of an institutional framework that is superior in terms of its ability 
to supply legal security at a supra-individual level may largely reduce the demand for 
guanxi transactions (Schramm and Taube 2004). Furthermore, if the rule of law and 
legal institutions ‘provide officials with legitimate justification for denying requests 
for favouritism based on guanxi ties [and protecting] officials from the demand of 
guanxi networks’ (Potter 2002: 188-89), the corrosive effect of guanxi can be 
reduced to the lowest level. The Chinese government, however, has failed to reduce 
the negative influence of guanxi on its formal legal system; in other words, corrupt 
activities are embedded in the guanxi network. This part primarily focuses on two 
ways in which guanxi weakens formal institutions. First, it discusses the 
embeddedness of corruption in guanxi networks; second, it explores corruption in 
the judicial system by examining whether China’s judicial reform succeeds in 
preventing judicial decision-making mechanisms from subversion by guanxi networks. 
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3.2.1. The embeddedness of corruption in guanxi networks 
Corruption is generally understood as the abuse of public office for private gains. 
Drawing from a critical review of recent literature on Chinese corruption, Ko and 
Weng (2011: 374) suggest a tentative definition of Chinese corruption: ‘publicly 
unacceptable misbehavior committed by state functionaries for private gains at the 
expense of public interests, and/or causing intentional and unintentional damage to 
public interests and values’. The phenomenon of Chinese corruption can be 
interpreted as the juxtaposition of guanxi and the legal system with differing 
functional principles and values (Schramm and Taube 2003a). From the perspective 
of guanxi-based governance, the provision of certain goods and the implementation 
of transactions (between money and power) among club members are normal or 
even necessary within the guanxi network, whereas these interpersonal activities 
may fall within the sphere of corruption when they are assessed from a legal 
perspective (Goudie and Stasavage 1998; Schramm and Taube 2004; Yu 2008b).  
It is commonly accepted that transaction costs are much higher in illegal and corrupt 
activities when compared with transactions in ordinary markets (della Porta and 
Vannucci 2005). There are several reasons for this. First, in order to avoid being 
discovered and arrested by control agencies (such as the judiciary and the police), 
the operating environment in which corrupt transactions are implemented is 
characterised by a high degree of secrecy, lack of transparency, limited participation, 
and a high withdrawal costs (Lambsdorff 2002). Secondly, transaction costs increase 
as more effort is required to search for a proper counterpart and gather sufficient 
information to ‘evaluate the quality and adequacy of each of their products as well 
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as their individual capacity and willingness to comply with corrupt contracts’ 
(Lambsdorff 2002: 222).  
Corruption agreements are also subject to a high risk of being cheated by the 
counterpart. This is caused by two main factors: on the one hand, ‘corrupt 
transactions are often non-simultaneous in nature, and one party must rely upon the 
word of the other’ (della Porta and Vannucci 2005: 153); on the other hand, corrupt 
transactions operate clandestinely and cannot be enforced by formal institutions 
(della Porta and Vannucci 2005; Lambsdorff 2002). 
In China, the guanxi network has always been regarded as an efficient mechanism 
for solving the problems frequently encountered during corrupt transactions. As 
Schramm and Taube (2003) state, guanxi-based governance provides a ‘transaction-
cost-minimising’ solution for sustaining the enforcement of corrupt transactions. 
Similarly, della Porta and Vannucci (2004: 187) show that relation-based 
enforcement mechanisms can effectively fulfil ‘the demand for protection of the 
fragile and uncertain property at stake in the corruption domain’. Most recently, 
Zhan (2012) focuses on the corruption-facilitating role of the guanxi network, for 
instance, the role of guanxi in dealing with an ineffective flow of information and 
managing environments with high uncertainty. The communication, exchange, and 
normative functions of the Chinese guanxi networks, suggested by Zhan (2012), 
provide a clear understanding about why economic actors tend to choose guanxi 
networks as a preferred mode of governance securing their corrupt transactions.  
Guanxi as a transmitter of information: The guanxi network functions as a significant 
transmitter of information, facilitating transactional corruption (Zhan 2012). Firstly, 
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as Zhan (2012) states, the partners of a corrupt agreement can rely on information 
supplied by the guanxi network to identify the seller or buyer of corrupt benefits 
rather than resorting to public channels. This guarantees the secret nature of the 
corrupt exchange. Secondly, Zhan suggests that the guanxi network possesses the 
capability to lower the risks of corrupt transaction for two reasons. On the one hand, 
in order to maintain a good reputation that is fundamentally important for every 
member in the club, the guanxi network prevents either side of the transaction from 
reneging after the other side has made the payment. On the other hand, it reduces 
the risk of being punished by the Chinese legal system as mutual trust within the 
network prevents the disclosure of information relating to bribery and corruption. 
Finally, the guanxi network is able to provide a convenient and private channel of 
dissemination because crucial information flowing through the guanxi network is 
non-transparent (Zhan 2012). The guanxi network largely relies on ‘non-(publicly) 
verifiable private information, and each party may have incentives to hide his 
partner’s private information in order to prevent potential competitors from stealing 
the relation or to cover up bad outcomes to capture the information rent’ (Li 2003). 
The role of the guanxi network in corrupt exchange: The exchange function, 
emphasized by Zhan (2012: 102), is ‘the second and perhaps the most direct 
corruption-facilitating effect of [the] guanxi network’. The guanxi network offers a 
non-public mechanism of distributing corrupt benefits between their holders and 
receivers. When formal institutions fail to ‘clearly specify criteria for the distribution 
and to strictly enforce the criteria’ (Zhang 2012: 2013), government officials make 
use of the guanxi network to manoeuvre their power to personal benefit, including 
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money, expensive gifts, sex, and even promotion (Wang 2012b). The guanxi network 
facilitates the distribution of valuable resources and opportunities from officials to 
those who have established connections with them. As Zhan (2012) demonstrates, 
corrupt exchanges within guanxi networks are difficult to monitor, detect, or expose, 
for two reasons. First, ‘exchanges through guanxi networks are exclusive to people in 
the network’ (Zhang 2012: online), and the dispenser of corrupt benefits normally 
allocates scarce resources and distributes opportunities (i.e. career mobility) with 
the help seekers who possess the strongest particularistic ties with the dispenser. 
This is a departure from market transactions that are based on price competition. 
Second, a corrupt exchange within a guanxi network is characterised by implicitness 
and a relatively long time horizon, making it extremely difficult for outsiders to 
detect.  
The role of guanxi in reducing the moral costs of corruption: Political culture and 
moral attitudes among citizens and public officials have direct and indirect influences 
on the moral costs of corruption (Andvig and Moene 1990). The ‘normative’ function 
of the guanxi network, emphasized by Zhan (2012), reduces the moral cost of 
corruption, resulting in rampant corruption in contemporary China. People’s 
behaviour in a society with strong interpersonal relations is largely circumscribed by 
‘the social norm of guanxi such as maintaining a long-term relationship, mutual 
commitment, loyalty, and obligation’, while they may care less about general social 
norms and formal rules (Chen and Chen 2004a: 306).  
Zhan (2012) indicates several normative elements of guanxi that encourage public 
officials to engage in corruption. First, the principle of reciprocity not only protects 
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corrupt transactions, but also makes corrupt exchanges through guanxi networks 
attractive. To be specific, given that corrupt exchange is illegal, ‘victims’ of corrupt 
transactions cannot be protected by the judicial system, whereas the guanxi network 
can sufficiently protect both parties involved in the exchange as ‘the fear [of] 
sanctions from other members of the network can significantly discourage 
dishonesty and defection’ (Zhan 2012: 104). Moreover, bribers within the guanxi 
network can normally obtain what they want at a lower price, making corruption 
attractive for companies, individuals and public servants. This is different from 
market transactions where the price a commodity is high when there are a large 
number of competitors. Second, the norm of gift giving legitimises bribery to a 
certain degree (Zhan 2012). Gift giving, as a prevalent social custom in China, is 
fundamental to establish and maintain a network of personal relationships (guanxi). 
As Steidlmeier (1999) argues,  
Practices of gift giving in China include visual behavioral patterns (organizational 
artifacts), which are enshrined in rites (li) of proper conduct. Such rites 
themselves are rooted in normative and prescriptive canons of righteousness (yi) 
and benevolence (ren), which express why such actions are culturally 
meaningful or logical. (p. 121)  
The Chinese traditional holidays such as the Mid-August Festival and the Spring 
Festival, and important family functions such as birthday parties, weddings and 
funerals, are regarded as ideal opportunities for seekers of corrupt benefits to 
present gifts (Wang 2013b; Zhan 2012). Under such circumstances the officials feel 
obliged to accept these gifts filled with love and care. After accepting these gifts, the 
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officials have to follow the principle of reciprocity that is also regarded as a type of 
moral action. Third, the guanxi network can distort the moral judgement that is used 
to decide whether a certain action is good or bad, right or wrong (Steidlmeier 1999). 
Zhan (2012) indicates how the norm-distorting effect of guanxi network functions: 
A common theme of the repentances is that these convicted officials started off 
very clean when first entering a new working environment; but after repeatedly 
witnessing the corrupt activities of their colleagues and friends, they eventually 
succumbed to the corrupt environment and went down the same path, partly 
because if they did not do so, they would face enormous difficulty in earning the 
trust and cooperation of the peers and carrying out their own work. (Online) 
The corruption-facilitating function of guanxi networks stimulates more people to 
engage in guanxi-based corruption in order to get the thing done, which greatly 
undermines legal institutions. Wedeman (2012a) states that, as Chinese economic 
reform deepened, the mode of corruption shifted from non-transactional 
corruption such as the embezzlement of state funds and the theft of state 
property to various forms of transactional corruption that can be done through 
market mechanisms or particularistic relationships. Moreover, Luo (2008) 
demonstrates that guanxi and corruption are highly intertwined in contemporary 
China. He further indicates that guanxi provides ‘a fertile soil in China for 
corruption to flourish’, and that legitimate businessmen may be forced to develop 
what Luo refers to as corrupted guanxi networks and engage in corruption 
because guanxi is the source of sustained competitive advantage (Luo 2008: 192). 
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3.2.2. The effects of guanxi networks on judicial corruption 
‘Is the Chinese judicial system corrupt?’ is the primary question this part aims to 
explore. Generally speaking, the reduction of judicial corruption in China is 
determined by three main aspects. First, decreases in judicial corruption depend on 
the extent to which China’s laws are able to efficiently regulate the gift exchanges 
between judges and private actors in guanxi networks. Second, decreases in judicial 
corruption will depend on the establishment of a judicial system, especially the 
decision-making mechanism, which can protect judges from the demands of guanxi 
networks. Third, judicial corruption will only decrease if China’s judicial system can 
prevent the informal linkages between judges and politicians that jeopardise judicial 
independence. 
As Millington et al. (2005) argue, ‘gift giving appears to be associated with illicit 
payments, corruption and the pursuit of self-interest in a society where traditional 
structures are breaking down and new institutional structures are in transition’ (p. 
265). Therefore, laws and regulations that can regulate the gift exchanges between 
judges and private actors are profoundly important. Legal institutions that attempt 
to control corruption in the judiciary should be able to make a distinction between 
two types of guanxi: quanli guanxi and qinyou guanxi. As Su and Littlefield (2001) 
suggest, gift exchanges within qinyou guanxi networks (‘kith and kin relationships 
emphasizing favour-seeking’) are permissible by law, while gift exchanges within 
quanli guanxi networks (‘power-dependence relationships emphasizing rent-seeking’) 
should be strictly prohibited (p. 203). However, laws regulating this kind of corrupt 
exchange are absent or barely enforced, and in practice it is extremely difficult for 
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anti-corruption agencies to distinguish corrupt exchanges within quanli guanxi 
networks from gift giving within qinyou guanxi networks (Su and Littlefield 2001; 
Zhan 2012). 
Regarding whether China’s judicial system possesses the capability to protect China’s 
courts from the demands of guanxi networks, a series of publications authored by 
Ling Li (2009, 2011, 2012) expose the evolution of corruption in China’s court system. 
The Chinese Communist Party introduced an informal decision-making mechanism to 
China’s courts when the party re-established the judicial system in the 1980s (Li 
2009b). Courts were divided into civil, criminal, or commercial divisions, and ‘each 
court division was mandated to complete the entire process from case registration, 
court hearing, panel adjudication, and issuance of verdict to enforcement of the 
judgement’ (Li 2009: 206). Judicial corruption rose dramatically in that period 
because the greater the concentration of power in the hands of judges, the greater 
the corruption in the judiciary. 
In the 1990s, the Supreme People’s Court launched an institutional reform to 
transform the informal decisional mechanism into a formal and efficient decision-
making system (Li 2012). The judicial reforms saw a complete restructuring of 
China’s court system by dividing the system according to process: ‘one division was 
charged with case admission and registration, another division with adjudication 
(further divided according to the nature of the case), and yet another division with 
enforcement’ (Li 2012: 18). Meanwhile, a new separate division—adjudication 
supervision—was established to vindicate individual rights and ‘give individual 
litigants a check on abusive judicial work’ (Woo 1991: 108). 
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Under the reform, the corruption-facilitating functions of guanxi networks are 
weakened. A division of power means a private actor who attempts to obtain 
corrupt benefits has to engage in a number of corrupt exchanges with different 
judges who perform different functional judicial power, which results in a great 
increase in the transactional corruption costs (Li 2011). Moreover, the added 
number of corrupt transactions increases the risk of being detected by anti-
corruption agencies. This means that litigants and other court users feel reluctant to 
develop corrupt guanxi when they realise that corruption has become so 
complicated, expensive and risky. As a result, a fairer justice system is achieved.  
However, Li’s (2012) latest research suggests a different story: ‘all these newly 
established divisions are subject to the same decision-making mechanism, they are 
as susceptible to corruption as the antecedent institutions’ (p. 18). China’s judicial 
reforms fail to establish a formal and efficient decision-making mechanism in the 
court system and, what is even worse, institutional changes institutionalise 
corruption in the judiciary. According to Li (2012), a decision-making mechanism in 
judicial institutions generally proceeds as follows. After the case is registered, it is 
assigned to the appropriate adjudication division. The subordinates (frontline judges) 
collect information and pass it to their superiors (leader judges), then the superiors 
‘instruct their subordinates about their preferences for the outcome of the litigation 
concerned, with or without considering the information provided’ (Li 2012: 24). The 
subordinates are obligated to implement instructions from their superiors. China’s 
current court system is characterised by unconditional compliance and the lack of 
judicial reasoning, making subordinates unable to question the legitimacy of the 
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instruction. Moreover, the subordinates perceive the instructions from leader judges 
as a primary source of legitimacy for the formal court actions. Frontline judges are in 
a dilemma: although they are legally responsible for the legitimacy of their actions, 
‘effective implementation requires violation of procedural rules and/or 
misapplication of the law’ (Li 2012: 10). Finally, the victorious plaintiffs can resort to 
the enforcement division if the defendants are unwilling to perform their obligations 
voluntarily.  
Even though China’s judicial reforms have empowered frontline judges, this does not 
reduce judicial corruption because leader judges (panel leaders) still monopolise the 
decision-making (Li 2012). The authoritarian political culture emphasising 
unconditional compliance is still prevalent in China’s court system. As a result, 
frontline judges show greater loyalty to their superior’s instruments than the law 
(Hiniker 1969; Xuan 2006). In this case, ‘the law can be easily distorted by decision 
makers in the process of judicial decision making, [and] the law cannot effectively 
deter those who make these decisions from behaving corruptly’ (Li 2012: 23). Under 
such circumstances, guanxi practice still retains its important role in corrupt 
exchanges between bribers and judges who possess the decision-making power, and, 
more importantly, corrupt judges tend to form a corrupt guanxi network—a self-
defence mechanism—against potential dangers exposed by anti-corruption 
investigations (Li 2011). As a result of institutional restructuring, collusive corruption 
becomes more prevalent in the judiciary, the distribution of profits within the 
corrupt guanxi network becomes more secure, and the links between corruption and 
guanxi networks become even more close-knit.  
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Moreover, the judiciary in China fails to separate itself from a strong link with party 
leaders (Balme 2009). The court in China, as a work unit, is ‘an institution that 
socially, politically, and culturally binds judges collectively to the CCP [Chinese 
Communist Party], the state, and the people’ (Balme 2009: 156). The government 
influences or affects the judiciary in three main ways: first, courts are funded by the 
same level government (Fu and Peerenboom 2010; He 2009d); second, local judges 
are ‘elected, appointed, and removed by local people’s congresses’ (Balme 2009: 
162); third, a large majority of judges are members of the ruling party (Henderson 
2009). 
Although party leaders are not judges, they can ultimately decide their cases without 
court hearing. The Chinese Constitution (2004) demonstrates that party leaders have 
exclusive power to supervise the decision-making process in the court system. The 
court adjudicative committee, consisting of a small group of party leaders, is the 
highest decision-making body on adjudicative affairs in court (Balme 2009; Li 2012). 
Party leaders in the decision-making body of the court exercise their power mostly 
‘through giving instructions to their subordinates, including court leaders, in regular 
or ad hoc meetings or in private conversations with or without written decrees’ (Li 
2012: 8).  
The establishment of this particular judicial decision-making mechanism in China’s 
courts guarantees that the Chinese Communist Party is placed above the law, 
enabling the ruling party to ‘process its political directives and specific demands in 
an institutionalized manner through the judicial system nationwide whenever 
necessary’ (Li 2012: 25). As a consequence, in order to avoid punishment from party 
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leaders, a judge, to a large extent, works like ‘a bureaucratic clerk’ who obeys the 
orders and instructions of his superior rather than ‘the voice of reason and law’ 
(Zhang 2003: 83-84). This mechanism allows corrupt judges and political leaders to 
form a corrupt network in the Chinese judiciary. 
To sum up, the coexistence of guanxi and the formal legal system produces few 
positive outcomes. This contradicts the popular perception that guanxi networks and 
the legal framework function as substitutes or complements. This section has 
emphasized the corrosive effects of guanxi network in Chinese society and analysed 
how guanxi practice undermines China’s formal institutions. Despite the efforts of 
the Supreme People’s Court to launch an institutional reform in the 1990s, judicial 
reforms failed to create a formal and effective Chinese judicial system. This 
encouraged economic actors either to rely on guanxi practice to influence local court 
decision-making, or rely on guanxi networks to resolve disputes and protect private 
property rather than resorting to the judiciary.  
Moreover, the judicial decision-making mechanism is designed to enable the ruling 
party to maintain its above-the-law status. But the same mechanism also facilitates 
court users to bribe judges, or party leaders who exercise the decision-making power 
in the judiciary, by using guanxi practice. In addition, the evolution of judicial 
corruption is directly paralleled by institutional changes in the court system. The 
prevalence of collusive corruption or the corrupt network in the judiciary make 




This chapter presents a theoretical analysis of the coexistence of the legal system 
and the guanxi network in contemporary China. Consistent with the first hypothesis 
generated in chapter IV, this chapter argues that the embeddedness of judicial 
activities within guanxi networks makes China’s legal system weak and unjust. The 
negative impact of guanxi on the formal legal system results in the rise of collective 
corruption within the public sector. As a result, Chinese people tend to either adopt 
guanxi practice to influence judicial decision-making or rely on guanxi practice or 
extra-legal protectors (e.g. criminal groups) to protect their rights and enforce 
transactions rather than resort to courts. 
However, even the most thorough review of the existing literature on the 
coexistence of the two systems of order cannot reveal the extent to which guanxi 
distorts the formal legal system. It is also difficult to ascertain whether it is correct to 
argue that guanxi in the reform era has been transformed from a substitutive and 
complementary institution to an informal institution that encourages private 
individuals and government officials to achieve their goals regardless of the arm's 
length principle and the rule of law. In order to explore whether the theory of the 
dark side of guanxi works in practice, the fieldwork and the analysis of the empirical 




Chapter VI  The Red Mafia in China: organized crime, guanxi and police 




Drawing on empirical evidence from Chongqing, this chapter aims to test the first 
and second hypotheses generated in chapter IV. The first hypothesis predicts that 
the embeddedness of police and judicial activities in guanxi networks makes state-
sponsored law enforcement agencies weak and inefficient. The second hypothesis 
predicts that guanxi networks facilitate corrupt transactions within and between 
public and private sectors, resulting in collective corruption within political 
establishments and the rise of state-illegal protectors—the Red Mafia. Evidence 
from the Chongqing crime crackdown not only provides a good opportunity to 
examine the corruption-facilitating and corruption-masking roles of guanxi, but also 
offers a vivid picture about what the Red Mafia is and how corrupt and dysfunctional 
local government has become.  
The mafia, as Gambetta (1993) demonstrates, is a special type of organized crime 
group that specializes in producing, selling and distributing private protection. 
Varese makes a clear distinction between an organized crime group which ‘attempts 
to regulate and control the production and distribution of a given commodity or 
service unlawfully’ and a mafia group which ‘is a type of organized crime group that 
attempts to control the supply of protection’ (Varese 2010a: 14, 17). In addition to 
the mafia, which derives its income mainly from the supply of illegal protection, a 
series of campaigns against organized crime and corruption in mainland China, 
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especially the Chongqing crime crackdown, suggests that a special type of group, the 
Red Mafia is heavily involved in the business of extra-legal protection (Businessman 
E 2012).32 
The author has argued elsewhere (Wang 2013b) that the ‘Red Mafia’ is a collective 
term that can be used to refer to the dominant protection supplier in the criminal 
underworld: corrupt law enforcers. The concept of ‘Red Mafia’ shares the identical 
meaning with the Chinese term ‘protective umbrella’, which refers to corrupt 
government officials—mainly from the criminal justice system—who use their power 
to safeguard organized crime groups and receive payment in money, sex and 
promotion (also see: Chin and Godson 2006; Zhang and Chin 2008).  
The emergence of the Red Mafia shows the tendency of rising corruption in China. In 
2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping ‘vowed to tackle corruption, warning that it 
threatens the Communist Party's grip on power’ (Patience 2013: online). Abuse of 
power has become a serious threat to the Chinese one-party state. Wedeman 
(2012a) demonstrates that ‘as reform deepened, the modal form of corruption 
shifted from predatory plunder and primarily petty corruption to various forms of 
transactive corruption wherein corrupt officials “sold” favors to economic interests 
seeking profit-making opportunities’. As Wedeman further explains, there are two 
type of transactive corruption: first, positive-sum or mutually-beneficial exchanges 
between corrupt officials and private actors; and second, a negative-sum exchange 
wherein a private actor is forced to bribe the corrupt official to avoid unwanted 
                                                          
32
 Qiu Geping, 11 January 2012, interview, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China; Jin Qigao, 10 January 
2012, interview, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China; Qiu, personal communication, e-mail message 
to author, 22 August, 27 August, and 28 August 2011.  
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official action. Drawing on Gambetta’s (1993) and Varese’s (2001) studies of mafias, 
it is clearer to say that the commodity in mutually-beneficial exchanges sold by 
officials is ‘protection’, while the commodity in negative-sum exchanges is ‘extortion’. 
Moreover, transactive corruption suggested by Wedeman (2012a) neglects one 
significant component: corrupt exchanges among public officials that also include 
both positive- and negative-sum exchanges. 
In contrast with the narrow definition of ‘Red Mafia’, which exclusively refers to law 
enforcers who are involved in the supply of protection in the criminal underworld, 
this thesis adopts a broader definition. ‘Red’ is the symbolic colour of the Chinese 
Communist Party, which controls the legislative, executive and judiciary branches. In 
this case, ‘red’ in its broader sense covers public officials from all government 
agencies.  
In this thesis, the ‘protection’ supplied by the Red Mafia extends to corrupt benefits 
distributed through guanxi networks. That is to say, ‘Red Mafioso’ refers to public 
officials (from any government agencies) who are involved in at least one of the 
following activities: (1) selling unlawful protection or transacting illicit benefits within 
the public sector (e.g. selling public appointments and sheltering other officials’ 
corrupt transactions); (2) creating mutually beneficial networks with legitimate 
private actors, such as engaging in rent-seeking activities; (3) distributing corrupt 
benefits to or supplying protection to illegal private actors; this might include 
safeguarding criminal groups and illicit entrepreneurs, enabling them to escape 
punishment, and wiping clean their criminal records. 
226 
 
It has been widely acknowledged that the study of guanxi and corruption suffers 
from a lack of comprehensive statistical information because police records and 
court files about corruption cases are not available to the public in China (Guo 2008). 
Corruption cases revealed by the Chongqing crime crackdown seem different 
because part of the information about organized crime and corruption has been 
disclosed by the mass media. The Chongqing crime crackdown demonstrates the 
corruption-facilitating role of guanxi. To be specific, the principle of reciprocity and 
the importance of maintaining face (mianzi33) in the guanxi network encourage high-
ranking government officials to distribute promotions and opportunities to those 
close to them in the network, facilitating the rise of illegal job markets (e.g. the 
buying and selling of public offices). Middle- and lower-level government officials 
also obtain illegal benefits through guanxi practice. For example, the guanxi network 
provides a safe and efficient channel for both mid- and low-level police officers and 
locally-based criminals to create mutually beneficial networks. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 1 offers a general 
description of the crime crackdown campaign in Chongqing. Section 2 focuses on 
guanxi and the buying and selling of public offices in Chongqing, and explores how 
relational power stemming from guanxi networks determines the way in which 
promotions and opportunities are distributed. Section 3 focuses on the relationship 
between organized crime, guanxi and police corruption by discussing the most 
widely-publicized case uncovered by the Chongqing crime crackdown: the Wen 
                                                          
33
 The term ‘face’ refers to ‘the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line 
others assume he has taken during a particular contact’. Please see: Erving Goffman, 'On Face-Work: 
An Analysis of Ritual Elements in Social Interaction', Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal 
Processes, 1/8 (1955), 213-31 at 213.  
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Qiang case. It suggests a typology of organized crime in Chongqing, examines how 
organized crime groups adopt a three-stage guanxi building (i.e. initiating, building, 
and using) to develop mutually beneficial networks with police officers, and explains 
why police protection becomes necessary for locally-based criminal groups. Section 
4 concludes that government authority has become a tradable commodity in 
mainland China where the government fails to control rampant public sector 
corruption. Guanxi allows government officials to conduct corrupt transactions with 
‘insiders’ (other officials) and ‘outsiders’ (private actors) to obtain private gain. What 
is worse, it encourages and even forces honest public officials to break the rule of 
law and supply unlawful benefits to those close to them in the guanxi network 
because a violation of the principle of guanxi will cause serious negative 
repercussions on the reputation of the violator.   
1. The Chongqing crime crackdown: a general description 
Chongqing is a major city in Southwest China and one of China’s four directly-
controlled municipalities (the other three are Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin). Like 
much of the rest of China, Chongqing’s wealth has grown suddenly and dramatically. 
The increase in wealth has also prompted the return of gangs (Moore 2009). One 
point emphasised by most interviewees and a few news reports is that ‘Chongqing is 
far from alone in suffering from organized crime, but has gone further than most 
cities in tackling it’ (Watts 2009: online). Provinces in mainland China, like Yunnan 
and Guangxi, are suffering from more serious organized crime than Chongqing, but 
these municipal governments lack the capability of cracking down on these serious 




The man behind Chongqing’s latest strike black campaign was its party chief, Bo Xilai. 
Austin Ramzy characterised Bo as ‘an ambitious outsider whose lack of local ties had 
given him a free hand to pursue his clean-up campaign’ (Ramzy 2010b: online). 
Without Bo’s considerable political confidence34, it would have been extremely 
difficult for the Chongqing Municipal Government to launch the war on organized 
crime. 
According to interview data and reports in state-controlled newspapers, such as 
China Daily, organized criminal groups in Chongqing were involved in a wide variety 
of businesses, from the traditional areas of gambling, prostitution, debt collection, 
protection, and drug dealing, to the legitimate businesses of the wholesale seafood 
trade, private bus networks, and nightclubs (Economist 2009; Moore 2009). The 
sums of money involved were huge. To take just one example, loan sharking: China 
Daily estimated that ‘the money lent by gangs at exorbitant interest rates [in 2008] 
crossed 20 billion RMB ($4.4 billion) or a third of the city’s fiscal income’ (Bolin  He 
2009c: online). 
The biggest crackdown on Chongqing’s gangsters and their colluding officials 
aroused particular attention because ‘it was directed, unusually, at the kind of 
people who count: the wealthy businessmen and powerful officials who controlled 
the gangs and enabled them to flourish’ (Economist 2009: online). From June 2009, 
                                                          
34 Bo Xilai was a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China. He made no secret of his 
desire to enter the Politburo Standing Committee but was expelled from the Chinese Communist 
Party in September 2012 for corruption and the abuse of power. For more details, please see: Jamie A. 
FlorCruz (2012), ‘The rise and fall of China’s Bo Xilai’, 




when Chongqing’s crime crackdown campaign began, to March 2010, a total of 3348 
suspects were arrested. More than 50 public officials were arrested for allegedly 
acting as protective umbrellas for local organized criminal groups. Fourteen of these 
were former high-ranking officials including Wen Qiang, Chongqing’s former director 
of the municipality’s justice bureau and deputy police chief, and Peng Changjian, 
deputy chief of the Chongqing Public Security Bureau (Huang 2010).  
Chongqing’s massive crackdown shows that the buying and selling of offices is 
widespread in China. It also illustrates that the collusion between organized crime 
groups and public sector officials has become a serious problem threatening the 
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. The protection offered by the Red Mafia 
is the most important factor for the resurgence of organized crime groups. A 
thorough analysis of the most famous corruption case uncovered by the Chongqing 
crime crackdown—the Wen Qiang case—offers a clear picture about how guanxi 
distorts China’s legal system and how it enables locally-based criminal groups to 
create corrupt networks with local police officers.   
2. Guanxi and corruption: the buying and selling of public offices in 
Chongqing 
In China, the promotion of government officials has been largely influenced by 
unwritten rules, particularly the practice of guanxi (Warren et al. 2004). This 
phenomenon is mainly caused by the weak political and legal system which fails to 
clearly specify criteria for the distribution of public offices and to strictly enforce 
those criteria. The principle of reciprocity and the essence of maintaining face in 
guanxi practice, as Zhan (2012: 103) demonstrates, ‘encourages local officials to 
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distribute promotions and opportunities to those closer to them in the network’. 
Moreover, the importance of guanxi forces individuals (lesser cadres and ordinary 
citizens) to cultivate relationships with those in power.   
In departure from most crime crackdown campaigns conducted by local 
governments, the Chongqing crime crackdown resulted in the end of numerous 
corrupt networks, especially within law enforcement agencies, and the reshuffle of 
at least 3,000 police officers in order to cut their links with organized crime groups 
(Wang and Ma 2010). The most influential network destroyed by this crime 
crackdown was within the Chongqing Public Security Bureau headed by Wen Qiang, 
who served as the deputy head of the Chongqing Public Security Bureau from 1992 
to 2008 and as director of the Chongqing Justice Bureau from July 2008 to August 
2009.  
Wen Qiang was described by most interviewees as a trustworthy person (Journalist A 
2011; Journalist D 2011). He regarded ‘the rule of ganqing’ in guanxi practice as 
being much more important than the rule of law (Prosecutor A 2011; Prosecutor B 
2011). As Journalist A (2012) says:  
‘Wen Qiang was born in Banan District, Chongqing. Chongqing has long been a 
water transportation hub on the upper reaches of the Yangtze River. The dock 
culture [sworn brotherhood culture] is one of the most distinctive cultures in 
Chongqing. Influenced by traditional Chongqing culture, Wen became obsessed 
with mianzi [face] and yiqi [righteousness]. Middle or lower levels of police 
officers who were familiar with Wen always called him “Qiang Ge” (Elder 
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Brother Qiang). Wen had great desire to main his mianzi/prestige. As a result, 
he often made decisions based on codes of brotherhood rather the rule of law’. 
From Wen’s perspective, the provision of assistance for promotions of middle and 
lower level officers within his guanxi networks was normal and even necessary, but 
transactions between Wen and his subordinates were clearly defined as corruption 
from a legal perspective. Unlike the legal market, in which the price determines 
transactions between sellers and buyers, transactions in the market of buying and 
selling offices were determined by interpersonal relationships between the holders 
and receivers of the benefits (Schramm and Taube 2003a; Zhan 2012). In other 
words, Wen may feel obliged to favour the people in his network rather than 
outsiders, to favour those closer to him over the others farther away in his network. 
In order to secure promotions or gain better job opportunities, many middle and 
lower level police officers in Chongqing had to invest in establishing and maintaining 
a close relationship with Wen. Moreover, people who were not members of Wen’s 
guanxi network tended to employ a middleman—a linking person who brings a 
buyer and seller from different networks together—to facilitate corrupt transactions 
(Zhao et al. 2011). Wen Qiang, as the main supplier of offices, was convicted of 
providing assistance for more than 20 police officers to gain promotion and police 
























transfer to a 
better job 
Wu XX Chen Wanqing Wen Qiang ¥1,190,000 





Geng XX Chen Wulin Wen Qiang ¥150,000 
Promotion Luo Li N/A
37
 Wen Qiang ¥400,000 
Promotion Ran Congjian Chen Wanqing Wen Qiang ¥500,000 
Same-level 
transfer to a 
better job or 






Zhou Hongmei Wen Qiang ¥1,590,000 




Zhao Liming N/A Wen Qiang ¥270,000 
Promotion Li XX N/A Wen Qiang ¥49,000 
Same-level 
transfer to a 
better job 
X XX Zhou Hongwei Wen Qiang ¥1,770,000 
Promotion Huang Daiqiang N/A Wen Qiang ¥95,000 
Promotion & 
same-level 
transfer to a 
better job 
Wang Daoshou N/A Wen Qiang ¥155,000 
Promotion Chen Tao N/A Wen Qiang ¥60,000 
Promotion & 
same-level 
transfer to a 
better job 
Xu Qiang N/A Wen Qiang ¥370,000 
Same-level 
transfer to a 
better job 
Chen XX N/A Wen Qiang ¥30,000 
Promotion Zhou XX Du Guangde Wen Qiang ¥200,000 
 
                                                          
35
 This table is designed by the author according to information from news reports released by Xinhua 
News Agency, the official press agency of the People’s Republic of China. 
36
 The Chongqing government has not disclosed all the names of ‘office buyers’, so this paper uses ‘XX’ 
to fill in the missing parts. 
37
 ‘N/A’ due to lack of public information 
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In the Chongqing case, relational power stemming from guanxi networks enables 
Wen’s subordinates to obtain promotions. As Shang et al. (2012) argue, relational 
power can be divided into two subcategories: direct and indirect. Direct relational 
power can be further divided into ganqing (affection) based relational power and 
renqing (felt-obligation) based relational power.  
In an affection-based relationship, ‘the leader and his/her follower socialize outside 
work, discuss personal problems and exchange advice on personal issues’ (Jiang et al. 
2012; Shang et al. 2012: 440). For example, Huang Daiqiang, Zhao Liming and Chen 
Tao, three middle-ranking police officers, were Wen’s ‘personal bodyguards’ when 
Wen enjoyed himself in nightclubs. This provided excellent opportunities for these 
police officers to share their personal problems and issues with their leader. 
Affection-based relationships therefore encouraged Wen to distribute corrupt 
benefits (e.g. promotion opportunities) to his loyal followers (Xinhua 2010e).  
Chen and Chen (2004a: 316) argue that socially-expressive activities, such as 
celebration parties for marriages, birthdays and promotions, have a great impact on 
‘affective trust and ganqing’. This is because celebrations provide good opportunities 
for lower-ranking officials to express their good wishes and greetings to their leaders. 
The Wen Qiang case shows that the Spring Festival (the Chinese New Year), Mid-
Autumn Festival, birthdays and occasions when Wen went abroad on official 
business provided excellent gift-giving opportunities for low- and mid-level police 
officers and local businesses to send ‘Hongbao’—red envelopes containing money or 
shopping cards—to Wen Qiang (Keyuan 2000; L. Li 2012). As Bracey (1992) states, 
gifts are converted into reciprocity, making the recipient indebted to the giver. The 
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only thing that Wen had to give in return was misuse of power or authority, which 
was also the only thing in which these bribers were interested.  
Obligation-based relational power is generated from the exchange of emotional 
feelings (e.g. work-related problems and issues) between the leader and his or her 
subordinates (Shang et al. 2012). Social and economic transactions create a sense of 
indebtedness, resulting in a felt-obligation-based relationship between two parties 
(Vanhonacker 2004). For example, Peng Changjian and Wen Qiang, two police chiefs, 
developed a very close working relationship because they had worked together for 
many years. It would have been difficult for Wen to establish himself as an anti-
crime hero without the assistance of Peng. In September 2000, with Peng's 
significant contribution, Wen successfully destroyed the Zhang Jun criminal syndicate 
and made himself China’s most reputable police officer (Ifeng 2010; Lu 2010). Wen 
rewarded Peng by promoting him from lowly officer all the way to police chief. 
In practice, it is extremely difficult to distinguish ganqing-based relationships from 
renqing-based relationships. In most corruption cases, these two types of 
relationship are simply mixed together. As Jiang et al. (2012: 209) argues: 
‘Guanxi based on kinship usually starts from ganqing while other kinds of guanxi 
typically start from renqing. However, as time passes, both kinds of guanxi 
contain both ganqing and renqing components. The only distinction is the 
proportions of ganqing and renqing in guanxi. For example, business guanxi 
usually has less ganqing elements than other guanxi.’ 
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Indirect relational power, also called network-based relational power, facilitates 
people who did not possess a direct guanxi relationship with Wen to receive corrupt 
benefits in Wen’s guanxi networks. As Shang et al. (2012) argue, this type of 
relational power is based on mianzi (face). A middleman (A) possesses the ability not 
only to bring the provider (B) and seeker (C) of corrupt benefits together, but also to 
make B feel obligated to C. The relationship between A and B indirectly affects the 
outcome of the request made by C.  
As Table 1 shows, Chen Wanqing was frequently invited to act as middleman when 
the help seeker was not a member of Wen Qiang’s guanxi networks. Chen was a 
billionaire in Chongqing. Since 2000, Chen had created and maintained good guanxi 
with Wen through continuous gift-giving on three types of occasion: special 
celebrations (e.g. birthdays), traditional Chinese festivals (e.g. Spring Festival) and 
returning from a long distance trip (Li 2010). Norms of reciprocity in guanxi networks 
made Wen reluctant to say ‘no’ to Chen’s requests. If a favour request was not 
granted as expected, guanxi quality would be negatively affected and Wen’s 
reputation in guanxi networks would be seriously damaged. As a result, people who 
did not possess guanxi with Wen tended to find a middleman to gain job transfers 
within the Chongqing police system.  
The buying and selling of public offices in Chongqing illustrates the importance of 
relational power in the distribution of government appointments. Guanxi in 
contemporary China exerts corrosive effects on the legal system. The Chongqing 
crime crackdown was followed by the reshuffle of mid- and high-ranking police 
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officers in order to break corrupt guanxi networks within the police system and cut 
mutually-beneficial links between police officials and criminals (Liu and Li 2010). 
3. The political-criminal nexus: organized crime, guanxi and police 
corruption in Chongqing 
The establishment of a close guanxi with high-ranking officials not only enables low- 
and mid-level police officers to gain promotions or transfers, but also safeguards 
their businesses with criminals. Unlike corrupt high-ranking government officials 
who make large amounts of money by selling government appointments or 
associating with legitimate businessmen, middle or lower-level police officers who 
want to earn such benefits have to associate with locally-based criminals or illegal 
entrepreneurs who are also eager to establish close guanxi networks with law 
enforcers (Chin and Godson 2006). Moreover, middle or lower-level police officers 
are willing to create friendly guanxi networks with illicit entrepreneurs who have 
close interpersonal connections with senior police officers. As a police officer argues:  
‘If a gang boss is a good friend of a police chief, lower level police officers would 
want to cultivate guanxi with this gang boss by providing internal information 
and business opportunities. This is an efficient way to get involved in the guanxi 
network led by senior officials, creating good opportunities to gain promotions’ 
(FGD A 2011). 
According to Antonopoulos (2013), the corrupt network between the criminal 
underworld and the political establishment can be created either through 
clientelistic relationships or bribery in the form of money, expensive gifts and/or 
services, and sex services, or through interpersonal, family guanxi links. Both 
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fieldwork data and extensive published materials suggest that police officers in Wen 
Qiang’s corrupt guanxi network were largely involved in offering protection for 




Table 2: The most influential political-criminal nexus in Chongqing headed by Wen Qiang38   
Wen Qiang:  
 
He served as the deputy head 
of the Chongqing Public 
Security Bureau from 1992 to 
2008 and as director of the 
Chongqing Justice Bureau 
from July 2008 to August 
2009. 
Wen was found guilty of: 
 Taking more than 12 million RMB in bribes 
to facilitate more than 20 officers to gain 
promotions or transfers; to help 
businessmen obtain illegal profits; and to 
provide protection to locally-based 
organized crime groups. Of these bribes, 
756,500 RMB came from gang members. 
 Failing to explain the source of assets worth 
10.44 million RMB. 
 Raping a university student in August 2007. 
Wen’s right-hand man 
Peng Changjian: 
 
Peng served as former 
deputy chief of the 
Chongqing Public Security 
Bureau, was reportedly a 
close ally of Wen Qiang. 
  
 
Peng was found guilty of: 
 
 Taking 4.71 million RMB in bribes from 
1998 to 2009, of which over 1.4 million 
RMB was offered by three gang bosses, 
Wang Xiaojun, Ma Dang, and Yue Ning. 
 Failing to explain the source of assets worth 
4.67 million RMB. 









·Bribed Wen with 
90,000 RMB and an 
Omega watch 
between 2004 and 
2008. 
Luo Li: 
·Deputy head of the 
city’s drug control 
department (2005-
2008). 
·Bribed Wen with 
400,000 RMB 
between 2005 and 
2008. 
Zhao Liming: 
·Deputy head of the 
city’s public transport 
security police division 
(2000-2009).  
·Bribed Wen with 
270,000 RMB between 
2000 and 2008. 
Chen Tao: 





·Bribed Wen with 
60,000 RMB 
between 2004 and 
2008. 
Xu Qiang: 






·Bribed Wen with 
370,000 RMB 
between 2004 and 
2008. 
Su Tao: 
·Deputy head of 
Jiangbei district sub-




·Bribed Wen to 
obtain promotion. 
The specific 
information of Su’s 
bribery is not in the 
public domain. 
Eight locally-based criminal organizations which controlled Chongqing’s illegal markets 
 
Wang Tianlun’s Gang 
·Businesses: Monopolizing the 
hog slaughtering and pork 
markets through threats and 
violence. 
·Length of activity: 13 years 
·Size: 23 members 
·Active since: 1996 
 
 
Xie Caiping’s Gang 
·Business: Gambling 
·Length of activity: 5 years 
·Size: 22 members 
·Active since: 2004 
 
 
Chen Mingliang’s Gang 
·Businesses: Prostitution, 
dispute resolution, gambling, 
and drug trafficking. 
·Length of activity: 8 years 
·Size: 34 members 
·Active since: 2001 
 
 
Ao Xingman’s Gang 
·Businesses: Drug production 
and trafficking, and illegal sale 
of firearms. 
·Length of activity: 13 years 
·Size: 46 members 
·Active since: 1996 
 
 
Wang Xiaojun’s Gang 
·Businesses: Gambling and 
prostitution. 
·Length of activity: 8 years 
·Size: 24 members 
·Active since: 2001 
 
 
Wang Sisters’ Gang (Wang Ziqi 
and Wang Wanning’s Gang) 
·Business: Prostitution. 
·Length of activity: 15 years 
·Size: over 20 members 
·Active since: 1994 
 
 
Yue Ning’s Gang 
·Business: Prostitution. 
·Length of activity: 11 years 
·Size: 31 members 
·Active since: 1998 
 
 
Fan Qihang and Gong 
Gangmo’s Gang 
·Businesses: Loan sharking, 
drug trafficking, and gambling. 
·Length of activity: 3 years 
·Size: 34 members 
·Active since: 2006 
 
                                                          
38
 This table is designed by the author. All the pictures and information in this table are from relevant 
news reports released by Xinhua News Agency from June 2009 to February 2012.  
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As Table 2 shows, Wen Qiang’s black empire consisted of three tiers. Wen, the 
‘godfather’ of Chongqing’s criminal underworld, and his right-hand man, Peng 
Changjian, former deputy chief of the Chongqing Public Security Bureau, sat on the 
top; the middle level consisted of Wen’s six ‘heavenly guardians’, who were mid-
level police officers in Chongqing; and on the bottom were eight organizations with 
an underworld nature, which controlled the illegal businesses of drugs, gambling, 
prostitution in Chongqing. 
Through a discussion of the Wen Qiang case, this section firstly develops a typology 
of organized crime in Chongqing, then analyses how locally-based criminals adopted 
the ‘debt logic’ of guanxi practice to establish mutually-beneficial networks with 
police officers. Finally, it interprets why the protection offered by police officers 
became necessary for organized crime groups in China.  
a. The criminal underworld in Chongqing: a typology of 
organized crime 
The most powerful protective umbrella in Chongqing was created by Wen Qiang and 
his subordinates. Under this umbrella, eight organizations with an underworld 
nature emerged to control the production and distribution of unlawful commodities 
and services. Rather than going into excessive detail about organizational structure 
and criminal businesses, this chapter offers a diagram summarising key information 
on eight notorious criminal organizations and interprets these organizations’ 




Table 3 Summary information on the eight organizations with an underworld nature that 
were under Wen’s protective umbrella 
Name of gang Length of 
activity in 
years 




1. Wang Tianlun’s  
Gang 
13 1996 23 Monopolisation 







2. Xie Caiping’s 
Gang 





3. Chen Mingliang’s 
Gang 






Luo li and 
Peng 
Changjian 
4. Ao Xingman’s 
Gang 
13 1996 46 Drug 
production and 
trafficking, and 
illegal sale of 
firearms 
Luo Li 
5. Wang Xiaojun’s 
Gang 





Su Tao and Li 
Hanbing 
6. Wang Ziqi and 
Wang Wanning’s 
Gang (or Wang 
Sisters’ Gang) 
15 1994 Over 20 Prostitution Chen Tao 
7. Yue Ning’s 
Gang 
11 1998 31 Prostitution Wen Qiang, 
Peng 
Changjian  
and Chen Tao 
8. Fan Qihang and  
Gong Gangmo’s 
Gang 






Chen Tao and 
Yang Zhi 
      
 
i. Structure 
Regarding organizational formations of organized crime in China, Xia (2008) suggests 
that ‘the choice of appropriate organizational form by organized criminal groups is 
not simple and pure. The organized criminal groups have chosen organizational 
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formations ranging from hierarchic (bureaucratic) structures to market mechanisms 
and to networks’ (p. 22). This part analyses the structure of the eight organized 
crime groups under Wen’s umbrella and focuses on three of the most fundamental 
features: ‘hierarchy’, ‘hermit-crab’-type hybrids39 and ‘networks’.  
Hierarchy 
Similar to traditional secret societies in ancient China, a hierarchical structure has 
been adopted by many organized crime groups in contemporary China (Chen 2005; 
Xia 2008). In response to this phenomenon, the majority of scholars and 
practitioners tend to regard a pyramid-type hierarchy as the dominant form of 
criminal organization.  
In Chongqing, the emergence of locally-based criminal groups was largely influenced 
by the ancient culture of sworn brotherhoods. Moreover, hierarchical organizations 
seemed a superior form for many criminal groups, especially those that mainly 
engaged in locally based criminal activities such as organising prostitution, running 
gambling dens, and involving in loan-sharking.  
For example, Chen Mingliang’s gang was regarded as the biggest criminal syndicate 
in Chongqing’s underworld (TimeWeekly 2009; Yi 2010). In common with the typical 
pyramid structure, there were a variety of ranks and positions within the syndicate. 
Chen Mingliang was the ‘dragonhead’. Lei Deming, an influential underworld figure, 
was a ‘military commander’ overseeing defensive and offensive operations. Ma Dang 
                                                          
39
 The term “hermit-crab-type hybrids” was first used by Professor Ming Xia in his 2008 paper titled 
‘Organizational formations of organized crime in China: perspectives from the state, markets, and 
networks’. It refers to criminal groups that ‘take over the shells of legitimate hierarchies’ (p 14). 
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was a financial officer and head of public relations for Chen’s group, taking charge of 
developing relationships with government officials. Key members actively 
participated in Chen’s legal and illegal businesses. The lowest rank consisted of 
dozens of rank-and-file gang members who carried out routine tasks (Xinhua 2010h). 
‘Hermit-crab’-type hybrids 
The existing literature shows that over half the criminal syndicates that were 
destroyed in Chongqing’s latest strike black campaign had legitimate covers. Xia 
suggests that the primary aim of creating a business front is ‘not only [creating] a 
safe place for the dirty money, but also [providing] a safe haven for criminals 
through a legitimate gathering site, organizational structure and coherence, and 
seemingly legal employment’ (Xia 2008: 14). Regarding the intermingling of 
organized crime and public officials, Ko-lin Chin argues that ‘the line between 
legitimate business and illegal conduct had become increasingly blurred’ (Jacobs 
2009: online). Similarly, Wang Li, a law professor in Chongqing, points out that 
Chongqing’s gangs, like gangs elsewhere in China, are organized around businesses 
rather than families. He furthers argues that: 
The gangs engaged in the traditional businesses of gambling, prostitution and 
drug dealing [in the first few years]. But then they set up companies…many of 
the larger gangs are contained inside legitimate business, with the godfathers 
also performing the role of chief executive. Inside the business, a small 
proportion of gangsters were hired in each department, charged with collecting 
debts and protection fees. The rest of the employees conduct normal business 
(Moore 2009: online). 
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Most of the gangland bosses under Wen’s protective umbrella had legitimate covers 
such as nightclub owners, construction entrepreneurs, motorbike moguls and real 
estate agents. Some of them were even influential millionaires or billionaires. In 
addition, a business front also enabled gang bosses to create connections with 
government officials. For example, Gong Gangmo, a gang boss in Chongqing, bribed 
former police chief Wen Qiang. Wen admitted in a court hearing that he accepted 
Gong’s bribes, but he emphasised that he did nothing for the gang as he thought 
Gong was a legal businessman, and he was unclear why Gong offered money to him. 
Networks 
Carlo Morselli defines a network as ‘a self-organizing structure that is driven by the 
emergent behaviour of its parts’ (Morselli 2009: 14). A criminal organization that 
adopts the criminal network form is able to ‘capture “a flexible order”, structural 
arrangements that are lighter on their feet than “slow moving” hierarchies and quick 
to adjust to changing situations and opportunities’ (Varese 2010a: 8). The use of 
networks theory for the study of organized crime has not been widely accepted by 
most scholars and practitioners in mainland China because they perceive the 
hierarchical organization (i.e. pyramid structure) as a superior organizational form. 
However, based on an enormous number of cases of organized crime exposed 
during China’s anti-crime ‘strike hard’ campaigns, Xia writes that many hierarchical 
criminal syndicates evolved into networked forms of organizations to seize the 
criminal opportunities generated within networks (Xia 2008). 
Ao Xingman’s gang was the largest drug production and trafficking organization in 
Chongqing. The organizational framework created by Ao and his confederates was a 
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powerful criminal network combining the features of two forms, a ‘cobweb’ and a 
production and distribution chain40. Under the ‘cobweb’ structure, Ao occupied the 
centre of the networks. Two other gang bosses, Tan Liren and Li Xiang, ex-members 
of Ao’s gang, developed their own drug production and trafficking organizations 
(Tian 2012). Tan’s gang and Li’s gang seemed like second-tier groups and 
acknowledged the hegemony of Ao Xingman in criminal networks, even though they 
were loosely connected. Each gang engaged in illegal activities independently and 
cooperated with each other only when necessary.  
Moreover, Ao Xingman succeeded in forming a chain-like structure by linking up 
supply, demand, and protection lines. The chain began in Burma, from where drugs 
were smuggled by Ao’s gangsters through Yunnan Province to the city of Chongqing.  
The distribution chain consisted of street gangs as well as 14 notorious criminal 
groups in Chongqing. The final link in the chain involved distribution in provinces 
such as Guangdong, Guangxi, and Yunnan. In order to secure his production and 
distribution chain, Ao also developed a tight relationship with his protector Luo Li, 
former deputy chief of the anti-drug brigade of the Chongqing Municipal Public 
Security Bureau (Xinhua 2011a, 2012a). 
ii. Activities 
Two key words, ‘monopoly’ and ‘the provision of illegal goods and services’, describe 
the activities of criminal organizations under Wen’s protective umbrella. 
Monopoly 
                                                          
40
 Xia (2008) offers more detail about ‘a cobweb’ and ‘a production and distribution chain’. 
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The Chongqing crime crackdown illustrates that corrupt government officials, 
especially police officers, were the only suppliers of a particular commodity (i.e. 
protection) in Chongqing’s criminal underworld. The monopoly of extra-legal 
protection businesses by corrupt police officers provided a safe environment for 
gangsters who had connections with these officers to engage in criminal activities 
and illegal businesses.   
For example, Ao Xingman and two smaller players, Tan Liren and Li Xiang, dominated 
Chongqing’s illegal drug market with up to an 80% share (Xinhua 2012a). Ao was able 
to gain such an extraordinary market share thanks to the protection offered by a 
senior police officer, Luo Li. Luo arrested other drug traffickers, forcing Ao’s 
competitors out of the market so Ao could expand his market share (Tian 2012). 
Wang Tianlun, a billionaire and notorious gang boss, managed to gain a 41% share of 
the hog slaughtering and pork markets through threats and violence. Wang’s 
gangsters forced pig farmers to send their pigs to Wang’s slaughtering company, and 
compelled customers to purchase water-injected meat (Yi 2010).  
The provision of illegal goods and services 
Prostitution is a booming industry in contemporary China. Four out of the eight 
criminal groups were involved in the prostitution business. Chen Mingliang and 
Wang Xiaojun, two gangland bosses, organized hundreds of women to engage in the 
sex trade (Xinhua 2010h, 2010g). Wang and his partners also opened a male 
prostitution den named ‘Luren Gangwan’ (literally, “Traveller’s Harbour”) in a hotel 
in central Chongqing (Xinhua 2010g).  
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Wang Ziqi was regarded as the ‘godmother’ of prostitution in Chongqing. Ms Wang 
and her sister Wang Wanning ran a brothel named ‘Bright Spot Teahouse’ in 
Chongqing between 1994 and 2009 (Moore 2011). Xinhua News Agency disclosed 
that at least 300 women had been victims of the Wang sisters’ gang. Some victims 
died or went mad (Xinhua 2011d). The mass production of cheap sex was mainly 
supplied for customers who were not willing or able to spend large amounts of 
money. By contrast, Yue Ning, a famous figure in Chongqing’s entertainment 
industry, ran two of the most lavish nightclubs and earned a huge amount of money 
from the business of high-end prostitution (Yi 2010; Yu 2010b). 
Gambling is another lucrative business. Four criminal syndicates under Wen’s 
umbrella were involved in running gambling houses. Xie Caiping operated more than 
30 gambling dens, including one just across the street from a courthouse (FlorCruz 
2009; Ramzy 2010a; Tran 2009; Xinhua 2009c). Xia Ping, under the protection of Xie 
Caiping, opened a casino in central Chongqing in 2004 and recruited over thirty 
members (Xinhua 2010f). In addition, Fan Qihang and Gong Gangmo’s gang also 
operated gambling dens, which contributed over one million RMB to their profits 
(Feng 2010). 
Moreover, these gangs also engaged in online gambling and succeeded in expanding 
their illegal commercial services in Southeast Asia. For example, Wang Xiaojun’s gang 
obtained 170 million RMB through engaging in organising online gambling between 
2001 and 2009. Wang’s group also opened four gambling houses in Chongqing in 
2003 and expanded its gambling activities to Macau in 2008 (Ma and Wang 2010; F. 
Yi 2010). Another gang boss who ran an international gambling ring was Chen 
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Mingliang. Cooperating with gambling casinos in Macau, Chen’s gang controlled the 
‘bate-ficha’ business41 in Chongqing, and took dozens of businessmen (who had to 
buy chips from Chen) on illegal gambling tours to Macau (Xinhua 2010h).  
Dispute resolution became a popular business which also brought huge profits to 
organized crime groups. Prized for its violent reputation, Chen Mingliang’s gang was 
frequently invited to resolve disputes among private business owners, becoming a 
well-known quasi-governmental organization (TimeWeekly 2009; Yi 2010). For 
instance, the dispute over He Lunjiang’s alleged 97 million RMB gambling debt was 
settled after lengthy talks between Chen’s follower Lei Deming and gang boss Wang 
Xingqiang. Due to Chen’s outstanding reputation, Wang agreed to reduce the debt to 
only 20 million RMB. In return, Chen’s group levied a service charge of 15 million 
RMB (TimeWeekly 2009). 
Drug production and trafficking in Chongqing were monopolised by three gangs led 
by gangland boss Ao Xingman. At least 14 criminal organizations were involved in 
selling and distributing illegal drugs on the streets and in their entertainment clubs. 
For instance, Fan and Gong’s gang engaged in illegally selling 10 kg of 
methamphetamine (Feng 2010). Yue Ning and Xie Caiping, two gang bosses, 
provided illegal drugs for their gangsters and customers in their gambling houses and 
nightclubs (TimeWeekly 2009). 
                                                          
41 The term ‘bate-ficha’, suggested by Angela Veng Mei Leong, means ‘to handle chips, and lots of 
chips indicate power and profit. So the bate-ficha business simply means the rolling or exchanging of 
chips between the customers (gamblers) and the bate-ficha guys (dapma-chai) or chip rollers’ (p. 86). 
For more details, please see: A.V.M. Leong, 'The ‘Bate-Ficha’ business and triads in Macau casinos', 
Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice journal, 2/1 (2004), 83-96. 
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Many gangs in Chongqing under Wen’s protective umbrella also participated in loan-
sharking, firearms trafficking and distribution, debt collection, and extortion. 
b. The rules of survival: obtaining police protection through 
guanxi-building 
Guanxi with government officials is a luxury item for ordinary people: ‘developing 
guanxi costs time, energy and money—all limited resources’ (Fan 2002a: 547-48). 
Creating a political-criminal guanxi network is, however, a necessary item for locally-
based criminal groups. The long-term survival of the eight notorious gangs in 
Chongqing was largely due to their success in establishing mutually-beneficial guanxi 
networks with police officers. Guanxi with police officers offers locally-based 
criminals significant protection against the uncertainties created by a series of crime 
crackdown campaigns. It is, however, not easy for an outsider to establish guanxi 
with those who control desired resources (Leung et al. 1995). Guanxi building, as 
Chen and Chen (2004a) demonstrate, is divided into three sequential stages: 
initiating, building and using. 
i. Initiating guanxi    
Two individuals who do not know each other but want to develop guanxi have to 
identify or create guanxi bases. A guanxi base is defined by Jacobs (1979: 243) as ‘a 
base in which two or more persons [have] a commonality of shared identification’. 
Guanxi begins with a guanxi base, but the existence of a guanxi base does not imply 
the existence of a guanxi. For example, two individuals might have a guanxi base (e.g. 
a neighbour) but they never get in touch with each other; under such circumstances, 
guanxi or active guanxi does not exist.  
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A guanxi base, as Fan (2002a) and Chen and Chen (2004a) suggest, can be classified 
into four categories: (1) kinship and family ties; (2) common social identities, such as 
tong xiang (from the same birthplace), tong xue (from the same educational 
institution), and tong shi (from the same workplace); (3) common third party, which 
refers to ‘two individuals [who] can claim to have guanxi because they have been 
acquainted through a third party with whom they both have guanxi even though the 
two individuals themselves have no other direct guanxi bases with each other’ (Chen 
and Chen 2004a: 311); (4) anticipatory bases, which can be created by two 
individuals who do not have the types of guanxi bases mentioned in 1, 2, and 3 but 
can still initiate guanxi through ‘expressing an intention or even a promise to engage 
in future exchanges, collaborations, or joint ventures’ (Chen and Chen 2004a: 311). 
Kinship ties are the most widespread and useful way for gangland bosses to create 
guanxi with government officials in small towns. However, a kinship guanxi base was 
not a major way for most gang bosses in Chongqing to establish guanxi with Wen 
Qiang or Wen’s subordinates (Journalist A 2011; Journalist D 2011). Under Wen’s 
umbrella, there was only one criminal organization—Xie Caiping’s gang—creating 
links with Wen Qiang and his subordinates through kinship ties. Xie Caiping, Wen’s 
sister-in-law, was known as the ‘godmother’ of the Chongqing criminal underworld. 
Although the guanxi between Wen and Xie was bad, Xie had a good affection-based 
relationship with Wen’s wife, so family ties still worked very well in Xie’s criminal 
business (Journalist A 2011; Journalist D 2011). Thanks to Wen’s influence, this 
kinship guanxi base also facilitated Xie to create and maintain good guanxi with local 
police officers, including Wen’s subordinate Zhao Liming, and two other police 
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officers, Guo Sheng and Gan Yong. The establishment of extensive guanxi networks 
with local police officers enabled Xie not only to be an influential female gang boss, 
but also to be an effective protector who safeguarded the illegal businesses of other 
gangsters; for example, she offered protection to Xia Ping’s gang (Li et al. 2010). 
Most locally-based gang bosses in Chongqing did not have kinship ties with Wen and 
his subordinates, but because all these gang bosses possessed extensive guanxi webs 
in Chongqing’s underworld and overworld, they were still able to establish guanxi 
with these corrupt police officers by identifying common social identities and a 
common third party, or by creating anticipatory bases. An example of identifying 
common social identities might work as follows: a gang boss would identify the 
police officer who took charge of a criminal case his gang members were involved in, 
and get familiar with that officer by finding mutual friends and common experiences. 
Being a member of a people’s congress or a people’s political consultative 
conference provides a valuable guanxi base for gangland bosses to enter into other 
members’ guanxi networks, allowing them to infiltrate the Chinese political system 
(also see Xia 2004). In contemporary mainland China, local economic development is 
inseparable from the entertainment businesses owned by gangland bosses, such as 
nightclubs, casinos, and the 'red light' districts (Wang 2012b). This makes the 
relationship between the local governments and nightclub managers harmonious 
rather than hostile. Moreover, illegal entrepreneurs can buy off senior officials and 
be admitted into people’s congresses or people’s political consultative conferences 
(Government official A 2012; Manager A 2012). For instance, Chen Mingliang, a 
billionaire and notorious gang boss operating prostitution rings, was a member of 
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the People’s Congress in Chongqing’s Yuzhong District before he was arrested in 
June 2009. Taking part in people’s congresses not only provided Chen with a 
legitimate cover, but also enabled him to develop friendly relationships with senior 
government officials, including two former police chiefs: Wen Qiang and Peng 
Changjian. 
ii. Building guanxi 
The existence of a guanxi base is not sufficient to develop active guanxi. As Fan 
(2002a: 548) demonstrates, ‘there must be some other factor(s) that trigger the 
development of guanxi’. A wide variety of transactional activities or interpersonal 
interactions can form triggers that turn outsiders into insiders (Jacobs 1982; Yang 
1994).  
In Chongqing, bribes in the form of money, free sex, and promotions are frequently 
used by gangsters to develop good guanxi with government officials. Chongqing’s 
criminal syndicates normally expanded their networks within the Chongqing Public 
Security Bureau through bribery. For example, in order to secure protection from 
government officials, Gong and Fan bribed a number of officers, including former 
police chief Wen Qiang, and three senior officers from the city’s public security 
police division (Yang and Chen 2010). The money offered by Fan and Gong was sent 
to these corrupt officials as presents for Chinese Spring Festival, the traditional 
occasion for giving presents and an ideal opportunity to offer bribes (Prosecutor B 
2011; Journalist D 2011). Moreover, bribes were offered when money was most 
needed, for instance when a family member of an official needed medical care, 
planned to study abroad, or started a new business, or when an official wanted to 
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buy a new house, make some investments, or travel abroad (Chin and Godson 2006; 
Li 2011b). 
Chongqing’s strike black campaign suggests that sex was also frequently used by 
gangsters to establish good guanxi with police officers. For instance, the Wang 
sisters provided free sexual services for Chen Tao, former deputy head of the city’s 
public security police division. Chen also asked the Wang sisters to provide sexual 
services for Chen’s colleagues, such as Huang Daiqiang and Wen Qiang (Luo et al. 
2010; Xinhua 2010h). Another example was former police chief Wen Qiang, a 
frequent visitor to Yue Ning’s lavish nightclubs. He received VIP treatment –free 
sexual services—or services charged at 30% discount (Yu 2010c).  
The practice of using or hiring sex workers (also known as ‘public relations girls’) by 
gangland bosses and illicit entrepreneurs to bribe party officials and police officers 
has become commonplace in China (Jeffreys 2006). Since 1996, there has been 
considerable debate over whether to criminalize ‘sex-related bribery’ and corruption. 
‘Sex-related bribery’, however, has not been criminalized by Chinese Criminal Law 
for two reasons: first, sex is understood as a private matter, with practices relating to 
the buying and selling of sex being viewed as a moral problem (Jeffreys 2006); 
second, it is extremely difficult for the police to collect evidence in cases of sex-
related bribery and corruption (Wang 2013d). The lack of legislation concerning ‘sex-
related bribery’ encourages gang bosses and illegal entrepreneurs to use sex to build 
friendly guanxi with police officers. 
Assisting local police officers to attain promotions was another way to create the 
political-criminal nexus. It was widely acknowledged that government officials who 
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were bought off by protection seekers were not reliable, while those who became 
friends of their bribers were more trustworthy, and those who received assistance 
from gangsters in their promotions were the best and most loyal protectors of all 
(Pei 2008). Using guanxi and money to secure promotion, gangsters in several major 
cities successfully manipulated rounds of competitions for jobs (Wang 2012b). 
Moreover, the nexus was also created when gangsters provided significant 
information relating to other criminals’ activities or removed the obstacles to 
promotion for government officials. For instance, Ao Xingman, a notorious gangland 
boss, provided police officer Luo Li with privileged information about other gangs’ 
involvement in a variety of drug trafficking, distribution, and production activities. 
With the help from Ao, Luo became a well-known hero in a series of actions against 
illegal drug activities. In return, Luo overlooked Ao’s criminal activities (Xinhua 2011a, 
2012a). In 2001, following the instructions of Luo, Ao and three confederates 
murdered Zhang Hao, ‘a drug trafficker who threatened to give evidence against Luo 
after his request for protection was rejected’ (Xinhua 2011a: online). In this case, the 
links between Luo and Ao were strengthened.  
iii. Using guanxi 
Once the target recipient (a police officer) accepts the bribes (e.g. free sex, money, 
expensive gifts, and assistance for promotion) from a gang boss, the recipient has a 
sense of moral obligation to reciprocate. As Wong and Chan (1999: 115) argue, 
‘being an insider, that is, within the network, means that information exchange and 
mutual understanding are enhanced or exchanged substantially and smoothly’.  
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For example, the establishment of close guanxi with police chief Peng Changjian 
enabled three gang bosses (Ma Dang, Wang Xiaojun and Yue Ning) to dominate the 
prostitution business in Central Chongqing District (Xinhua 2010d). In order to create 
a good operating environment for the illegal clubs owned by these gang bosses, 
Peng ordered police officers not to conduct routine investigations of these clubs but 
only act if the officers received public tip-offs or obtained evidence (Xinhua 2010c). 
Furthermore, during traditional Chinese holiday seasons (e.g. Chinese New Year and 
the Mid-Autumn Festival), Peng often invited other senior police officers to take part 
in parties organized by Ma Dang (Tian 2010). This allowed Ma to establish guanxi 
with all these officials who became new members of this corrupt guanxi network.  
The Chongqing case illustrates that the principle of reciprocity in the guanxi network 
encouraged corrupt police officers to offer illegal protection to their bribers, such as 
protection against extortion conducted by public officials, protection of criminal 
businesses, protection against police harassment, protection against criminal 
investigation and protection against legal punishment. Corrupt officials also 
facilitated the supply of essential information from the criminal justice system, the 
use of officials’ personal networks for gangsters to create extensive links, and the 
provision of assistance in gangs’ market competition.  
iv. The importance of middlemen 
The process of building an effective guanxi network, as Pearce suggests, is extremely 
time-consuming and complex. This does not mean, however, that the help seeker 
who does not have direct guanxi with the potential giver cannot employ guanxi to 
facilitate transactions. In most cases, intermediaries or middlemen have well-
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institutionalized roles in bringing together two parties who otherwise probably 
would not meet. As Pye and Pye (1985: 294) argue, ‘middlemen can reduce 
uncertainty, clarify the respective rewards and advantages, and thus put the 
relationship on an objective basis, therefore reducing the importance of [the] 
emotional dimension’. 
The Wang Tianlun case offers a good illustration of how gang bosses rely on 
middlemen to get things done (see Table 4). Wang Tianlun, a billionaire and 
notorious gang boss, monopolized Chongqing’s hog slaughtering and pork market 
through threats and violence (Wang 2009b; Yi 2010). In mid-December 2003, Wang 
Dongming, Wang Tianlun’s brother, assigned two gangsters to ‘teach a lesson’ to a 
pig farmer who refused to sell pigs to the slaughtering company owned by Wang 
Tianlun’s gang; this action ended in the death of that farmer (Wang 2009a). 
Immediately after this incident, Wang Dongming and two gangsters were arrested by 
the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Chongqing Public Security Bureau.  
In order to help his brother and gang members escape punishment, Wang Tianlun 
had to make use of his guanxi networks and money. Li Zhi, deputy head of the 9th 
branch of the CID, was a long-time friend of Wang Tianlun because they came from 
the same town. However, Li Zhi had just been transferred to the CID and had not set 
up close guanxi networks with his colleagues. He turned to Zhou Hongping, Li’s 
classmates and the head of the 8th branch of the CID, to ask for confidential 
investigation information of this case. With the help of Zhou Hongping, Wang 
Tianlun identified two police officers who took charge of the Wang Dongming case. 
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But these officers refused to offer any useful information, which was quite 
unexpected (Xinhua 2009a).  
The failure to gain confidential information through employing Wang Tianlun’s 
relationship with Li Zhi did not stop Wang. He next turned to a guanxi middleman, Li 
Jinsong, with whom he had a long-term business guanxi. The long-term management 
of a luxury hotel enabled Li Jinsong to create a wide guanxi network with high-
ranking police officers including Wen Qiang. Initially, Wen refused to attend a dinner 
organized by Li Jingsong (i.e. refused to give mianzi to Li). Then Huang Daiqiang, a 
key member in Wen’s corrupt network and deputy chief of the CID, was invited by Li 
Jinsong as an intermediary to persuade Wen to offer help. After receiving 100,000 
RMB, Huang Daiqiang organized a dinner and Wen Qiang, Wang Tianlun, and Li 
Jinsong were invited. A close guanxi with Huang obliged Wen to provide this favour. 
Wen appointed Huang Daiqiang as a team leader to handle this homicide case. 
Huang Daiqiang halted the criminal investigation, and as a result, Wang Doingming 
and his gangsters escaped conviction (Xinhua 2010b, 2010a).42 This case illustrates 
the importance of middlemen in facilitating corrupt transactions. It also shows that 
money is not the key factor for a corrupt transaction. Instead, government officials 
care more about the principle of reciprocity or the obligation to save face (mainzi) 
within guanxi networks. 
                                                          
42
 The investigation of the case did not resume until the arrest of Wen Qiang in 2009. 
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To sum up, the political-criminal nexus in Chongqing demonstrates how gangland 
bosses established close guanxi with those in positions of power by adopting the 
three stages (i.e. initiating, building, and using) of guanxi building and emphasizes 
the importance of middlemen in guanxi practice. After the creation of mutually-
beneficial networks, corrupt government officials secured the eight notorious local 
                                                          
43
 The original table is from ChinaDaily.com. Information in Table 3 has been updated. 
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gangs’ criminal businesses, enabled them to gain access to licit and illicit business 
opportunities, helped them escape punishment, and assisted them in monopolising 
local illegal markets.  
c. Protection as a commodity: police corruption and the rise of 
Chinese organized crime  
Illegal markets, such as prostitution, gambling, and drug trafficking, have increased in 
China since the early 1990s.44 Qiu Geping argues that China’s local governments 
normally turn a blind eye to illegal markets, such as prostitution and gambling, when 
the economy of cities is only in its infancy; this has been widely regarded as ‘the 
hidden rule’ of attracting foreign investors who are regular consumers of these 
services.45  
Denizens of the criminal underworld are unable to make use of state-sponsored 
protection and enforcement mechanisms to safeguard their personal security and 
guarantee their property rights, or resolve disputes, because they are operating 
outside the law (Hill 2003; Wang 2011). For illegal markets to operate effectively, 
criminals must provide governance institutions themselves to ‘define and enforce 
property rights, adjudicate disputes, and mitigate the harms of externalities’ 
(Skarbek 2011: 702). However, gangs in China fail to limit negative outside 
interferences, especially threats posed by the criminal justice system such as police 
extortion, criminal investigation, and crime crackdowns organised by both central 
and local governments. The inability of gangs to rely on state-sponsored formal 
                                                          
44
 Federico Varese analyses foreign triads in China in Mafias on the move (2011). He offers a similar 
argument about the development of large illegal markets in China since 1978. 
45
 Qiu Ge-ping, 11 January 2012, interview, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China. 
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protection mechanisms or to defend themselves leads to a huge demand for 
protection. As Varese argues: ‘lack of protection implies that there will be more 
opportunities to meet that demand, and hence that meeting it will be more 
profitable than elsewhere’ (Varese 2004: 145). 
In post-Mao China, the booming illegal markets have created demand for alternative 
sources of protection. Meanwhile, a supply of people who possess authority and 
specialise in abusing power is available within China’s socialist market. The extensive 
literature on the theory of corruption in communist and post-communist countries 
has established that the Chinese Central Government and the rule of law have failed 
to control widespread corruption (Manion 2004; Pei 2009; Steidlmeier 1999; Sun 
1999, 2004). He (He 2000: 245) shows that ‘the extent of corruption has increased 
dramatically and sharply since 1978 with the situation becoming even worse after in 
the 1990s’. Lo (1993) suggests that the party-state controls the means of production 
without sufficient supervision, which enables Party cadres to abuse their power for 
private gain. Moreover, the existence of the guanxi network encourages police 
officers to collude with organized crime groups for private gain as the political and 
legal system fails to specify and enforce clear criteria for the exercise of police power. 
In the absence of strong government and effective self-protection associations, an 
alternative system of governance—the corrupt network within law enforcement 
agencies, consisting of police officers connected and coordinated through the rules 
of guanxi—has emerged to settle disputes for illicit groups and safeguard them 
against negative outside influences.  
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The existing literature shows that both centralised and decentralised governance 
institutions acquire resources in three ways, as Skarbek suggests: ‘relying on 
people’s inherent cultural preference to contribute, increasing the quality or 
quantity of the good to entice contributions, abusing threats and violence against 
people who do not contribute’ (Skarbek 2011: 702; Wintrobe 1990, 1998). Past 
research mainly focuses on how groups finance governance by loyalty and 
repression, while this chapter reports on the corrupt guanxi network in China and 
suggests the abuse of power by police officers as a fourth instrument for financing 
governance.  
Corrupt police officers successfully obtain resources by increasing the benefits of 
participation and raising the cost of refusing to participate. To be specific, creating a 
political-criminal nexus or ‘wearing a red hat’ has become the most effective way for 
organized crime groups to gain extra-legal protection. Interview data suggests that it 
is impossible for local gangs to have a long-term existence if they fail to create links 
with government officials, especially those from the criminal justice system (FGD A 
2011; Businessman B 2012; Government Official B 2012).46 Large sums of money, 
expensive gifts, free sexual services, and assistance with promotion are usually 
offered by gangsters to public officials, especially police officers (Chin and Godson 
2006; D. Clarke et al. 2006; Punch 2009; Punch and Gilmour 2010). In return, corrupt 
officials offer illegal protection to their bribers.  
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A case study of Chongqing shows that ‘gangs are infiltrating government at ever-
higher levels, even into the senior reaches of provincial governments and central 
ministries’ (Economist 2009: online). Interview data shows that the nexus between 
gangsters and low-ranking government officials seems tight, while the links between 
gangsters and high-ranking officials are sometimes loose because these senior 
officials seldom deal protection directly with gangsters. In Wen Qiang case, for 
example, the gang bosses only obtained protection services directly from Wen if 
Wen’s ‘heavenly guardians’ were unable to provide sufficient protection (Journalist 
D 2011). In one such incident, gangsters wanted to escape punishment for 
committing a murder, but Wen’s subordinates did not possess the authority to 
interrupt the criminal investigation. Wen did it instead (Journalist A 2011; Journalist 
D 2011).  
Moreover, apart from services directly offered by corrupt police officers, for example, 
protecting criminals’ businesses, protecting the criminals from law enforcement 
authorities, and actively participating in criminals’ businesses (Chin and Godson 
2006), protection services are also exchanged within protective umbrellas that are 
organised as pyramids where high-ranking officials sell protection to the low- and 
mid-level officials who deal with gangsters directly. The rule of the protection market 
in the criminal underworld may be as follows: high-ranking officials are top-level 
producers and sellers, while low-ranking officials buy protection from their ‘bosses’ 
and resell it to individuals who are willing to purchase extra-legal protection for their 
criminal businesses (Prosecutor A 2011; Prosecutor B 2011; Journalist D 2011; Taxi 
driver A 2011; Taxi driver C 2012).  
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Low- and mid-ranking police officers protect these notorious gangs directly, while 
high-ranking officers acted behind the scenes guaranteeing the work. This is how 
corrupt police officers control the production and distribution of illegal protection in 
the criminal underworld.  
4. Conclusion: government authority as a tradable commodity 
‘Red Mafia’ is the collective term, coined in this chapter, for corrupt public officials in 
mainland China who supply private protection through guanxi networks. The 
protection offered by the Red Mafia refers to corrupt benefits distributed through 
guanxi networks. The Chongqing crime crackdown offers an excellent opportunity to 
examine the role of guanxi in facilitating the buying and selling of public offices and 
building mutually beneficial networks between locally-based criminals and police 
officers. 
Consistent with the first and second hypotheses generated in chapter IV, the 
Chongqing case demonstrates that the embeddedness of police and judicial activities 
in guanxi networks results in two unexpected outcomes: a weak and unjust legal 
system, and the rise of the Red Mafia. Relational power encourages senior public 
officials to distribute promotions and opportunities to those close to them in guanxi 
networks, facilitating the formation of illegal job markets within the public sector. 
Selling public appointments and associating with legitimate businesses are major 
strategies for senior government officials to obtain illicit benefits, while mid- and 
low-ranking police officers who want to obtain corrupt benefits normally establish 




In order to deal with external uncertainties caused by anti-crime campaigns 
organised by both central and local governments, locally-based criminal groups are 
eager to buy protection from local government officials, especially police officers. 
Gangland bosses follow the three stages of guanxi building and frequently employ 
middlemen to create close interpersonal relationships with police officers. Corrupt 
benefits distributed through guanxi networks are secure, because fighting against 
one corrupt official means a war with one’s whole guanxi network. 
The guanxi network encourages government officials to engage in corrupt 
transactions in order to obtain private gain. It also forces honest public officials to 
offer corrupt benefits to those in their guanxi networks. As Kiong and Kee (1998: 81) 
argue, ‘the closer the guanxi, the higher the expectation of its reliability by both 
parties’. Violation of expectation produces a sense of disruption of trust, and thus 
damages one’s reputation in the guanxi network. 
Where the government loses control over corruption, government authority or 
public power becomes a commodity. Transactive corruption involves not only illicit 
exchanges between state and non-state actors in which public officials ‘sell’ their 
authority to private actors, but also illicit exchanges among state actors in which 
high-ranking government officials ‘sell’ promotions and opportunities to lower-
ranking officials and shelter other officials’ corrupt transactions. Compared with 
commodities in legal markets which are traded through price competition, corrupt 




The existing literature suggests that the study of state-illegal protectors (e.g. the Red 
Mafia) is an unexplored and under-researched area. Emphasising the importance of 
the Red Mafia in China’s extra-legal protection market does not mean to imply that 
there are no other types of extra-legal protectors. As this chapter demonstrates, the 
major beneficiaries of red mafia protection are organized crime groups, legitimate 
and illegal businesses, and corrupt government officials. The fundamental condition 
for them to gain corrupt benefits (i.e. protection) is the establishment of guanxi 
networks that facilitate corrupt transactions between the help seeker and the 
potential help giver. Private individuals and entrepreneurs who are unable to employ 
guanxi networks with those in power have to reply on alternative sources of extra-
legal protection.  
It is, however, unlikely that the Red Mafia will be able to dominate the criminal 
protection business in China. This is due to two reasons: on the one hand, the 
protection supplied by the Red Mafia is distributed within guanxi networks, and 
establishing close guanxi with government officials is time-consuming and costly; on 
the other hand, corrupt public officials do not always possess comparative 
advantages over private-illegal protectors (the Black Mafia). For example, by abusing 
power, high-ranking government officials are frequently invited by private 
businesses to deal with disputes between government debtors and private creditors, 
while street gangsters may enjoy competitive advantage in coping with disputes 
between private actors (e.g. private debt disputes) or resolving a certain kind of 
social problem that local authorities are reluctant to deal with (e.g. the problem of 
‘nail households’). The study of extra-legal protection in China should not be limited 
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to the Red Mafia; attention should also be paid to the role of organized crime groups 
in the provision of private protection. 
To sum up, the rise of the Red Mafia in China’s socialist market economy is a key 
feature of state weakness. The Chongqing case demonstrates how guanxi distorts 
China’s legal system and facilitates corrupt transactions within and between public 
and private sectors. The Red Mafia sells private protection (or distributes corrupt 
benefits) to protection seekers through guanxi networks, but it is unable to meet the 
demand. For example, entrepreneurs in the criminal underworld tend to resort to 
reputable gang bosses to mediate disputes, protect rights and facilitate transactions 
when they do not possess guanxi resources with government officials or where the 
Red Mafia’s protection is perceived as ineffective. In legal markets, private 
individuals or merchants who distrust the legal institutions may employ private-
illegal protectors (the Black Mafia), but whether the buying and selling of Black Mafia 









From theoretical and empirical perspectives, chapters V and VI demonstrate that the 
subversive influence of guanxi on China’s legal system results in the failure of the 
state-sponsored institutions to fulfil the huge demand for protection generated by 
the widespread creation of private property rights and the increasing number of 
disputes. The third hypothesis generated in chapter IV predicts that weak law 
enforcement agencies inevitably lead to the emergence of other forms of protection 
and enforcement. The author’s fieldwork in China focuses its main attention on 
illegal forms of protection. Consistent with the third hypothesis, empirical data 
collected from China reveals two particularly striking phenomena: the rise of 
underground police organizations and the emergence of unlawful hospital security 
teams. China’s economic reform and weak legal framework make the supply of 
extra-legal protection and illegal enforcement a profitable business for criminals and 
a major source of income for many unemployed people.  
The term ‘Black Mafia’, in this thesis, refers to locally-based criminal groups and 
unemployed groups which derive their income mainly from the provision of unlawful 
protection and quasi law enforcement. Fieldwork in China, especially the city of Qufu, 
provides valuable materials to examine the role of guanxi in the buying and selling of 
extra-legal protection. These materials are used to test the fourth hypothesis, which 
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posits that guanxi plays an essential role in the buying and selling of black mafia 
services. 
The movement of street gangs into extra-legal protection businesses is becoming a 
serious problem in most Chinese cities. For example, 64 criminal groups which acted 
as underground police organizations providing illegal protection and dispute 
resolution services were destroyed during a ‘strike black’ campaign in 2008 in 
Handan, a prefecture-level city located in Hebei province (Zhang 2008b). The biggest 
criminal group, headed by Li Falin, was invited to resolve a wide range of disputes, 
including neighbourhood disputes, commercial and contractual disputes, and land 
disputes between residents and local authorities. The Li Falin group offered over 
1,000 enforcement actions between 2002 and 2008 (Hou 2008; Zhang 2008a).  
Moreover, street gangs are invited by many local hospitals to deal with medical 
disputes. Disputes between hospitals and patients pose a great challenge to hospital 
security (Jin et al. 2006; Li et al. 2004). For example, on the morning of 23 August 
2011, a full-scale melee broke out in the atrium of a hospital in the southern city of 
Nanchang between ‘the hospital’s in-house security team’—consisting of hospital 
staff and gangsters—and the family members, friends and neighbours of a patient 
who had died due to hospital negligence (Economist 2012; Shi 2011). During this 
violent incident, three cars were destroyed and 15 people were injured. The 
increasing number of ‘incidents’ aiming at hospitals and their staff suggests that the 
trust relationship between doctors and patients has eroded (FlorCruz 2011). Legal 
channels, such as judicial dispute resolution, mediation and negotiation, are 
available but prove inefficient in practice (Xiang et al. 2011). An internal security 
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system consisting of illegal enforcers (criminals and unemployed people) becomes an 
effective enforcement unit which avoids disrupting the normal running of the 
hospital. This clearly merits further examination. 
This chapter will argue that Chinese businesses are increasingly turning away from 
the legal protection offered by state-sponsored institutions and legitimate private 
agencies and choosing instead the extra-legal protection services supplied by 
organized crime groups. Criminal protection or quasi law enforcement, however, has 
received surprisingly little attention in discussions of organized crime relating to 
China (Broadhurst 2013; Chen 2005; Chin and Godson 2006; Curtis et al. 2002; 
Lintner 2004; Lo 2010; Shen et al. 2010; von Lampe et al. 2012; Wang 2013b; Xia 
2008; Xu 2009a; Zhang and Chin 2008). After searching China’s academic database 
(CNKI Database) and the English-language literature through Google Scholar and 
Scopus47, it becomes evident that although thousands of journal papers, books and 
dissertations focus on Chinese organized crime, no academic publication examines 
the emergence of extra-legal protection in China. The study of extra-legal protection 
in this thesis goes some way towards filling a gap in the existing organized crime 
literature. 
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 1 provides a general 
description of the rise of the extra-legal protection industry in contemporary China 
by applying the demand and supply theoretical framework. Section 2 focuses on 
analysing two widely publicised cases: underground police organizations (dixia 
chujingdui) and the provision of hospital security by unlawful protectors (yiyuan 
neibao). In order to offer a clear picture of how extra-legal protection groups work, it 
examines their group structure, illegal activities and methodologies, and the 
mechanisms of their emergence. Section 3 explores how private individuals and 
entrepreneurs employ red mafia protection, black mafia services and law 
enforcement to cope with government officials’ extortion, solve the problem of 
being stalked, and enforce loan repayment. Section 4 discusses the theoretical 
challenges raised by the study of extra-legal protection to the traditional 
understanding of organized crime in China. The research into extra-legal protection 
is particularly important because it challenges existing stereotypes about organized 
crime and contributes to the understanding of trends in Chinese black societies. 
Section 5 concludes.   
1. The movement of criminal groups into private protection businesses 
in post-Mao China 
China’s post-1978 economic reform has been recognised as essentially successful, 
but this process of economic transition is mirrored by the resurgence of organized 
crime groups (Xia 2006). Most scholars focus on the involvement of Chinese 
organized crime groups into ‘traditional’ businesses such as gambling (Hing 2005), 
prostitution (Liu 2012a), cigarette smuggling (von Lampe et al. 2012), drug trafficking 
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and distribution (Huang et al. 2012), human smuggling (Zhang and Chin 2002), and 
counterfeiting (Chow 2000). Some criminologists point out that a large proportion of 
locally-based criminal groups also engage in legitimate businesses by establishing 
business fronts, thus it is difficult to distinguish illegal conduct from legitimate 
business (He 2009b; Wang 2013b; Xia 2008).  
The existing research, however, fails to present the whole picture of Chinese 
organized crime. Based on fieldwork data and news reports in recent years, this 
chapter suggests that criminal groups in China are showing great interest in a new 
area: the business of private protection. This emerging phenomenon can be 
explained by using the theoretical framework ‘the supply of and demand for private 
protection’ suggested by Gambetta and other scholars (Chu 2000; Gambetta 1993; 
Hill 2003; Skarbek 2011; Tzvetkova 2008; Varese 2001, 2011a; Wang 2011).  
On the supply side is the increase of surplus labour in both rural and urban areas. 
China’s new agricultural policy—the household responsibility system—not only 
allows rural peasants to sell surplus production on the open market, but also enables 
peasants to free themselves from the land and move to urban areas to earn extra 
income (Lo and Jiang 2006; Ma 2001). The number of migrant peasant labourers 
increased dramatically from around one or two million at the beginning of China’s 
economic reform in 1978 to 147 million in 2006 (Zheng 2008). But migrant peasants 
do not have equal access to employment; as Lo and Jiang (2006: 110) argue, ‘they 




China’s surplus labour also consists of mass layoffs caused by the privatisation 
process. China’s economic reform in urban areas focuses on the improvement of 
efficiency and profitability, resulting in millions of employees losing their jobs in 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collective enterprises, and government and public 
service units (Chiu and Hung 2004; Li and Putterman 2008). From 1996 to 2004, over 
50 million workers were laid off, about 80% from the state sector (Dong and Xu 2008; 
Yang et al. 2010). The existence of a large number of laid-off workers and underpaid 
and underprivileged labourers from the countryside signals the emergence of a new 
urban underclass, which is a major challenge confronting the Communist Party 
(Solinger 2006). These marginalised workers and peasants become new blood for 
criminal activities and tend to regard organized crime as a stepladder of social ascent 
if opportunities arise (Deng and Cordilia 1999; Lo and Jiang 2006; Xia 2009). In weak 
states a situation may arise where some criminal groups not only seize criminal 
opportunities, but also enter into the business of private enforcement and provide 
basic security and protection against plunderers (Mehlum et al. 2002). 
On the demand side, China’s booming markets foster a demand for protection. 
Locally-based criminal groups have emerged to exploit the new markets—both legal 
(construction and manufacturing) and illegal (gambling, prostitution, and drug 
trafficking)—that have emerged and expanded. The huge demand for private 
protection has arisen for a combination of reasons. On the one hand, two types of 
market operators—those who deal in illegal goods or services and those who deal 
illegally with legitimate goods—cannot resort to state-sponsored law enforcement 
when disputes arise, and thus benefit from ‘governmental’ services by non-state 
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actors (Gambetta 2011). On the other hand, a modernising nation’s economic 
prosperity leads to a growing number of disputes among market operators, 
‘requiring at least a modest legal infrastructure centred on the protection of 
property and contract rights’ (Posner 1998: 1). But the social embeddedness of 
police and judicial activities into guanxi networks, as chapter V and chapter VI 
demonstrate, is an ongoing problem in China, a problem that greatly undermines 
public confidence in China’s legal system. As Li (2012: 873) argues, the interplay 
between law and party politics in China’s courts and the absence of judicial scrutiny 
are two fundamental features in the Chinese judiciary, resulting in ‘corruption being 
an endemic, institutionalized activity in China’s courts unlike the rather idiosyncratic 
and isolated incidents that may occur in any legal system elsewhere’. 
The legal system lacks its ability to fulfil the increasing demand for protection, thus ‘a 
demand for alternative sources of protection is expected to arise’ (Varese 2004: 145). 
And meeting such a demand is more profitable in a weak state, like China, than 
elsewhere. In this case, criminal groups consisting of marginalised workers and 
peasants earn their living by taking advantage of the wide gap between the demand 
for legal protection of property and contacts and the relative inefficiencies of 
supplying these services by the state. The shift of criminal groups to the private 
protection sector is the key aspect this chapter aims to explore. The following 
section analyses two of the most influential phenomena to present a clear picture of 
how these criminal groups supply extra-legal protection and quasi law enforcement.  
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2. Case studies: how criminal groups and the urban poor survive by 
forming extra-legal protection organizations 
The unexpected result of China’s economic reforms is the increasing marginalisation 
and poverty of three new groups in the cities: laid-off workers, peasant migrants and 
the new urban poor (Solinger 2006). Take peasant migrants for example: Zhou Litai, 
a famous lawyer fighting for the rights of migrant workers injured and mistreated by 
private enterprises, categorises peasant migrants into four subgroups: 1) migrant 
workers providing labour for factories and construction sites; 2) peasant migrants as 
lawbreakers involved in a range of criminal activities such as robbery, theft and fraud; 
3) sex workers; and 4) casual labourers such as porters (Lawyer A 2011). Problems 
encountered by rural migrant workers are described by Li Shi as follows:  
‘The majority of migrant workers face considerable insecurity in terms of 
employment, income, social protection, and access to education for their 
children. Their housing conditions are much worse than those of local urban 
residents, and even worse than those they would have experienced in their 
place of origin if they had not migrated.’ (Shi 2008: 22) 
Confronting social problems such as massive unemployment, economic inequality, 
relative deprivation and impoverishment, marginalised groups have to adopt drastic 
measures in order to survive. In ancient China, the most effective strategy for those 
displaced from their villages was to create secret associations for self-protection 
(Murray 1993). In contemporary mainland China, the formation of extra-legal 
protection groups has become another method for the new urban underclass to 
survive. Two influential phenomena, underground police organizations and the 
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provision of hospital security by unlawful protectors are examined in order to have a 
better understanding of how criminals and marginalised people produce, sell and 
distribute their security services. 
2.1. Case study one: underground police organizations 
A new type of criminal group poses security threats to local communities and 
markets in most Chinese cities. It is known by many names: underground police 
organization (dixia chujingdui), underground police gang (dixia chujing bang) or 
underground police and emergency service unit (dixia 110) (Xu 2010). Recent news 
reports disclose that underground police organizations consisting of a large number 
of laid-off or unemployed workers are frequently invited by private individuals, 
enterprises and even local governments to deal with problems that are alleged to be 
urgent, difficult and risky (Cheng et al. 2009).  
The main business of underground police organization is providing efficient and 
effective services such as dispute resolution and private enforcement (Guo and Liu 
2010). This type of group is far from the private police forces that are owned by non-
governmental entities; underground police organizations are deemed illegal by both 
central and local governments. This is because the supply of private protection by 
underground police organizations is based on threats and violence.  
Since 2008, a great number of underground police groups have been destroyed 
during ‘strike black’ (anti-crime) campaigns in many cities, such as Handan city in 
Hubei province, Changsha—the capital city of Hunan province, Pizhou city in Jiangsu 
province, Xi’an—the capital city of Shaanxi province, and Fuzhou city in Fujian 
province. In this case, the extra-legal protection organization as a new type of 
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criminal group merits further examination. This part explores the social organization 
of Chinese extra-legal protection. To be specific, it describes and analyses the 
structural and operational features of underground police organizations.  
2.1.1. Group structure 
Organization 
Most organized crime groups in contemporary China and the more traditional 
Chinese triads, both of which are characterised by codes of loyalty and a pyramidal 
organizational structure (Chu 2000; He 2009b), while underground police 
organizations favour structural fluidity and flexibility. To be specific, an underground 
police organization is a powerful criminal network consisting of small groups 
connected through personal relationships among gang leaders (Liang 2010). Each 
enforcement action involves at least one criminal group. A customer—private 
individual or entrepreneur—who is in trouble informs a gang leader or organiser of 
how many people he needs and how much he will pay. The gang leader will then 
spread the information about enforcement actions to his followers and other leaders 
if necessary. Taking advantage of new technologies such as mobile phones and 
Tencent QQ (a free instant messaging computer program in China), the information 
about ‘customer orders’ can reach everyone within several minutes (Yan and Sun 
2005). A agreed number of gangsters arrive at the agreed place at the agreed time to 
carry out agreed action, and will leave the ‘battlefield’ immediately after the task is 
completed (Xinhua 2009b).  
Organisers or gang leaders usually supervise the whole action without directly 
participating (Liang 2010). Those members who are involved in dispute resolution or 
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private enforcement actions sometimes do not know each other as they may come 
from different cities or criminal groups; therefore a clear and uniform symbol (e.g. 
wearing a red wrist strap) is required to distinguish friends from enemies (Yan and 
Sun 2005). A self-organising structure adopted by the underground police 
organization can increase its ability not only to seize the criminal opportunities 
generated within the network, but also to meet customers’ different needs and 
expectations.  
Personnel and recruitment 
An investigation conducted by the public security bureau of Shaanxi province reveals 
that most members involved in quasi law enforcement actions are young 
unemployed people aged between 18 and 25 (Su 2009). A majority of them are 
peasant migrants who failed to find jobs in the city. Some underground police groups 
may also consist of ex-prisoners (Xinhua 2011b). In addition, students from sport 
universities and retired sportsmen are sometimes regarded as preferable enforcers 
since they enjoy comparative advantage in the use of violence (Yan and Sun 2005). 
Members in each group either come from the same birthplace (tong xiang) or used 
to work together (tong shi). It is also reported that some young people initially know 
each other via cyberspace (Xinhua 2011c).  
2.1.2. Illegal activities and methodologies 
Soft Violence 
In a departure from traditional mafias that establish their reputation through the use 
of violence, an underground police organization seldom resorts to physical violence 
277 
 
in the process of supplying protection and enforcement (Liang 2010). Soft violence is 
a major and effective method adopted by these illegal protectors and enforcers. 
Interview data suggests a tentative concept of ‘soft violence action’ which indicates 
the practice of achieving goals through harassment, humiliation, blame, threat, 
stalking, criminal coercion and other methods, all of which avoid using violence 
directly or causing serious physical damage (FGD F 2012). Victims commonly 
experience enormous stress, anxiety and fear; as a result, most of them choose to 
withdraw from conflicts. 
The choice of soft violence as a major ‘weapon’ generates great challenges for police 
investigation and evidence gathering. Police officers normally choose not to take 
action against unlawful enforcers if physical violence does not happen (Police Officer 
A 2012). Law enforcement officers also fail to identify the leaders of criminal 
enforcement actions as they normally ‘command war’ through remote control (Guo 
and Liu 2010). The only measure police officers can take is crowd dispersal. 
Depending on the use of soft violence, an underground police organization can 
effectively defend itself against crime investigation. Enforcement services offered by 
underground police officers seem more efficient than local policing units, and thus 
unlawful enforcers are invited by an increasing number of customers (e.g. real estate 
developers, gambling house owners, bar managers, self-employed businessmen, 
underground bank owners) to deal with a wide range of disputes. 
Extra-legal protection and quasi law enforcement 
Underground police officers are frequently employed to resolve a wide range of 
disputes such as neighbourhood conflicts, traffic accidents and debt enforcement 
278 
 
(Wei 2008). They are also invited to assist entrepreneurs in monopolising local 
markets by disrupting their competitors (Xinhua 2009b). Extra-legal protection and 
quasi law enforcement are the best-selling commodities in the illegal markets. For 
example, disputes between sex workers and customers are common and often 
escalate to violence. Underground police officers become the only effective choice 
for sex workers and brothel operators to protect their property rights and personal 
security as both buying and selling sex are illegal in mainland China (Zhao 2012).  
Furthermore, illegal protection and enforcement services are beneficial to local 
governments. This gives rise to the formation of the collaboration between local 
authorities and illegal enforcers, a surprising truth in post-Mao China. Criminal 
enforcers are acting as ‘servants’ of local government as they can act outside the law 
which local authorities cannot (Hou 2008; Wang 2011). The provision of dispute 
resolution services by extra-legal enforcers in demolition projects is a good example 
to illustrate this unusual phenomenon.  
The transfer of land-use rights has become an important source of income for most 
Chinese cities because Chinese local government buys land at a low price and sells it 
at a high price (Walker and Hin 1994). As Chinese economist He Qinglian argues, they 
‘requisition’ land from the original occupants through various means, without 
considering the rule of law (2007b: 45). During this process, the toughest issue local 
authorities have to conquer is ‘nail households’ (dingzi hu)—property owners who 
refuse to ‘give up rights of return on their property when they are offered what they 
consider insufficient compensation from developers’ (Mertha 2009: 234).  
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Services offered by criminal enforcers, suggested by the existing literature and 
interview data (Businessman B 2012; FGD D 2012), are deemed as efficient when 
dealing with the problem of ‘nail households’ (Zhao 2012; Osburg 2013). In contrast 
with the violent demolition that has been described by the media as a symbol of 
China’s urbanisation, most demolition projects in recent years proceed without 
causing death or injury to residents (FGD E 2012). Local government officials and real 
estate developers reveal that street gangs or underground police officers are only 
invited when local government officials and real estate developers have tried every 
legal measure but failed to persuade ‘nail households’ to relocate. The practice of 
stalking, threats and trespass used by these criminal enforcers have proved more 
effective (Businessman B 2012).  
For example, one resident refused to relocate despite all troubleshooting measures 
taken by real estate developers and local authorities, but he agreed to accept the 
compensation immediately after the involvement of street gangs in the project. The 
only requirement of relocation was transferring his grandson to a new school in 
different city as his grandson was bullied, threatened and harassed by unknown 
persons (Yu 2008a; Zhao 2012). The involvement of street gangs in the demolition 
project is allowed by local authorities, thus local police officers turn a blind eye to 
these illegal actions and only intervene if injuries or deaths are caused. 
Price and division of money 
The protection sector charges different prices not only for different services, but also 
for different groups of customers. Take ‘underground emergency services’ for 
example. Each member who participates in quasi law enforcement can obtain 
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around 100 RMB (about £10) in appearance fees each time (Cheng et al. 2009). 
Compared with rank-and-file members, each organiser or gang leader can earn more 
money, ranging from 1,000 RMB to 3,000 RMB (Yan and Sun 2005). In addition, some 
organisers overstate the number of members who are actually involved in 
enforcement actions in order to make extra money (Guo and Liu 2010). When a 
conflict or dispute is resolved by exceptional means, like violence, rather than pure 
coercion, each member can receive at least 200 RMB. Violence will inevitably result 
in some injuries. In this case, employers have to pay the medical bills of all the 
members who are injured in the process of resolving disputes. If extra-legal 
enforcement activities bring unexpected outcomes such as criminal investigation and 
prosecution, employers have to pay a large amount of damages for ‘settling-in 
allowance’ or ‘travel allowance’ (Liang 2010). To establish good relationships with 
local authorities or entrepreneurs, underground police officers sometimes offer free 
services or services charged at a certain discount (Manager B 2012).  
Unlike ‘underground emergency services’ that usually require dozens or even 
hundreds of people to assemble and react quickly, the debt collection service is 
often offered by a small group with fewer than five persons (Wei 2008; Xu 2005). It is 
one of the most profitable businesses since illegal enforcers normally charge 30% or 
50% of the successfully collected money (FGD I 2012). They may charge a discounted 
price, however, if employers and collectors have formed a long-term and 
harmonious relationship (Xu 2005). Regarding the provision of land dispute 
resolution services by illegal enforcers, there is no clear information on service 
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charges. But the existing literature suggests that the net profit of demolition services 
is even more than that of operating gambling dens (Zhao 2012).  
2.1.3. The mechanisms of emergence 
The supply of people trained in violence and the demand for criminal protection and 
quasi law enforcement are two key factors for the birth of extra-legal protection 
groups (Varese 2006). In China, the supply of abundant surplus labour and the 
demand for illegal protection have resulted in the rise of underground police 
organizations. To be specific, on the supply side is mass lay-offs and peasant 
migrants. On the demand side is the great market need for quasi law enforcers 
caused by a growing distrust both of police officers and of the entire legal process.  
The World Values Survey suggests that ‘Chinese citizens in general had lower levels 
of confidence in police than the U.S. citizens did’ (Wu and Sun 2009: 174). This might 
be due to the fact that police officers have been clearly associated with serious 
corruption. A growing body of literature examines police corruption and the links 
between criminal groups and police officers (Chin and Godson 2006; Jiao 2001; 
Wang 2013b). Vocabulary frequently used by the existing literature shows a low level 
of confidence in police enforcement: unfairness, taking bribes, extortion, torture and 
the collusion between police and gangsters (Broadhurst 2013; He 2007a; Qiu 2008). 
For distrust in the police, the lack of efficient and effective policing is another serious 
problem urging private individuals and entrepreneurs to find alternative sources of 
protection. The Secretary of the Political and Legal Commission in a county-level city 
of Shandong province points out that the lack of police results in the failure of local 
police officers to meet the society’s needs for law and order. As he states,  
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‘In 1993, the police-population ratio was one police officer for every 1,000 
persons. This means that there were only 440 police officers for our city with a 
population of 440,000 in that period. The number of police officers has not 
changed for nearly 20 years, even though the population increased dramatically, 
from 440,000 to 640,000. In the last two years, the number decreased as about 
70 police officers retired, but the local police department failed to recruit any 
new members. As you know, recruiting new police officers is not an easy issue in 
recent years because it requires candidates to pass both National Judicial 
Examination and Civil Service Examination (two of the most difficult exams in 
China). The number of police officer younger than 30 is fewer than five. In this 
case, the aging problem brings great challenges for the efficiency of the police.’ 
(Businessman D 2012) 
As mentioned above, the limited number of police officers as well as the aging 
problem led to the incapability of police to deal effectively with social problems. 
Although all the police officers I interviewed assured me that they can immediately 
respond to emergency calls, most entrepreneurs I interviewed showed that law 
enforcement is neither fair nor effective (FGD C 2012; FGD E 2012; Government 
official A 2012; Police officer A 2012). Chinese users of quasi law enforcement agree 
that underground police officers are more efficient than the law enforcement 
agencies (Li 2008; Zhang 2008b). 
The author’s fieldwork data, however, contradicts the survey evidence offered by 
other scholars. The data from both Beijing and rural areas shows ‘highly positive 
popular perceptions of—and an overwhelming popular willingness to mobilize—both 
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the courts and the police’ (Michelson and Read 2011: 170). But further analysis 
suggests that the perception of people who experienced the process is far more 
negative than the perception of non-users. Their perceptions do not hold sway over 
the general perception of official justice as the ratio of users to non-users is low in 
China (Michelson and Read 2011). A high level of disillusionment and a more 
negative perception of the fairness and effectiveness of the legal process are 
fostered by concrete and first-hand experience (Gallagher 2006). 
An interviewee’s personal experience can be used to explain why many 
entrepreneurs would like to buy extra-legal services rather than resort to courts. In 
order to recover an unpaid invoice, he firstly decided to take the legal route. After 
winning the lawsuit, he thought he would recover his debt shortly. However, the 
enforcement chamber failed to enforce the judgement even after three years. This 
phenomenon is normally described as ‘winning the case, but losing the money’ 
(yingle guansi, sule qian). The failure of legal enforcement forced him to seek 
alternative means. A friend introduced him to an influential gang leader. After 
reaching an agreement on the division of money, he received payment within just 
three days (FGD D 2012). Negative experience with the courts and the efficiency of 
private channels suggest that resorting to extra-legal enforcers is a preferable way to 
collect debts. 
Another interviewee’s experience is also useful to explain why local businessmen 
tend to rely on street gangsters to recover private loans: 
‘I tried all legal means [e.g. negotiation through a middleman and lawsuit], but 
the debtor still refused to repay me. Nevertheless, I knew he had the ability to 
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pay his debt. So I was really angry. Our friendship was ruined… it was not about 
money! It is about mianzi (face). He [the debtor] treated me as an idiot. I told 
my friend [a street gangster] that he could keep any money he got back from 
my debtor. My friend managed to fully recover the debt and voluntarily gave me 
60%. He is a trustworthy man; we have deep ganqing [affection]’ (FGD I 2012). 
This suggests that gangster’s quasi law enforcement is genuine and efficient. 
Enforcement services offered by street gangsters are important for private 
entrepreneurs, complementing the means of legal enforcement and protection.  
2.2. Case study two: the provision of hospital security by unlawful 
protectors 
Customers who buy or use extra-legal protection and quasi law enforcement services 
consist not only of private individuals, entrepreneurs, and local authorities who are 
unable to fight off ‘nail households’ through legal means, but also of state-sponsored 
institutions such as hospitals. China has experienced a growing number of medical 
disputes (Burkitt 2012; Liebman 2013). In recent years, the number of cases 
involving physical violence against doctors and nurses has risen. As the Economist 
magazine states: 
‘According to figures from the Ministry of Health, more than 17,000 “incidents” 
aimed at hospitals and their staff occurred in 2010, up from around 10,000 five 
years earlier.’(Economist 2012: online) 
The doctor-patient relationship is increasingly being eroded by tension and 
violence. A national survey financially supported by the Chinese Association of 
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Science and Technology of 3,665 medical professionals and 1,198 patients in 2008 
suggests that:  
‘80% of the surveyed medical professionals say the doctor–patient relationship 
is poor or very poor… In fact, 3.9% of the surveyed medical professionals report 
having been physically assaulted by patients or their relatives within 1 year, 
more than half say that they have been subject to verbal abuse, and nearly a 
third say that they have been threatened.’(Zhang and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2011: 
460) 
Meanwhile, the increasing erosion of the doctor-patient relationship is also closely 
associated with a new phenomenon: ‘Yi Nao’, which refers to medical or hospital 
disturbance created by patients or their family members or gangsters. The number 
of Yi Nao has increased dramatically over the past 10 years (Zheng et al. 2006). In 
order to meet the great demand from patients and their relatives who want to use Yi 
Nao to obtain compensation for perceived or actual medical malpractice, Yi Nao 
gangs consisting largely of unemployed people are frequently invited by patients or 
their family members to deal with medical disputes (Hesketh et al. 2012a). The 
involvement of Yi Nao gangs poses serious security problems for most local hospitals 
in China. As Hesketh et al. argue: 
‘Criminal gangs are prepared to go to extreme lengths to obtain compensation 
from hospitals on behalf of families in dispute with hospitals, in return for a 
substantial cut of the payment. Hospitals are usually forced to give in to their 
demands, but often not before serious damage has been done to staff and 
facilities. Of the 124 cases of violence reported on the website, 37 involved Yi 
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Nao, including many of the more serious attacks in the past five years.’ (2012a: 
1) 
The high frequency of verbal abuse and physical assault directed against medical 
professionals and the use of Yi Nao vigilante groups signal that China’s medical 
profession is in crisis. As a consequence, hospitals and local governments attempt to 
protect health-care workers by adopting various strategies such as increasing police 
patrols presence inside hospitals, improving communication between doctors and 
patients, increasing investment in health resources, and improving the effectiveness 
of medical malpractice litigation (Hesketh et al. 2012b; Hesketh et al. 2012a; Wang 
et al. 2012). Legal means of anti-violence in hospitals require not only a large amount 
of government investment but also long-term institution building. This means they 
cannot become effective in the near future. As a result, local hospitals have 
introduced a pragmatic solution: the purchase of protection services offered by 
‘informal security teams’.  
Informal security teams are unlawful enforcers who are invited to cope with the 
problem of hospital violence and to protect medical staff and hospital property. 
Compared with private security firms that can only supply services that have been 
authorised by the government, informal security organizations are able to offer 
extra-legal means of dispute resolution which Chinese law prohibits but hospitals 
actually need (FGD F 2012). The provision of hospital security by unlawful protectors 
is a widespread phenomenon in China, but it is relatively unknown in Western 
countries. Therefore, the following parts discuss three major aspects of these 
unlawful security groups that offer quasi law enforcement to many local hospitals: 
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group structure, illegal activities and methodology, and the mechanisms of 
emergence. 
2.2.1. Group structure 
In order to adapt to the changing institutional environment, ‘Chinese criminal forces 
have chosen a variety of organizational structures ranging from hierarchy to the 
market and the network’ (Xia 2008: 1). Xia’s interpretation provides insightful 
suggestions for this chapter to explain the organizational formation of informal 
security organizations. A traditional hierarchical structure that usually consists of a 
‘dragonhead’ on the top with varying levels of members beneath him is not an 
effective organizational form for these informal security organizations. This is 
because the demand for security services varies every day and one group of extra-
legal protectors may find it difficult to fulfil the needs in situations when street gangs 
are invited by patients and their relatives to take part in Yi Nao. Interview data 
suggests that many informal security organizations adopt the network form of 
organization that is thought flexible and effective (FGD F 2012). These groups usually 
operate independently, but will collaborate closely if necessary. In other words, 
other criminal groups will provide assistance if an informal security organization is 
unable to defeat Yi Nao gangs. 
Many informal security organizations have legitimate business fronts. For example, 
Southern Weekly, China’s most influential liberal newspaper, reported that over 100 
hospitals have outsourced medical dispute resolution to one company called 
‘Daocheng Hospital Management Company’ (Daocheng) because hospitals are less 
capable of dealing with Yi Nao (Cai 2012a). Although the involvement of Daocheng in 
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settling medical disputes has been supported not only by local hospitals but also 
local governments, services offered by Daocheng are prohibited by the rule of law.  
According to fieldwork data, the informal security organization in my research site 
recruits unemployed people consisting of laid-off workers, ex-prisoners and 
hooligans (FGD F 2012). Daocheng only recruits young men aged between 22 and 28 
over 180 cm tall. Sportsmen, retired soldiers and students from police colleges are 
preferred. One of the most important recruitment requirements is that the applicant 
should have an ‘ugly’ face (Cai 2012a).   
2.2.2. Illegal activities and methodologies 
Informal security organizations are invited to take charge of three major aspects: 
resolving medical disputes, protecting medical professionals and hospital property, 
and stopping disturbances created by patients and their relatives (Cai 2012a). In 
order to avoid prosecution, these informal security groups frequently adopt soft 
violence as a means of enforcement. Coercion, threat and fraud are common 
methods for settling medical disputes and suppressing Yi Nao. The trigger for use of 
violence by unlawful protectors is aggressive behaviour by patients or their family 
members (Lv 2007). 
Here is an example of how one unlawful security group expands its illegal protection 
business (FGD F 2012). One criminal group (the Tian’an group) reached an 
agreement with a local hospital to deal with medical disputes and Yi Nao in 2004. At 
the beginning, the hospital was routinely patrolled by eight informal security staff. 
The involvement of the Tian’an group brought a fundamental change to hospital 
security: the number of Yi Nao deceased dramatically. The positive feedback from 
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the hospital helped the Tian’an group build its reputation. As a result, other 
institutions (e.g. high schools) in need of extra-legal protection also purchased 
services from the Tian’an group. In order to meet the increasing demand, the leader 
of the group adopted two strategies to improve productivity and profitability: 1) 
recruiting new members, 2) adopting flexible working practices such as moving 
workers from location to location according to demand. If hospital professionals 
were not bothered by Yi Nao, the director of the hospital did not care about how 
many informal protectors worked every day. As a result, the Tian’an group made a 
large profit because the hospital hired and paid for eight guards, but only three 
routinely patrolled the hospital.  
Overstating the number of medical disputes, fabricating the details of hospital 
disturbances and even recreating Yi Nao if necessary; all these tactics are employed 
by these informal security groups to remind administrators that without their 
protection hospital violence will certainly occur (Cai 2012b). The unlawful strategies 
applied by informal protectors can generate a long-term demand for protection from 
local hospitals. Moreover, these unlawful protectors are frequently invited by 
patients and their relatives as Yi Nao gangs to settle medical disputes with other 
hospitals that are not under their protection (Cai 2012a). To sum up: coping with, 
and at the same time recreating, Yi Nao is a means by which the power of informal 
security companies can persist for a long time.  
2.2.3. The mechanism of emergence 
The purchase of extra-legal protection and unlawful enforcement is a pragmatic 
strategy that helps many local hospitals respond to the changing environment, 
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where legal channels of dispute resolution are unable to settle the increasing 
number of Yi Nao. It is therefore worth examining the reasons why patients and their 
relatives tend to regard Yi Nao as an important way of expressing their 
dissatisfaction with poor medical treatment and as a way of obtaining compensation 
for perceived or actual medical malpractice. Confronting medical disputes, patients 
and their family members can adopt three methods of resolution: administrative 
mediation by local health bureaus, medical malpractice litigation and third-party 
mediation (Liebman 2013; Wang 2005).  
The rise of violence and protests relating to medical disputes signals the failure of 
these legal channels of dispute resolution. Firstly, studies show the widespread 
distrust of administrative mediation offered by local health bureaus (Zhu 2010). The 
reason suggested by Hesketh et al. (2012a) is that legal channels for mediating 
medical disputes, which operate through local health bureaus, are inefficient and 
perceived to be heavily weighted in favour of the medical establishment.  
Secondly, pursuing doctors for compensation through the courts is perceived as 
unreliable and inefficient. In medical malpractice lawsuits, ‘the key step is for the 
claimant to prove that the physician failed to meet the required standard of care’ 
(Samanta et al. 2006: 321). According to the 2002 Regulations on Handling Medical 
Accidents (the ‘Regulations’) issued by the State Council, medical review boards are 
intended to evaluate whether or not a ‘medical error’ that caused personal injury to 
a patient ‘results from medical personnel negligently violating relevant laws, 
administrative regulations, rules, standards governing medical care, or ordinary 
practice’ (Liebman 2013: 12). In practice, the review board consists of local doctors 
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who are likely to protect hospitals and colleagues, so this mechanism finds it difficult 
to obtain trust from patients. 
Moreover, conflicts remain in the existing law and regulation governing medical 
disputes. Tort Liability Law of People’s Republic of China, effective as of 1 July 2010, 
is designed to improve the ability of the courts to settle medical negligence and 
medical malpractice. But the State Council has not amended the 2002 Regulation, 
which should be made consistent with the Tort Liability Law (Chang 2010). This 
brings great confusion to medical malpractice litigation.  
Finally, many local governments are attempting to create an alternative mechanism 
for medical disputes: the non-lawsuit model through third-party mediation (Zhao 
2011). The new channel of dispute resolution which has been led by governmental 
authorities, People’s Mediation Committees, professional organizations and 
insurance companies is an innovative solution designed to reduce tension between 
doctors and patients (Lan et al. 2009). However, the third-party mediation 
mechanism suffers from a series of problems, such as ‘the lack of a sustainable 
supporting mechanism, unclear legal status of the mediation institutions and 
mediation agreements’ (Zhao 2011: 401). Popularising this new method will not be 
an easy job in the near future.  
Administrative mediation, medical malpractice litigation and third-party mediation 
are important aspects in painting a picture of institutional failure. The fact is that the 
current system is designed to protect hospital interests results in the lack of public 
trust in formal institutions, encouraging patients and their families to resolve their 
claims through aggression and disruptive behaviour (Liebman 2013). Meanwhile, the 
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Yi Nao gang, a new type of organized crime group, have emerged out of the power 
vacuum created by the absence of state protection and enforcement. 
In order to deal with violence against medical professionals, many local hospitals 
form long-term cooperative relationships with local police departments (BBC 2010; 
Chi and Wang 2010; Hou 2010). However, this type of collaboration suffers from two 
problems. On the one hand, the involvement of police officers is not effective in 
practice, as police officers have to perform their duties in strict compliance with the 
law and choose to take action only if physical violence does happen. This means they 
usually do nothing if hospital violators disturb regular hospital orders without using 
physical violence. On the other hand, cooperation between hospitals and police 
departments is criticised by the public since police officers should focus on 
protecting lives and property of citizens rather than assisting hospitals in dealing 
with Yi Nao organized by patients who aim to protect their rights through informal 
means (Chi and Wang 2010; JCRB 2010). Consequently, unlawful protection supplied 
by laid-off workers, ex-prisoners and street gangsters who specialise in the use of 
soft violence has become the most effective strategy to settle the problems of Yi Nao. 
To sum up, a thorough analysis of two cases illustrates the relationship between the 
failure of state institutions and the rise of the illegal protection businesses. It 
demonstrates that quasi law enforcement or extra-legal protection is a booming and 
profitable industry attracting great interest from the so-called ‘urban underclass’—
poor people. The exploration of this new type of criminal group helps researchers to 
grasp the trends in Chinese organized crime. The rise of unlawful protectors in post-
Mao China encourages researchers to explore how private individuals and 
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entrepreneurs resolve disputes and protect rights by resorting to three types of 
protection and enforcement. It also poses theoretical challenges for the study of 
organized crime and the existing anti-organized crime strategy.  
3. The uses of red mafia protection, black mafia services, and law 
enforcement 
When three mechanisms (i.e. red mafia protection, black mafia services, and law 
enforcement) are available, the choice is determined by various factors. Chapter VI 
explains how private individuals and merchants employ guanxi networks to obtain 
private protection from government officials, and how officials distribute corrupt 
benefits through guanxi networks. The author’s fieldwork in Qufu provides an 
opportunity to verify the fourth hypothesis, which posits that the buying and selling 
of black mafia services is determined by trust and reputation within guanxi networks.  
Some interviewees are more likely to purchase services from unlawful protectors 
(e.g. street gangsters); while others do not think the purchase of extra-legal 
protection is a rational choice. It can be argued that the choice of the model of 
protection and enforcement depends on the resources businessmen possess. The 
prerequisite for the use of criminal protection is the creditworthiness of unlawful 
protectors that has been established by the level of trust and reputation in the 
guanxi network. In other words, the use of extra-legal protection has been greatly 
influenced by the guanxi resources (networks). The following examples are selected 
to explain how extra-legal protection (i.e. red mafia protection and black mafia 
services) and law enforcement are used to cope with government officials’ extortion, 
solve the problem of being stalked, and enforce loan repayment. 
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3.1. Coping with government officials’ extortion 
Although local governments attempt to promote the efficiency, accountability and 
transparency of public administration, extortion by public officials is still a problem 
for most private enterprises (Dunfee and Warren 2001). Many people interviewed by 
the author are angry over government officials’ illegal conduct, especially extortion 
by tax auditors. In China, there are no standard rules on how to prepare company 
accounts, especially for private companies, thus it is very easy for tax auditors to find 
faults with income tax if they wish (Chang 2011). Private companies with sound 
business performance are normally targeted.  
Two types of counter-measures are applied by most entrepreneurs to confront 
government officials’ extortion. The first strategy is the use of protection offered by 
street gangsters based on the guanxi network. Businessman AA tends to ask for help 
from his sworn brother (a reputable gang boss Z) to deal with the troubles brought 
by corrupt taxmen. A phone call from gang boss Z is enough to end the extortion 
activities. As businessman AA says: 
‘What they (tax auditors) want is money…if they find their activities will result in 
a terrible outcome like their families are threatened, all of them will stop their 
dirty businesses. Then they will turn their attention to any other companies. You 
see, earning extra money is so easy for them’ (FGD D 2012). 
The involvement of street gangs in fighting against extortion by the tax bureau is not 
unusual, where the political and legal system fails to clearly specify criteria which 
local governments must follow and to strictly enforce these criteria. The behaviours 
of these unlawful protectors include threatening phone calls, messages and 
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unwanted appearances at an official’s home. Creating fictive kinship (e.g. sworn 
brothers) is an efficient way to reduce the uncertainties and strengthen mutual trust. 
As Wang et al. (2014: online) argue that ‘being sworn brothers is a way to add 
sentimental components into guanxi and shorten the psychological distance 
between them’. The main cost of using a gangster’s protection, suggested by 
businessman AA, is ganqing touzi, which refers to the investment in personal 
relationships to build a close or good guanxi with criminal protectors. Ganqing is 
defined by Wang (2007: 82) as ‘refer[ing] to feelings and emotional attachment 
among members of networks, [which is] often an indicator of closeness of guanxi’. 
The second strategy is the use of guanxi networks to secure protection from 
government officials. Businessman BB, who is an influential entrepreneur, is more 
likely to use his personal guanxi network with government officials to resolve 
extortion by taxmen. The reason why businessman BB refuses to purchase 
protection from gangsters is that street gangs are untrustworthy and purchasing 
illegal services from them will diminish his reputation in the local community. When 
he was asked whether his company experienced extortion by corrupt tax auditors, 
his answer was yes, but he suggested a different type of coping strategy: 
‘Last time the tax auditor showed up in my company, he found faults in the 
company books. My company was required to pay tax shortages: 2,000 RMB, 
which they found after a whole day’s investigation. After payment, my 
subordinates and several auditors went to dinner together. I did not attend that 
reception. After expensive drinks and seafood, all the auditors said that despite 
finding a small problem in the company books, the accounting system of my 
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company was much better than that of other companies…sometimes I have to 
rely on personal relationships if drinks and food do not work. Last year, 
inspection by tax auditors was so frequent. They found new problems in my 
income tax every time. This meant what they wanted was more than drinks and 
small gifts… In order to stop their disturbances, I turned to my friend X who is 
the head of the local government. My friend X helped me organise a dinner with 
the head auditor. From then on, there were fewer troubles because they 
realised that I had a close guanxi network with the local government … 
Inspection by tax auditors is very disturbing…the tax burden for private 
companies is huge, but we have to pay extra money for their drinks’ 
(Businessman G 2012). 
The background of these two businessmen may be useful to interpret why two 
wholly different types of counter-measures are applied. Businessman AA operates a 
medium-size enterprise which is one of the fastest-growing companies in the local 
community, while a private company owned by businessman BB is a leading 
enterprise which was owned by the local government and privatised in 2001. 
Businessman BB is also a member of the local people’s congress. The social status of 
businessman BB has enabled him to establish social connections with local 
authorities; as a result, the guanxi network is regarded as the best strategy in 
preventing government officials’ extortion. By contrast, businessman AA, who lacks a 
close guanxi with government officials, is more likely to use extra-legal protection as 
a governance mechanism.  
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3.2. Solving the problem of being stalked 
Interview data further suggests that the possession of close guanxi with government 
agencies (red mafia protection) can be inadequate to meet the demand for 
protection. Resolving some kinds of disputes also requires those seeking help to 
employ guanxi networks with business friends and gang bosses. Here is an example 
of how a businessman solved the problem of being stalked.  
Businessman CC, a successful entrepreneur, operates a private company which has 
been ranked as one of the largest construction firms in the city. The secret of his 
success is nothing more than the creation of close guanxi relationships with the local 
government. In 2012, businessman CC was stalked by unknown persons and received 
a series of threatening calls and messages. Using mobile phone surveillance systems, 
police officer DD, a good friend of businessman CC, provided the details of the 
persons (gangsters E and F) who made threatening calls. The police officer suggested 
that a face-to-face meeting with gangsters E and F was not a safe choice for 
businessman CC. Then a reputable gang boss, G, introduced by one friend of 
businessman CC, was invited to have a talk with E and F in order to find the person 
(businessman KK) who was responsible. After obtaining the information, the 
problem of being stalked (which was caused by a commercial dispute) was finally 
resolved when a middleman, M, was involved in the talks between businessmen CC 
and KK (Business F 2012). This is a perfect example of a complex web of connections 




Defining stalking is not easy. The concept suggested by Westrup and Fremouw (1998: 
255) is: ‘stalking denotes the unwelcome, repetitive, and intrusive harassing and/or 
threatening behavior directed toward a specific individual’. Similarly, Robert and 
Dziegielewski (1997) argue that: 
‘In stalking, an individual repeatedly engages in harassing or threatening 
behaviors to another individual. These behaviors can and often do take the form 
of threatening phone calls, messages, vandalism, or unwanted appearances at a 
person's home or workplace.’ (p. 361) 
In China, legal sanctions and laws to protect the victims of stalking have been 
criticised as lacking. Stalking has not received a great deal of attention from the 
media and law enforcement agencies. Similarly, the fieldwork data suggests that 
police officers fail to protect citizens from the threat of stalking. Victims of stalking 
who seek public protection from the legal system are often informed by state 
authorities that a police officer’s duty to intervene does not arise until the 
perpetrator has harmed them physically (Bradfield 1998). This results in two 
unintended consequences. On the one hand, stalking becomes the most effective 
means of enforcement applied by criminal groups, especially unlawful enforcers. For 
example, most ‘nail households’—people who refuse to relocate—will agree to 
change their residences after the experience of being stalked. On the other hand, 
victims of stalking who lack public protection have to purchase black mafia services, 
facilitating the rise of the criminal protection industry.  
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3.3. Debt collection mechanisms: how do underground banks enforce 
loan repayment? 
The existing literature suggests that informal financial institutions can substitute for 
formal financial systems (Chen and Touve 2011; Tsai 2007). Informal lending 
institutions in China can be divided into two main types: 1) interpersonal lending 
(minjian jiedai) which is ‘largely legal and very commonly used by among 
entrepreneurs’ (Ayyagari et al. 2010: 3054); 2) informal lending by private money 
houses and underground banks that ‘charge very high interest rate above the state-
mandated interest rate ceilings and are thus banned by the People’s Bank of China’ 
(Ibid).  
Underground banks are illegal but active in China’s coastal provinces where private 
firms prosper (Tsai 2004). Their illegal status makes underground lending 
organizations reluctant to resort to state-sponsored monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms. Underground lending organizations, therefore, are more likely to ‘rely 
on trust, reputation or coercion and violence for payment of loans’ (Ayyagari et al. 
2010: 3055). Trust and reputation in the guanxi network are inadequate for 
underground lenders to recover all their loans. That is to say, underground loan 
sharks cannot prosper without the private protection and enforcement of criminal 
groups. The following paragraphs analyse how the debt collection mechanisms of 
underground banks work. 
Step one: urging the debtor to fulfil his debt through guanxi practice. It is impossible 
for strangers to get a loan from underground banks. Access to underground lenders 
is usually based on networking through common friends (Ayyagari et al. 2010; Yu 
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2010a). When the payment is overdue, the introducer becomes the first enforcer to 
persuade the debtor to fulfil his responsibility. In order to promote the effectiveness 
of enforcement, false rumours such as ‘XX is untrustworthy’ will be spread among 
the debtor’s friends and family members. In this case, failure to fulfil an obligation is 
closely associated with losing face (mianzi) (FGD D 2012; FGD E 2012). Mianzi, 
defined as ‘the recognition by others of an individual’s social standing and position’, 
is the core element of Chinese culture (Buckley et al. 2006: 276). In order to protect 
his mianzi or dignity, the debtor tends to make the loan payments.  
Step two: the involvement of debt collectors (street gangsters) in claiming loans from 
debtors. Underground banks usually hire debt collectors—most of whom are 
gangsters—to claim loans from debtors if guanxi practice does not work (Manager D 
2012). Stalking, coercion and violence are major means of enforcement employed by 
debt collectors. However, the involvement of unlawful enforcers may be not 
effective in some situations, such as when the debt collector is the mutual friend of 
both moneylender and debtor (FGD E 2012). The debt collector will lose his mianzi or 
prestige if he carries out enforcement duties regardless of the existing guanxi 
relationships. The failure of criminal enforcement compels moneylenders to resort 
to the courts. 
Step three: debt recovery through the courts. Although underground banks are not 
sanctioned by the government, the loan contract signed by both parties is sufficient 
for underground moneylenders to recover their debts. The information about high 
interest rates is not included in the contract, but the amount of money in the loan 
contract is a total of principal and interest (FGD C 2012). Even if the judges decide in 
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favour of the plaintiffs, but debt recovery is much slower than the use of debt 
collectors. For this reason, resorting to the courts is usually regarded as not the 
preferred choice. 
To sum up, the fieldwork data discusses how entrepreneurs in China obtain reliable 
extra-legal protection through guanxi practice, which presents a possible method for 
estimating the scale and seriousness of the criminal protection market. Illegal 
protection offered by the Red Mafia and quasi law enforcement supplied by the 
Black Mafia are widely used to prevent government officials’ extortion, defend 
themselves against stalking and improve the efficiency of debt collection. The data 
suggest that both the Red Mafia and the Black Mafia play a complementary role to 
the formal legal system by providing quasi-governmental services to those in need. 
Stalking, coercion and soft violence are means and resources employed by the Black 
Mafia in the provision of criminal protection (or extortion) when laws and legal 
sanctions fail to protect victims. Interview data also shows that the purchase of 
extra-legal protection by entrepreneurs is largely based on trust and reputation in 
the guanxi network.  
On one hand, guanxi practice facilitates entrepreneurs—especially illegal 
entrepreneurs—to purchase illegal services offered by criminal groups. On the other 
hand, the guanxi network sometimes makes mafia services ineffective, for example, 
criminal enforcers who are invited to enforce loan repayment belong to the same 
network as the debtors. Under such circumstances, illegal entrepreneurs have to 
resort to the legal system as the illegal enforcement actions may be strongly 
influenced by existing guanxi networks. In a departure from this part that aims to 
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provide the logic of using extra-legal protection businesses in China, the following 
section focuses on theoretical challenges posed by the study of extra-legal 
protection. These challenges urge criminologists to reconsider the definition of 
organized crime and to revise the widely-accepted interpretation of Chinese black 
societies. 
4. The rise of the Black Mafia: questioning existing stereotypes about 
organized crime   
4.1. Soft violence: a new defining characteristic for Chinese organized 
crime? 
Criminologists have selected a set of primary and secondary characteristics to define 
the concept of ‘organized crime’. Among them, the use of violence or threats of 
violence has been generally accepted as an important dimension of organized crime 
(Alach 2011; Finckenauer 2005; Hagan 2006; Schelling 1971; Varese 2010a; Von 
Lampe 2006). As Hagan (2006) argues:  
‘What is essential to the definition of organized crime is the ability to use, and 
the reputation for the use of violence or the threat of violence to facilitate 
criminal activities, and in certain instances to gain or maintain monopoly control 
of particular criminal markets.’(p. 134) 
Violence has also been identified by most Chinese criminologists and legal 
practitioners as one of the defining features of organized crime groups (He 2009b). 
However, the changing macro socio-economic environment encourages organized 
crime groups to adopt new strategies to facilitate criminal activities and achieve 
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criminal profits (Ayling 2011). Since the beginning of the 1980s, the dramatic rise in 
violent and other serious crime has seriously threatened China’s social stability (Xia 
2006). In order to restore public order in post-Mao China, the Chinese central 
government launched three rounds of Yanda—literally, ‘strike hard’—through anti-
crime campaigns in 1983, 1996 and 2001 (Broadhurst 2013; Trevaskes 2012). 
Moreover, local government authorities have organized a series of Dahei—literally, 
‘hit or strike black’—through anti-gang campaigns (Lam 2012; Wedeman 2012b). 
Both Yanda and Dahei target violent and other serious crime such as intentional 
injury, murder, robbery, and “quarrelling and fighting” (douou). 
The Chinese style of policing serious crime shows that the use of violence brings 
great risks to the survival of criminal groups. Where the expected costs of a violent 
action are high, criminals, including quasi law enforcers, tend to produce and sell 
their unlawful commodities and services without resorting to violence or aggressive 
behaviours (Liu 2010; Zhao 2012). Soft violence or coercion, therefore, is becoming 
the key feature of Chinese organized groups, especially these involved in the 
provision of unlawful protection (Li 2011a; Zhou and Zhao 2011). This argues against 
the existing understanding of organized crime, which regards the use of violence as 
one of the most important characteristics. 
Criminal groups who specialise in the use of soft violence enjoy comparative 
advantages over violence-based organized crime groups. In contrast with physical 
violence, soft violence is a type of psychological abuse that can influence or control 
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the inner choices of victims. 48 It can force them to make decisions unfavourable to 
themselves because the soft violence causes psychological trauma, including anxiety, 
chronic depression, dissociation and anger. By using soft violence, or organized 
coercion, criminals not only obtain substantial profits from their illegal activities but 
also significantly reduce the risk of being caught and punished by the law (Zhao 
2012). As a result, soft violence has become one of the most cost-effective means 
applied by many criminal groups in contemporary China.  
4.2. Corruption: a defining characteristic for the Black Mafia? 
Corruption of government officials, especially those from the criminal justice system, 
is a major characteristic of most organized criminal groups (Finckenauer 2005). The 
existing literature on Chinese organized crime emphasises the significance of the 
links between government officials and criminals in the resurgence of black societies 
in China (Broadhurst 2013; Chen 2005; Chin 2003; Chin and Godson 2006; Xia 2004). 
After the establishment of the ‘political-criminal nexus’ (the collusion between the 
criminal underworld and the political establishment), various kinds of criminal 
protection will be offered by corrupt officials (Antonopoulos 2013). As Wang (2013b: 
20) suggests: 
‘[Favours provided by the political establishment includes] protection against 
extortion conducted by public officials, protection of criminal businesses, 
                                                          
48
 Gang bosses who have established reputation in the criminal underworld are often invited by 
people of their guanxi networks to resolve disputes and enforce loan repayment. The use of soft 
violence does not mean criminal enforcers are less capable in using physical violence; rather, extra-




protection against police harassment, protection against criminal investigation 
and protection against legal punishment.’ 
In response to this dangerous collusion, China’s anti-crime campaigns have focused 
on two aspects: curtailing corruption (‘protective umbrella’) and reducing organized 
crime (He 2009b). However, the existing anti-crime and counter-corruption 
measures fail to identify and reduce the growing criminal protection industry, as the 
political-criminal nexus is not a key factor for the existence of extra-legal protection 
groups. Most illegal businesses, such as gambling and prostitution, need illegal 
protection from corrupt government officials because they face a high risk of 
imprisonment. Purchasing protection from police officers is an unnecessary 
investment for most extra-legal protection groups as they are able to stay safe even 
during crime crackdowns (Li 2011a). This encourages many illegal entrepreneurs to 
reallocate capital from traditional areas, such as gambling or prostitution, to a highly 
profitable and low risk business—the provision of private protection (Zhao 2012).  
By using soft violence, unlawful protectors provide governmental services for illegal 
entrepreneurs in the criminal underworld and offer quasi police emergency services 
for citizens, all of which seem beneficial to the societies. Hence, to date China does 
not have any clear laws or regulations dealing with the problem of soft violence (Liu 
2010). It thus creates the very conditions that are favourable for the formation of 
these unlawful groups. Even for these criminal groups that get their main source of 
income through the business of assisting local authorities in resolving stubborn ‘nail 
households’, the existing literature suggests that corruption of police officers is not 
necessary (Zhao 2012). The reason why local governments and real estate 
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developers purchase illegal services (quasi law enforcement) offered by unlawful 
protectors is their reputation for soft violence.  
Guanxi also plays a significant role in the buying and selling of private protection. 
Unlawful enforcers popularize their services by utilizing their guanxi networks with 
real estate developers and local authorities. This type of guanxi network is, however, 
different from corrupt guanxi networks created between traditional crime groups 
and police officers. The former, like business guanxi, is used to seize business 
opportunities, while the latter is built to obtain illegal protection from government 
officials. 
5. Conclusion 
In contemporary China, criminal protection organizations, using intimidation, 
harassment, stalking or organized coercion, and backed up with the threat of 
violence against property and persons, are thriving. The existence of underground 
police organizations and the provision of hospital security by unlawful protectors 
strongly challenge most criminologists’ perception of Chinese organized crime. Soft 
violence, organized coercion and stalking make the provision of extra-legal 
protection a profitable and relatively safe business. Both fieldwork data and the 
existing literature indicate three important trends in the evolution of criminal groups 
in contemporary China. First, the booming criminal protection market involves a 
large number of laid-off workers and peasant migrants, which means providing 
illegal protection or participating in unlawful enforcement has become an important 
way for marginalised people to survive. In a sense, it may be rational to describe this 
as a form of employment or labour. Second, more and more criminal groups have 
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shifted their illegal businesses from traditional areas such as prostitution and 
gambling to the provision of protection and enforcement in legitimate sectors of the 
marketplace in order to avoid being destroyed during China’s anti-crime campaigns. 
Third, criminal groups that have established their reputation in the criminal 
underworld are more likely to expand their businesses to new areas like producing, 
selling and distributing private protection. For example, street gangs are involved in 
the majority of demolition projects. Assisting local authorities in solving the problem 
of ‘nail households’ not only brings generous profits to street gangs, but also makes 
a great ‘contribution’ to China’s urbanisation. 
Protection supplied by criminal groups remains a social evil (Varese 2013b). Extra-
legal protection groups not only protect legitimate market participants but also sell 
protection and enforcement services to other criminal groups, thereby promoting 
criminal activities such as illegal gambling, theft, frauds, counterfeiting, robbery and 
extortion. Consistent with the third and the fourth hypotheses generated in chapter 
VI, this chapter shows that China’s weak legal system prompts private property 
owners to seek protection and enforcement sold by the Black Mafia, and the buying 
and selling of quasi law enforcement is based on trust and reputation in the guanxi 
network. In addition to buying unlawful services, the use of black mafia services 
requires purchasers to invest in ‘personal affection’ and ‘friendship’ in order to 
establish a high level of trust. Extra-legal protection or quasi law enforcement is 
therefore a luxury item because developing and/or maintaining guanxi with unlawful 
enforcers costs time, energy and money, all of which are limited resources.  
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A more intractable problem in quasi law enforcement is the potential for extortion. If 
unlawful enforcers develop expertise and ability in the use of soft violence or 
organized coercion, the incentive for extortion is great. This potential discourages 
people who do not have guanxi relationships with criminal enforcers to purchase 
extra-legal services. This is the reason why many entrepreneurs interviewed by the 
author indicated that they would abandon their claims if the executive branch failed 
to enforce court decisions rather than asking for help from street gangsters. 
However, in the absence of functional legal or law enforcement systems, people 
without connections with unlawful enforcers may start to develop guanxi 
relationships with these criminals and rely on the use of extra-legal protection to 
prevent government officials’ extortion, defend themselves against stalking (or 








In February 2012, southern China's Guangdong Province, under the leadership of its 
party chief Wang Yang, launched a high-profile campaign against organized crime 
and commercial bribery. This campaign was officially called ‘three strikes’ (sanda), 
which refers to a ‘war’ against three main types of criminal activities: the 
monopolization of markets through violence and fraud, counterfeiting, and 
commercial bribery (Xinhua 2012c). Guangdong’s ‘three strikes’ emphasizes the 
importance of fighting against ‘protective umbrellas’ (corrupt government officials) 
and corrupt guanxi networks that enabled locally-based criminal groups to flourish. 
The aim of this massive campaign, as the Guangdong government stated, was to 
achieve ‘two constructions’ (liangjian): building trust and establishing a more 
effective supervision of socialist market (Xu 2012). 
From the start of the ‘three strikes’ in February 2012 through to 8 June 2012, a total 
of 2,723 cases of commercial bribery were investigated. These cases involved 1,070 
party members and government officials, including 28 high-ranking and 123 mid-
level officials. On 15 August 2012, the Guangdong government revealed that a total 
of 1931 government officials, including 132 middle- and high-level officials, had been 
arrested for their involvement in the supply of extra-legal protection to locally-based 
crime groups and illegal entrepreneurs (Lan 2012).  
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The Guangdong ‘three strikes’ shows the increasing intertwinement of organized 
crime, guanxi and corruption, which even threatens the legitimacy of the Chinese 
Communist Party. Comparing the two most influential crime crackdown campaigns 
organized by local governments, it can be argued that Bo Xilai, who led the 
Chongqing crime crackdown, and Wang Yang, the man behind Guangdong’s ‘three 
strikes and two constructions’, adopted a similar strategy—a war against organized 
crime and corruption—to establish a nationwide reputation. They chose this path 
because anti-crime and anti-corruption campaigns are the most effective way to 
establish a party chief’s reputation, helping to earn seats on the Central Politburo 
Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China. Party chiefs who lack political 
ambitions or strong support from the central government, however, find it 
extremely difficult to achieve success in the campaign against organized crime and 
corruption because guanxi networks offer secrecy and safety to their ‘club members’ 
(e.g. government officials, illegal entrepreneurs and gang bosses) and putting an 
official behind bars requires a crackdown on one’s own guanxi networks.   
The recent crime crackdown campaigns offer valuable material for researchers 
wishing to examine corrupt networks within public sectors and the involvement of 
street gangsters as unlawful enforcers. The study of extra-legal protection (red mafia 
protection and black mafia enforcement), however, suffers from serious 
methodological limitations caused by politics, culture and language. On the one hand, 
scholars from overseas institutions find it extremely difficult to gain access to 
government records and interviewees in mainland China, because organized crime 
has been considered a politically sensitive issue that is closely associated with public 
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corruption. On the other hand, Chinese criminologists who can obtain police records 
and court files through the use of guanxi networks show less interest in getting 
published in English language journals. Furthermore, language barriers not only 
prevent western scholars from accessing Chinese language materials but also stop 
most Chinese criminologists disseminating their theories and findings to foreign 
countries. 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of Chinese organized crime and extra-
legal protection in three ways. First, it examines historical aspects of Chinese 
organized crime including a detailed description of brotherhoods and secret societies 
in the Qing Dynasty, the Chinese mafia in the period of the Republic of China, and 
the resurgence of Chinese organized crime in contemporary China (chapter II). Until 
recently, only a few publications looked into the history of secret societies and the 
resurgence of organized crime in the post-Mao era (also see: Chen 2005; Xia 2006). 
The in-depth historical analysis provided by this thesis is thus useful for researchers 
and legal practitioners wishing to obtain a thorough understanding of Chinese 
organized crime.  
Second, it offers the first theoretical and empirical research on China’s extra-legal 
protection, an important but hitherto-unexplored area of research. A critical review 
of existing literature suggests that organized crime groups earn illicit benefits by 
engaging mainly in ‘traditional’ businesses such as gambling, prostitution, loan 
sharking, illicit drug distribution, robbery and counterfeiting. The extant research, 
however, fails to present the whole picture of Chinese organized crime. Based on the 
mafia literature and fieldwork data collected from two Chinese cities, this thesis 
312 
 
complements the existing research by suggesting that the Black Mafia plays an 
important role in the supply of private protection for both legitimate and illicit 
markets (chapter VII). Moreover, in order to explore why and how the Black Mafia 
has emerged in contemporary China, this thesis incorporates guanxi theories in the 
discussions of state weakness and the rise of extra-legal protectors (chapters V and 
VI). It offers a deeper understanding of the coexistence of guanxi and the formal 
legal system and of the negative side effects of guanxi. 
Third, this thesis, in contrast with past research, demonstrates that the provision of 
criminal protection is no longer the exclusive domain of organized crime groups. 
Corrupt government officials, named the ‘Red Mafia’ in this thesis, have colonized 
this territory (chapter VI). High-ranking government officials distribute corrupt 
benefits though their guanxi networks; selling government appointments and 
involvement in rent-seeking activities are their major activities. Mid- and low-ranking 
government officials who want to obtain such benefits have to apply other methods. 
For example, law enforcement officers tend to make large amounts of money by 
associating with locally-based criminals and illegal entrepreneurs who are also eager 
to establish close guanxi networks with law enforcers. This thesis stresses the role of 
guanxi networks in facilitating corrupt transactions by linking the favour seeker and 
the favour giver and establishing a secret channel for public officials and organized 
crime groups. 
This thesis is fortunate to be able to count on Gambetta’s and Varese’s research, 
which has led to new insights and inspired a new theory. It is pertinent to discuss 
how this thesis benefits from Gambetta’s research into the Sicilian mafia and 
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Varese’s study of the Russian mafia, to compare the ways in which extra-legal 
protectors in China differ from other long-standing mafias, and to clarify to what 
extent the study of Chinese extra-legal protection contributes to the body of 
knowledge. The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first 
briefly reviews the Sicilian model of mafia emergence. In the second, the author 
examines the applicability of the Sicilian model when it is used to interpret the rise 
of Chinese-style criminal protection groups, and suggests a Chinese model of mafia 
emergence. The final section discusses directions and implications for research and 
policy. 
1. The Sicilian model of mafia emergence 
There is no doubt that The Sicilian Mafia (1993) has become the single most 
influential book in the field of the economic theory of organized crime. The 
theoretical framework suggested by Gambetta has been applied by several scholars 
to interpret the rise of the criminal protection organizations in very different parts of 
the world. As Gambetta (2011) himself argues: 
‘[T]he book has had some success at influencing several studies that have taken 
its approach further in a number of directions, both theoretical and empirical… 
for example, Yiu Kong Chu (2000) has worked on the Triads in Hong Kong; 
Federico Varese (2001) and Timothy Frye (2002) on the emerging Mafia in post-
Soviet Russia; Curtis Milhaupt and Mark West (2000a) and Peter Hill (2003) on 
the Yakuza in Japan; and Marina Tzvetkova (2008) on the Bulgarian emerging 
protection market’ (p. 6). 
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Moreover, Gambetta’s book contributes to the development of a number of other 
areas of research such as mafia transplantation (Varese 2006, 2011a), mafia 
diversification (Campana 2011a), prison gangs (Skarbek 2011), youth gangs (Sobel 
and Osoba 2010), and the study of extra-legal governance (Dixit 2003, 2004). 
Gambetta’s innovative research on the mafia in Sicily was published 20 years ago. It 
is now time to reconsider the importance of the Sicilian model of mafia emergence. 
One of Gambetta’s most insightful discoveries relates to the defining feature of the 
mafia: the commodity mafia groups provide is not violence, but protection 
(Gambetta 1993; Varese 2013b). According to Gambetta, the mafia is considered a 
special type of organized crime group that specialises in producing, selling and 
distributing private protection (Gambetta 1993). Drawing on the research into the 
Sicilian mafia, Varese defines the phenomenon of organized crime as one form of 
economic governance, ‘the set of rules and norms that regulate exchange’ (Varese 
2010a: 14). According to Varese (2010a), ‘an organized crime group attempts to 
regulate and control the production and distribution of a given commodity or service 
unlawfully’ (p. 14), while ‘a Mafia group is a type of organized crime group that 
attempts to control the supply of protection’ (p. 17). The difference between a mafia 
group and a drug syndicate is clear: the former attempts to control the supply of 
criminal protection and extra-legal enforcement rather than the drugs controlled by 
the latter (Gambetta 1993). The clear distinction between mafia and organized crime 
offers a solid theoretical foundation for further research. 
Another of Gambetta’s significant contributions is the discussion of the relationship 
between mafia emergence and distrust. The origin of the Sicilian mafia is explained 
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by Gambetta as a perverse response to the lack of trust in southern Italy in the early 
nineteenth century (Gambetta 2000a). Endemic distrust is identified as the key point 
to explain why the mafia emerged in southern Italy rather than elsewhere in the 
country (Gambetta 1993). Mafias are able to facilitate market exchanges among 
participants who distrust each other by enforcement of deals and promises 
(Gambetta 2000a; F. Varese 2006). Moreover,  the mafia has thrived for centuries by 
continuously injecting ‘distrust into the market to increase the demand for the 
product [it] sells—that is, protection’ (Gambetta 2000: 173).  
The third and the most significant contribution made by Gambetta is the 
establishment of the valuable theory named by Varese as the ‘property rights theory 
of mafia emergence’ (Varese 2011a). Two fundamental issues are identified when 
Gambetta interprets the origins of mafia: the demand for protection and the supply 
of the same. As Gambetta (1993) argues, all illegal business transactions need a 
certain type of protection and enforcement, otherwise exchanges will not occur. This 
implies that demand for extra-legal protection remains constant in illegal markets. 
Moreover, the failure of the state to provide sufficient and efficient protection to 
legitimate entrepreneurs and individuals results in the demand for mafia protection 
in legal markets (also see: Varese 2001). 
For example, the abolition of feudalism in 1806 in the continental South and in 1812 
in Sicily, and the widespread introduction of private property rights, resulted in a 
dramatic increase in demand for protection (Gambetta 1993). The presence of the 
state failed to protect newly-established private properties, forcing property-owners 
to seek alternative forms of protection. Gambetta (1993) emphasised that the mafia 
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is not the only solution because protection suppliers also include a paramilitary 
organization, a private security company and the elder of a tribe. But market 
participants normally choose the strongest supplier; this is not necessarily the 
cheapest, but one that offers ultimate guarantees in the area (also see: Nozick 1974).   
In areas like rural eastern Sicily, where traditional elites were present and united, 
these elites were able to meet the growing demand for protection. In western Sicily, 
however, a new industry consisting of people trained in violence and specialising in 
the supply of private protection began to emerge in the first half of the 19th century 
(Gambetta 1993). The ‘supply-demand’ model of mafia emergence has become a 
general theoretical framework for the examination of extra-legal protection groups 
in many transitional countries (Varese 2001). The mafia functions as a substitutive 
informal institution that achieves what formal institutions are designed, but fail, to 
achieve, for example, the private protection of private property rights and the 
facilitation of transactions.  
As mentioned above, Gambetta’s and Varese’s research on mafias establishes sound 
theoretical and empirical foundations for the economic theory of organized crime. 
The great success of the Sicilian model has stimulated researchers’ interest in 
exploring the question: can the Sicilian model of mafia emergence be applied to 
interpret the origin of the mafia phenomenon in post-Mao China? Gambetta himself 
argues that his theory might be useful to predict the rise of secret societies (e.g. the 
Shanghai Green Gang) before 1949, but it is not able to interpret the rise of extra-
legal protection in contemporary China.49 This is because the historical conditions 
                                                          
49
 Diego Gambetta, personal communication, e-mail message to author, 4 June 2013. 
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that gave rise to the growth of the Sicilian mafia do not apply to post-Mao China. The 
Sicilian mafia and the Russian mafia emerged when there was no strong government, 
while China is different: the party-state is very strong. In this case, Gambetta’s 
theory is neither right nor wrong when applied to China. This encouraged the author 
to establish a new theory taking into account China’s local conditions. 
Strong as it is, however, the Chinese state is not strong enough to curtail rampant 
corruption within the public sector. Moreover, it fails to protect government officials 
from the demands of guanxi networks. The exploration of guanxi and law in chapters 
V and VI offers a clear picture of extra-legal protection as it operates in 
contemporary China.  
2. The emergence of extra-legal protection with Chinese characteristics  
Drawing on published materials and fieldwork data, this thesis contributes to the 
existing literature by proposing the ‘socio-economic theory of mafia emergence’, 
which incorporates Granovetter’s argument on social embeddedness into 
Gambetta’s ‘property rights theory of mafia emergence’. To be specific, Gambetta’s 
theory demonstrates that individuals and merchants in both legal and illegal markets 
tend to choose the strongest supplier, contributing to the development of a certain 
type of protection (e.g. the mafia). This theory, however, does not explain why 
people, in environments characterized by the absence of trust, trust criminals. The 
theory of social embeddedness suggests that all economic behaviours (e.g. the 
purchase of illegal goods and services) are embedded in networks of continuing 
social relations. In the Chinese context, it is important to examine how social action 
is embedded in guanxi networks.  
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Drawing on the theory of embeddedness and the guanxi literature, this thesis 
explores the social embeddedness of two types of activities: judicial and police 
activities, and the choice of preferred model of protection. In China, the 
embeddedness of judicial and police activities in guanxi networks facilitates the 
emergence of collective corruption and the rise of state-illegal protectors, i.e. the 
Red Mafia. The growth of the Red Mafia is a key feature of state weakness. As this 
thesis argues, the Red Mafia is not the sole supplier in the extra-legal protection 
market, as people who are unable to obtain red mafia protection tend to purchase 
black mafia enforcement. Furthermore, the buying and selling of private protection 
is dictated by trust and reputation within guanxi networks. 
2.1. The role of guanxi in the emergence of the Black Mafia 
The existing research on mafia emergence has generally been limited to examining 
the substitutive relationship between the state and the mafia. This thesis, on the 
other hand, expands the research to incorporate the concept of guanxi—a Chinese 
variant of social capital—in the discussion of state weakness and the rise of private-
illegal enforcers (the Black Mafia). To be specific, it demonstrates the corruption-
facilitating roles of guanxi, i.e. how guanxi distorts China’s legal system by 
substantially decreasing both the effectiveness and efficiency of the enforcement of 
laws (see Chapter V and VI) and promoting the formation of corrupt guanxi networks 
between locally-based criminals and government officials (see Chapter VI). This 
thesis also shows the mafia-facilitating roles of guanxi (see Chapter VII); the clash 
between guanxi and the formal legal system makes law enforcement agencies 
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unable to provide sufficient and efficient protection for citizens, contributing to the 
rise of the Black Mafia (e.g. underground police organizations). 
The Sicilian model emphasises the relationship between state failure and mafia 
emergence. The case of China, however, illustrates the way in which this dominant 
theoretical framework oversimplifies the mechanism of mafia emergence. To be 
specific, the Sicilian model misses an important aspect of what makes potential 
customers believe mafia groups are willing to and have the ability to provide high 
quality, reliable and trustworthy services. Unlike normal market transactions, there 
are strong uncertainties about both the price of these illegal transactions and their 
results. That is to say, why do private property owners, in a post-Mao China 
characterised by the absence of trust, place their trust in criminal groups?  
The buying and selling of extra-legal protection or quasi law enforcement services 
indeed requires a mechanism to reduce illegal transaction costs, guarantee quality of 
services and punish violators. In contrast to past research on the mafia, which has 
typically ignored the role of social capital in reducing transaction costs associated 
with the extra-legal protection market, this thesis establishes that how guanxi 
networks facilitate trust and promote illegal commodity exchanges.  
Chapter VII demonstrates that guanxi and black mafia enforcement are frequently 
used by private individuals and entrepreneurs to prevent government officials’ 
extortion, defend against stalking and improve the efficiency of debt collection. It 
shows that the purchase of extra-legal protection by entrepreneurs is largely based 
on trust and reputation in the guanxi network. The use of extra-legal protection 
requires purchasers to invest in ‘personal affection’ and ‘friendship’ in order to 
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establish a high level of trust. Extra-legal protection or quasi law enforcement is 
therefore a luxury item because developing and/or maintaining guanxi with unlawful 
enforcers costs time, energy and money, all of which are limited resources. 
Moreover, chapter VII suggests that soft violence has become the main weapon used 
by private-illegal protectors. The use of soft violence enables these unlawful 
protectors to stay safe as the police choose not take action unless physical violence 
occurs. 
Using guanxi in the extra-legal protection market can be a double-edged sword: on 
the one hand, it guarantees the quality of mafia services, and thus induces 
individuals or entrepreneurs to purchase extra-legal protection. On the other hand, 
the guanxi network sometimes makes mafia services ineffective, for example when 
criminal enforcers who are invited to enforce loan repayment belong to the same 
network as the debtors, which would makes enforcement extremely difficult. 
This thesis recognizes the growth of private legal security companies, analyzed by 
Trevaskes (2007) and Zhong and Grabosky (2009). Private policing is a very strong 
competitor of the Black Mafia in China’s private protection market, but the rise of 
private legal security falls beyond the scope of this thesis. The role of private legal 
security and its nexus with extra-legal protectors deserve further research. 
2.2. The Red Mafia 
This thesis aims to examine a different enforcement system—the Red Mafia—which 
performs the same function as the Black Mafia but in a different way. As the existing 
mafia literature demonstrates, the mafia—the main player in the criminal protection 
market—attempts to control the supply of private protection. Empirical data from 
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China, however, suggests that organized crime groups are no longer key suppliers; 
instead, corrupt government officials, especially those from the criminal justice 
system, are invading and beginning to control this profitable business (chapter VI). 
The Red Mafia consists of a large number of corrupt government officials in 
mainland China who behave like mafiosi and regard the provision of criminal 
protection as their main source of income. As is well documented, corruption is a 
serious problem in China (Pei 2009; Steidlmeier 1999; Sun 2004). Most middle- and 
high-ranking government officials obtain corrupt benefits by engaging in buying and 
selling public appointments and affiliating with wealthy businessmen (Ngo 2008; Zhu 
2008). Law enforcement officers, especially mid- and low-level police officers, who 
want to achieve such benefits tend to associate with criminals.  
This thesis adopts a broad definition of ‘protection’. That is to say, protection offered 
by the Red Mafia refers to ‘corrupt benefits’ that are normally distributed through 
guanxi networks. The existing literature suggests that economic reforms result in a 
surge in corruption, the  form of which has shifted from plunder to transactive 
corruption wherein corrupt officials sell favours to private actors seeking profit-
making opportunities (Wedeman 2012a). Protection, in this thesis, is not limited to 
favours exchanged between government officials and private individuals but extends 
to ‘corrupt benefits’ distributed within public sectors.  
The analysis of the Chongqing crime crackdown confirms that government officials’ 
invasion of the criminal protection market leads to the expected outcome: locally-
based criminal syndicates who establish guanxi networks with police officers are not 
only able to monopolise the illegal markets but also able to remain safe even in 
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crime crackdown campaigns, while criminal groups who fail to obtain protection 
from government officers will either be expelled from the market or be destroyed by 
anti-crime actions. When a corrupt guanxi network is established, mid- and low-
ranking law enforcement officers make exchanges directly with locally-based 
criminals. In order to secure their positions, avoid punishment, or obtain promotions, 
lower-level officials tend to bribe higher-level officials in their guanxi networks with 
money and expensive gifts. In response, high-ranking officials have to return favours 
to their bribers, for example turning a blind eye to their subordinates’ protection 
business. When low-level officials lack the ability to shelter these criminals, higher-
ranking officials do it instead. This is because failure to follow the rules of reciprocity 
in a guanxi-based relationship will result in the loss of face and being viewed as 
untrustworthy.  
Unlike violence that has been considered by mafia groups as the most important 
resource in producing and selling private protection, the abuse of legal powers 
becomes the key resource for the Red Mafia. The abuse of public powers in China is 
caused by cultural and ideological factors including ‘the lack of an entrenched legal 
culture in the rule of law, the absence of an ingrained constitutional spirit in limited 
government and the emergence of pragmatism as a political ideology’ (Wong 1998: 
87). The Red Mafia manages to obtain wide-ranging illegal benefits by increasing the 
benefits of participation and raising the cost of refusing to participate. 
2.3. Guanxi practice as a social evil 
Guanxi, as most scholars argue, is a neutral word in Chinese. For example, Shang et 
al. (2012) argue that guanxi as a power source itself is neutral; it is thus not right for 
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scholars (for example: Chen and Chen 2012) to separate good guanxi from bad. 
Shang et al. (2012: 438) further explain that ‘it is what guanxi is used for and how it is 
used that leads to good and bad results’. Similarly, Chen and Chen (2004a: 312) point 
out that ‘the quality of guanxi is a neutral term describing the subjective judgment 
made by the guanxi parties regarding the current state of their guanxi’.  
Guanxi may be morally neutral, but ‘the consequences of guanxi [practice] can range 
from benign, neutral, to questionable and corruptive’ (Fan 2002b: 378). As Chen et al. 
(2004: 201) argue, ‘guanxi practices become problematic when favour exchanges 
involve the personal use of formal organizations’ collective resources’. The exchange 
of gifts, favours and banquets are normal ways of creating and maintaining guanxi 
networks in private domains of life (Yang 2002). However, in the absence of effective 
law regulating gift exchanges made by officials, the importance of mianzi (face) and 
renqing (affection) encourages or even forces government officials to use their 
positions to drain off public resources and sell them to those with whom they have 
close guanxi ties (Chen et al. 2004; Park and Luo 2001; Zhan 2012). This brings 
benefits to corrupt exchange participants at the expense of others, such as 
competitors or the general public (Fan 2002b). Under such circumstances, 
inappropriate practice of guanxi erodes the arm’s-length principle which states that 
personal relationships—such as friendship or kinship—should not play any role in 
the decision-making of government officials (Fan 2002b). Furthermore, guanxi 
practice/manipulation, as this thesis demonstrates, inevitably violates the rule of law 
when judicial decision-making is embedded in guanxi networks.  
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On the one hand, legitimate and illegal businesses that demand capital or protection 
always employ guanxi networks to obtain what they need from power holders. 
Corrupt officials, on the other hand, rely on guanxi ties—the safe and secret 
channel—to distribute benefits in order to earn under-the-table income. Transactive 
corruption proliferated as reform deepened (Wedeman 2012a), so the negative 
influence of guanxi practice on the formal legal system is growing. For example, 
scarce material resources are allocated through guanxi networks rather than 
according to government policy and regulation. Public appointments or promotion 
opportunities are distributed to members in corrupt officials’ networks rather than 
through fair competition (chapter VI). Unlawful protection is offered by corrupt 
police officers to gang bosses with whom they have close guanxi relationships, while 
other criminal or illicit entrepreneurs who do not possess guanxi resources suffer 
from greater risk of being destroyed by anti-crime campaigns (Wang 2013b).  
In most circumstances, the rules of guanxi, such as reciprocity and equality, urge 
private individuals and government officials to get things done regardless of the 
arm’s-length principle and the rule of law. A government official or a law enforcer 
embedded in social networks feels obliged to offer favours to the people in his 
network, and to distribute corrupt benefits to these who are closer to him (Zhan 
2012). Guanxi in contemporary China has gradually transformed from substitutive to 
complementary and finally to corrosive informal institution.   
To sum up, the study of extra-legal protection in China needs to take into account 
local conditions, e.g. the co-evolution of guanxi networks and the legal system. That 
means this thesis cannot simply apply Gambetta’s theoretical framework. The 
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examination of this dual order system provides a new insight into the understanding 
of state weakness and the rise of extra-legal protectors. Take the Chongqing case for 
example: guanxi has become a key strategy for both parties: locally-based criminal 
syndicates make use of guanxi to obtain protection from law enforcement agencies; 
government officials employ guanxi to engage in illegal activities, such as rent-
seeking and the buying and selling of offices, to achieve corrupt benefits. In addition, 
the buying and selling of mafia services (red mafia protection and black mafia 
enforcement) is largely based on trust and reputation within guanxi networks. 
3. Conclusion and recommendations 
The conclusion will touch upon three areas: the Chinese model of mafia emergence, 
recommendations for future research and policy recommendations. 
3.1. Chinese model of mafia emergence 
Gambetta’s theoretical framework succeeded in applying the law of supply and 
demand, one of the fundamental principles governing an economy, to explore the 
emergence mechanism of the Sicilian mafia. Based on extensive empirical research 
in post-Soviet Russia, Varese pioneered the development of Gambetta’s framework 
by applying the mafia theory across countries. The traditional model of mafia 
emergence, however, neglects the importance of social capital in the process of 
mafia emergence. This thesis develops a new theoretical framework by incorporating 
the concept of guanxi – the most important Chinese variant of social capital—into 
the discussion of state weakness and mafia emergence. It further establishes that 
the Red Mafia, consisting of corrupt government officials, has developed into the 
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most influential protection agency in China, which contradicts the traditional view 
that organized crime groups are the main suppliers in the criminal protection market. 
3.2. Recommendations for future research 
The further development of the new theoretical framework requires researchers to 
adopt a more clearly comparative approach. Gambetta’s theoretical framework has 
been used to interpret the mafia phenomenon in other countries (or areas) such as 
post-Soviet Russia, Japan, Hong Kong, and Bulgaria. It is worth examining how social 
capital in these countries (or areas) exerts influence on the rise of the mafia, and to 
compare the different roles social capital plays in its origins. If further research on 
the origins of well-established mafias in other countries arrives at a similar 
conclusion, that social capital appears to encourage corrupt behaviours and facilitate 
mafia emergence, the new framework will become a universally-accepted theory. If 
further research demonstrates social capital has less impact on the rise of mafias in 
other parts of world, it may suggest that the intertwinement between social capital 
(guanxi) and mafia emergence is a uniquely Chinese phenomenon. If further 
research suggests social capital plays divergent roles in state failure and the rise of 
mafias in different countries, this should be followed by a comprehensive 
examination of the underlying reasons for this.  
The incorporation of social capital in the discussion of the origins of mafias 
challenges the theoretical foundation of the economics of organized crime. The 
study of Chinese extra-legal protection described in this thesis suggests that the rise 
of certain types of organized crime groups is not only driven by the ‘invisible hand’ of 
the market but also by the ‘visible hand’ of social relations (also see: Kleemans 2012). 
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The economic and structural approaches are not sufficient to explain organized 
crime in China and beyond, which encourages criminologists to develop new way of 
understanding organized crime in the modern world. But how and to what extent a 
social capital approach fills the gap deserves further research.  
3.3. Implications for policy 
First, the emergence of extra-legal protection groups requires Chinese law-making 
institutions and law enforcement agencies to make a clear distinction between 
‘organized crime groups’ in general and a particular subcategory, ‘the Black Mafia’, 
which refers to a type of criminal group specialising in the provision of quasi law 
enforcement. The lack of a legal definition of this special type of criminal group 
creates favourable conditions for its development. Furthermore, the absence of a 
legal definition signals that both central and local governments do not recognise the 
growth of the extra-legal protection market as a serious social problem. As a result, 
crime crackdown campaigns organized by both central and local governments 
succeeded only against street crime and straight-forward violent crime, but they 
failed to control organized crime groups, especially the newly developed 
underground police organizations. 
Second, the use of soft violence by criminal groups as the main strategy of 
enforcement encourages the Chinese government to amend or update laws or enact 
new legislation governing this new means of committing crime and of escaping the 
clutches of the law. Soft violence is a type of psychological abuse, forcing victims to 
make decisions unfavourable to themselves. China still does not have any laws 
specifically to tackle soft violence such as harassment or intimidation. The existing 
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PRC law and legal system are therefore far from adequate in terms of protecting soft 
violence victims and bringing their perpetrators to justice.  
The absence of legislation dealing with the problem of soft violence not only makes 
it possible for criminal groups to survive crime crackdown campaigns but also 
encourages other locally-based crime groups to shift their businesses from gambling, 
prostitution and drug distribution to the business of private protection. In this case, 
it is essential to produce effective legislation to tackle underground police 
organizations and soft violence.  
Third, China must strengthen its institutional supervision and improve its legal 
control over the exercise of government power, especially police power, in order to 
prevent government officials from falling under the influence of guanxi networks. It 
is vital for the anti-corruption agency to make a distinction between positive guanxi 
practice and negative guanxi practice. Business-government guanxi, political-criminal 
guanxi and guanxi networks within state institutions are often viewed negatively. 
This is because ‘guanxi, by its very nature, discriminates against people outside the 
guanxi network’ (Chen and Chen 2012: 418).  
When the political and legal system fails to regulate the use of power by government 
officials, the guanxi network encourages public officials to engage in corrupt 
activities, such as rent-seeking, protection of locally-based criminal groups, and the 
buying and selling of offices, in order to obtain private benefits. Moreover, the 
guanxi network facilitates corrupt transactions by providing secret and secure 
channels for the holders and seekers of corrupt benefits to share information and 
make transactions. Guanxi, as a relational power in the Chinese context, has become 
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the best strategy to reduce transaction costs and lower the risks of being punished. 
In this case, reducing the negative impact of guanxi on China’s formal legal system 
should be considered a matter of urgency. 
Fourth, in order to reduce the great demand for extra-legal protection and quasi law 
enforcement, the Chinese government must adopt a combination of strategies: 
securing private property rights, improving the efficiency of law enforcement 
agencies and developing various types of dispute resolution mechanisms. Clearly 
defined and well enforced private property rights will reduce the demand for extra-
legal protection. The Chinese legal system, however, is unable to offer well-defined 
and secure private property rights, especially land property rights. The absence of 
clear and secure land-use rights leads to serious clashes between land users and 
local governments. Land users often resort to violence when their land is 
requisitioned by the local government or real estate developers. As a response, 
street gangs who specialise in the use of soft violence are frequently employed by 
local governments and real estate developers to tackle ‘nail householders’—land-
users who refuse to make way for construction projects. The involvement of street 
gangs in demolition projects leads to public distrust of local governments, giving rise 
to rampant protest against government land grabs. This requires the Chinese 
government to provide secured land rights for Chinese farmers. 
The Chinese government should make it a top priority to build judicial capacity and 
improve the efficiency of justice. China experiences widespread distrust in its legal 
system, especially the police. When China’s legal system improves its ability to 
protect property rights and settle disputes, citizens’ trust in the legal system will 
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gradually grow. As a result, there will be less demand for alternative sources of 
protection. Moreover, post-Mao China experiences booming illegal markets. The 
legal means of dispute resolution—litigation and arbitration—are not available to 
the criminal underworld, which contributes to the rise in demand for mafia services. 
As a result, a further piece of policy advice that emerges from this thesis would be 
legalising gambling and prostitution in mainland China, although this measure is 
controversial. When gambling and prostitution are regulated by legislation, it creates 
favourable conditions for legal businessmen to take over these businesses. That is to 
say, locally-based crime groups will lose their significance in these no-longer-illicit 
industries. Consequently, customers and suppliers of these commodities or services 
are able to resort to courts to safeguard their rights and resolve disputes, reducing 
the demand for extra-legal protection.  
It is imperative for the Chinese government to develop different mechanisms of 
private protection and dispute resolution. China has established various kinds of 
alternative disputes resolution (ADR) including administrative resolution, civil 
mediation, arbitration and negotiation. But the existing ADR system is still far from 
adequate in terms of protecting land-user rights and resolving environmental 
pollution. When there are no effective legal channels of dispute settlement, citizens 
tend to employ illegal means of protection. Moreover, both central and local 
governments should establish favourable policies for the newly-developed private 
security firms which can largely meet citizens’ demand for security. In addition, 
legalising investigation services is another important step for China to destroy 
underground investigation teams.  
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To sum up, this thesis offers a new theoretical framework for studying mafia 
emergence by exploring the role of guanxi—the Chinese variant of social capital—in 
state weakness and the rise of extra-legal protectors in contemporary China. It 
demonstrates that the negative impact on Chinese society of the booming extra-
legal protection market is far from negligible. Guanxi provides a secret channel for 
corrupt transactions, facilitating the rise of illegal job markets (the buying and selling 
of offices) and building the political-criminal nexus. The negative influence of guanxi 
on legal institutions leads to serious corruption in China, contributing to the rise of 
illegal organizations involved in supplying extra-legal protection and quasi law 
enforcement. In addition, it emphasises the importance of distinguishing criminal 
groups which specialise in supplying private protection from other criminal 
syndicates which obtain their main source of income from other illicit businesses.  
The study of extra-legal protection in contemporary China contributes not only to 
the understanding of trends in Chinese organized crime but also to exploring 
effective countermeasures to organized crime. The impact of guanxi networks on the 
rise of mafias is an important but previously unexplored area of study. It is thus 
important for law researchers and legal practitioners, especially those from mainland 
China, to turn special attention to this emerging phenomenon. The ultimate 
objectives for this study are to make recommendations that promote China’s legal 
reform and to develop the new model of mafia emergence into a universally-
accepted theoretical framework that can be applied to other transitional countries. 
To achieve these objectives, the new model of mafia emergence which integrates 
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